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Machine learning (ML) has come to be widely used in a broad array of settings, including
important security applications such as network intrusion, fraud, and malware detection, as
well as other high-stakes settings, such as autonomous driving. A general approach is to
extract a set of features, or numerical attributes, of entities in question, collect a training
data set of labeled examples (for example, indicating which instances are malicious and which
are benign), learn a model which labels previously unseen instances presented in terms of
their extracted features, and then investigate alerts raised by instances predicted as malicious.
Despite the striking success of ML in security applications, security issues emerge from the full
pipeline of ML-based detection systems. First, ML models are often susceptible to adversarial
examples, in which an adversary makes changes to the input (such as malware) to avoid being
detected. Second, using detection systems in practice is dealing with an overwhelming number
of alerts that are triggered by normal behavior (the so-called false positives), obscuring alerts
resulting from actual malicious activities. Third, adversaries can target a broad array of
ML-based detection systems to maximize impact, which is often ignored by individual ML
system designers.
In this thesis, I focus on studying the security problems of deploying robust machine learning
systems in adversarial settings. To conduct systematic research on this topic, my study
xxi

is based on four components. First, I study the problem of systematizing adversarial
evaluation. Concretely, I propose a fine-grained robustness evaluation framework for face
recognition systems. Second, I investigate robust machine learning against decision-time
attacks. Specifically, I propose a framework for validating models of ML evasion attacks,
and evaluate the eﬃcacy of conventional robust machine learning models against realizable
attacks in PDF malware detection. My work shows that the key to robustness is the
conserved features, and I propose a systematic algorithm to identify these. Additionally, I
study robustness against non-salient adversarial examples in image classification and propose
cognitive modeling of suspiciousness of adversarial examples. Third, I study the robust
alert prioritization problem—often a necessary step in the detection pipeline. I propose a
novel approach for computing a policy for prioritizing alerts using adversarial reinforcement
learning. Last, I investigate robust decentralized learning, and I develop a game-theoretic
model for robust linear regression involving multiple learners and a single adversary.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1

Motivation and Challenges

Machine learning (ML) has come to be widely used in a broad array of settings, including
important security applications such as network intrusion, fraud, and malware detection, as
well as other high-stakes settings, such as autonomous driving. A general approach is to
extract a set of features, or numerical attributes, of entities in question, collect a training
data set of labeled examples (for example, indicating which instances are malicious and which
are benign), learn a model which labels previously unseen instances presented in terms of
their extracted features, and then investigate alerts raised by instances predicted as malicious.
Success of ML is particularly striking: in malware detection, ML-based static detection of
malicious entities can achieve 99% accuracy [102, 103] while in traﬃc sign classification the
accuracy exceeds 91% [25].
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Nevertheless, the learning systems can potentially be subverted by adversarial manipulations,
which exposes applications that use machine learning techniques to a new class of vulnerabilities. This challenge, in turn, motivates our proposed research of designing robust machine
learning systems in practice. We elaborate on the challenging issues from the following three
aspects.
Vulnerability to Adversarial Examples. Recent research has shown that machine learning approaches, and especially classifier learning, are susceptible to adversarial examples.
That is, a classifier can be fooled by adding small perturbations to the original examples. A
fundamental reason for such vulnerabilities is that classification learning algorithms generally
assume that the distribution of training and test (or production) data is similar. This assumption is violated in security applications, where malicious entities correspond to attackers
who can, and do, take deliberate action to evade defensive measures. For example, in the case
of malware detection, an adversary can modify malware code so that the resulting malware
is categorized as benign by ML, but still successfully executes the malicious payload [103,
126]. An even a broader class of adversarial examples features attacks that manipulate an
object, such as a human face, so that face recognition pipeline misclassifies he/she as another
person [97].
Overwhelming Number of Alerts. One of the core problems in security is detection
of malicious behavior, with examples including detection of malicious software, emails,
websites, and network traﬃc. There is a vast literature on machine-learning based detection
approaches [11, 76, 101]. Despite best eﬀorts, however, false positives are inevitable. Moreover,
one cannot, in general, reduce the rate of false alarms without missing some real attacks as a
result. Under the pressure of practical considerations such as liability and accountability, these
systems are often configured to produce a large number of alerts in order to be suﬃciently
sensitive to capture most attacks. As a consequence, cybersecurity professionals are routinely
2

inundated with alerts and must sift through these overwhelmingly uninteresting logs to
identify alerts that should be prioritized for closer inspection.
A considerable literature has emerged attempting to reduce the number of false alerts without
significantly aﬀecting the ability to detect malicious behavior [42, 48, 93]. Most of these
attempt to add meta-reasoning on top of detection systems that capture broader system state,
combining related alerts, escalating priority based on correlated observations, or using alert
correlation to dismiss false alarms [114]. Nevertheless, despite significant advances, there are
typically still vastly more alerts than time to investigate them. With this state of aﬀairs, alert
prioritization approaches have emerged, but rely predominantly on predefined heuristics, such
as sorting alerts by suspiciousness score or by potential associated risk [2]. However, any policy
that deterministically orders alerts potentially opens the door for determined attackers who
can simply choose attacks that are rarely investigated, thereby evading detection. Therefore,
how to balance the fundamental trade-oﬀ between false alert and attack detection rate forms
another obstacle for robust machine learning systems deployed in practice.
Decentralization of ML Systems. Increasing use of machine learning in adversarial
settings has motivated a series of eﬀorts investigating the extent to which learning approaches
can be subverted by malicious parties. An important class of such attacks involves adversaries
changing their behaviors, or features of the environment, to eﬀect an incorrect prediction.
Most previous eﬀorts study this problem as an interaction between a single learner and a
single attacker [10, 20, 59, 132]. However, in reality attackers often target a broad array of
potential victim organizations. For example, they craft generic spam templates and generic
malware, and then disseminate these widely to maximize impact. The resulting ecology of
attack targets reflects not a single learner, but many such learners, all making autonomous
decisions about how to detect malicious content, although these decisions often rely on similar
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training datasets. However, such setting is typically ignored when ML systems are deployed,
which forms the third challenge towards robust machine learning system in practice.

1.2

Overview of The Thesis

In response to the challenges described above, I make several contributions to designing robust
machine learning systems under adversarial environments in this thesis. My contributions fall
into four directions: systematizing adversarial evaluation (Chapter 3), robust machine learning
against adversarial examples (Chapter 4, 5, and 6), robust alert prioritization (Chapter 7),
and robust decentralized learning (Chapter 8).
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I present the background
knowledge and related work of this thesis. Chapter 3 presents a framework for fine-grained
robustness evaluation of face recognition systems, which enables to assess diﬀerent levels of
robustness under various adversarial circumstances. Chapter 4, 5, and 6 focus on adversarial
defense against decision-time attacks. Specifically, I first present a general framework for
validating the eﬃcacy of conventional robust ML against real attacks in Chapter 4, and
show that robust ML systems can fail to defend against realizable attacks in the context
of PDF malware detection. In Chapter 5, I present a refinement of robust ML by utilizing
conserved features and show that augmenting robust ML with such features can significantly
improve performance. Afterward, I investigate robustness against non-salient adversarial
examples in image classification in Chapter 6, and propose a simple formalization of an
important aspect of what makes adversarial perturbations unsuspicious based on the notion
of cognitive salience. Chapter 7 focuses on deciding which of a large number of alerts to
choose for further investigation—often a necessary step in the detection pipeline. In this
chapter, I present a novel game-theoretic model and principled computational approach for
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robust alert prioritization. Chapter 8 investigates robust decentralized learning, in which I
present a game-theoretic approach for adversarial regression involving multiple learners and
a single attacker. Chapter 9 concludes and discusses potential future directions.

5

Chapter 2
Background and Related Work

2.1
2.1.1

Machine Learning in Security
Malware Detection

In the (supervised) machine learning literature, it is common to consider the problem
abstractly. We are given a training dataset D = {(xi , yi )}, where xi 2 X ✓ Rn are numeric
feature vectors in some feature space X and yi 2 L are labels in a label space L. Each
data point (or example) in D is assumed to be generated i.i.d. according to some unknown
distribution P. We are also given a hypothesis (model) space, H, and our goal is to identify
(learn) a good model h✓ 2 H parameterized by ✓ in the sense that it yields a small expected
error on new examples drawn from P. In practice, since P is unknown, one typically aims to
find h✓ 2 H which (approximately) minimizes empirical error on training data D.
In malware detection—as in others—one is not given numerical features; instead, we start
with a collection of entities, such as executables, along with associated labels (we assume
6
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Figure 2.1: Closed-set and open-set face recognition systems.
henceforth that these are available, as we focus here on supervised learning problems). We
must then design a collection of feature extractors, where each feature extractor computes a
numerical value of a corresponding feature from an input entity. For example, we extract a
“size” feature by computing the size of an executable. Applying feature extractors to each
entity in our dataset, and adding associated object labels, allow us to generate a dataset D
to fit the conventional ML framework.
Generally, the label space is binary: either a file is benign (which we can code as

1), or

malicious (which we can code as +1). In addition, several prior eﬀorts presented techniques
for defining feature extractors (commonly known simply as features) for PDF malware
detection [102, 103]. Applying such feature extractors to a PDF file dataset transforms this
dataset into one comprised of numerical feature vectors and associated binary labels. The
goal is to predict whether previously unseen PDFs (simulated by holding out a portion of our
dataset as test data) are correctly labeled as malicious or benign.
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2.1.2

Face Recognition

In computer vision tasks such as face recognition, the raw feature extractor can be a camera
that captures entities and translate these into images with pixels in the digital space. The
images are subsequently fed into deep convolutional neural networks (CNNs) to extract higher
level features such as shapes and edges. Generally, deep face recognition systems aim to solve
the following two tasks: 1) Face identification, which returns the predicted identity of a test
face image; 2) Face verification, which indicates whether a test face image (also called probe
face image) and the face image stored in the gallery belong to the same identity. Based on
whether all testing identities are predefined in the training set, face recognition systems can
be further categorized into closed-set systems and open-set systems [65], as illustrated in
Fig. 2.1.
In closed-set face recognition tasks, all the testing samples’ identities are enrolled in the
training set. Specifically, a face identification task is equivalent to a multi-class classification
problem by using the standard softmax loss function in the training phase [105, 106, 109].
And a face verification task is a natural extension of face identification by first performing the
classification twice (one for the test image and the other for the gallery) and then comparing
the predicted identities to see if they are identical.
In contrast, there are usually no overlaps between identities in the training and testing set
for open-set tasks. In this setting, a face verification task is essentially a metric learning
problem, which aims to maximize intra-class distance and minimize inter-class distance under
a chosen metric space by two steps [22, 65, 66, 88, 95, 120]. First, we train a feature extractor
that maps a face image into a discriminative feature space by using a carefully designed
loss function; Then, we measure the distance between feature vectors of the test and gallery
face images to see if it is above a verification threshold. As an extension of face verification,
8

the face identification task requires additional steps to compare the distances between the
feature vectors of the test image and each gallery image, and then choose the gallery’s identity
corresponding to the shortest distance.

2.2

Decision-Time Attacks on Machine Learning Systems

Recent studies have shown that ML-based techniques are often susceptible to adversarial
examples, in which an adversary makes changes to the input of a machine learning model in
order to cause an incorrect prediction at the decision time. Based on the space in which such
attacks are performed, decision-time attacks can be further categorized into realizable attacks
and feature-space attacks, as detailed below.

2.2.1

Realizable Attacks

Realizable attacks are attacks that entail modifying the actual object in order to fool a machine
learning model that subsequently takes its digital representation as input. An early realizable
attack on machine learning was devised by Fogla et al. [27, 28], who developed an attack on
anomaly-based intrusion detection systems. Šrndic and Laskov [103] present a case study of
an evasion attack on a state-of-the-art PDF malware classifier, PDFRate. Xu et al. [126]
propose EvadeML, a fully realizable attack on PDF malware classifiers which generates evasion
instances by using genetic programming to modify PDF source directly, using a sandbox
to ensure that malicious functionality is preserved. Grosse et al. [34] develop a method
for generating evasion attacks against a deep learning-based Android malware classifier,
using a gradient-based approach which is also a form of iterative improvement heuristics.
This particular attack can be viewed as realizable, even though it wasn’t implemented and
evaluated in actual malware, since the attack space is significantly restricted to only add
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features that do not interfere with others already present. Similarly, MalGAN, an evasion
attack based on generative adversarial networks developed by Hu and Tan [46], only adds
features from benign to malicious malware, and we treat it as a realizable attack (since it’s
not diﬃcult to implement). Additionally, several recent approaches attempt to generate
adversarial examples against computer vision systems in physical space, such as adding
stickers to a stop sign to cause misclassification [25], or wearing printed glass frames to fool
face recognition [97].
Next, we introduce realizable attacks on two representative domains, PDF malware detection
and face recognition, respectively.
Realizable Attacks on PDF Malware Detection. In PDF malware detection, abstractly,
one is given a learned model h✓ (x) (e.g., a SVM or neural network) which returns a label
y = h✓ (x) (e.g., malicious or benign) for an arbitrary feature vector x 2 X (e.g., extracted
from a PDF file). The attacker additionally starts with an entity e (such as a malicious
PDF file), from which we can extract a feature vector (e). The attacker then transforms e
into another entity, e0 , with an associated feature vector x0 = (e0 ) so as to accomplish two
goals: first, that h✓ (x0 ) returns an erroneous label (for example in PDF malware detection,
labels e0 as benign based on its extracted features (e0 )), and second, that e0 preserves the
functionality of the original entity e—which, in our example of PDF malware detection,
entails preserving malicious functionality of e. The realizable attack as just described is
presumed to transform the entity itself, such as the malicious PDF file, albeit accounting for
the eﬀect of such transformation on the extracted features x0 = (e0 ). The process by which
such realizable attacks can be successfully accomplished is quite non-trivial, and typically
warrants independent research contributions (e.g., [126]).
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Figure 2.2: EvadeML [126], a realizable attack on PDF Malware Classifiers.
Figure 2.2 illustrate EvadeML [126], a realizable attack on PDF malware detectors which
allows insertion, deletion, and swapping of objects, and is consequently a stronger attack than
most other realizable attacks in the literature, which typically only allow insertion to ensure
that malicious functionality is preserved. EvadeML assumes that the adversary has black-box
access to the classifier and can only get classification scores of PDF files, and was shown to
eﬀectively evade state-of-the-art PDF malware detectors. It employs genetic programming
(GP) to search the space of possible PDF instances to find ones that evade the classifier while
maintaining malicious features.
Realizable Attacks on Face Recognition. In the context of face recognition, of particular
interest are attacks in the physical world (henceforth, physical attacks). Generally, physical
attacks have three characteristics [122]. First, the attackers directly modify the actual entity
rather than digital features. Second, the attacks can mislead state-of-the-art face recognition
systems. Third, the attacks have low suspiciousness (i.e., by adding objects similar to common
“noise” on a small part of human faces). For example, an attacker can fool a face recognition
system by wearing an adversarial eyeglass frame [97], a standard face accessory in the real
world.
In this dissertation, we focus on the digital representation of physical attacks (henceforth,
physically realizable attacks). Specifically, physically realizable attacks are digital attacks
that can produce adversarial perturbations with low suspiciousness, and these perturbations
11

Figure 2.3: Sticker attack: an example of physically realizable attacks on face recognition
systems. Left: original input image. Middle: adversarial sticker on the face. Right: predicted
identity. In practice, the adversarial stickers can be printed and put on human faces.
can be realized in the physical world by using techniques such as 3-D printing (e.g., Fig. 2.3
illustrates one example of such attacks on face recognition systems). Compared to physical
attacks, physically realizable attacks can evaluate robustness of face recognition systems
more eﬃciently: on the one hand, realizable attacks allow us to iteratively modify digital
images directly so the evaluation can significantly speedup compared to modifying real-world
objects and then photographing them; on the other hand, robustness to physically realizable
attacks provides the lower bound of robustness to physical attacks, as the former has fewer
constraints and larger solution space.
Formally, physically realizable attacks on face recognition can be performed by solving the
following general form of an optimization problem (e.g., for closed-set identification task as
described above):
arg max `(h✓ (x + M ), y)

s.t.

2

,

(2.1)

where h is the target face recognition model parameterized by ✓, ` is the adversary’s utility
function (e.g., the loss function used to train h), x is the original input face image, y is
the associated identity,

is the adversarial perturbation, and

is the feasible space of the

perturbation. Here, M denotes the mask matrix that constrains the area of perturbation; it
has the same dimension as

and contains 1s where perturbation is allowed, and 0s where

there is no perturbation.
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2.2.2

Feature-Space Attack Models

As implementing realiazable attacks requires domain knowledge and considerable amount of
engineering work, it is natural to short-circuit the complexity involved, and work directly in
the feature space, as is conventional in the machine learning literature [4, 7, 13, 20, 33, 69,
130]. Moreover, a series of eﬀorts explore attacks in the context of image classification by
deep neural networks [13, 33, 82, 85, 108]. These approaches commonly generate adversarial
perturbations within a bounded `p norm so that the perturbations are imperceptible, although
Gilmer et al. [30] question the common threat models used in these works.
In this case, the attacker is modeled as starting with a malicious feature vector x (not the
malicious entity e), and directly modifying the features to produce another feature vector
x0 2 X, so as to yield erroneous predictions, i.e., y 0 = h✓ (x0 ) (for example, being mislabeled
as benign). Crucially, since we are no longer appealing to original entities, we must abstract
away the notion of preserving (malicious) functionality. This is done through the use of a
cost function, c(x, x0 ), whereby the attacker is penalized for greater modifications to the
given feature vector x, commonly measured using an `p norm diﬀerence between the original
malicious instance and the modified feature vector [7, 58]. We term these the feature-space
attack models.
The problem of identifying an adversarial example in feature space for x can be captured by
the following optimization problem (or its variants):
(2.2)

max L (h✓ (x + ), y)
2 (✏)

where L(·) is the loss function used to train the classifier h✓ and
perturbation space which is commonly represented as a `p ball:
13

(✏) is the feasible

(✏) = { : k kp  ✏}. A

number of approaches have been proposed to solve the optimization problem above. For
classifiers with real-valued features, we can use gradient based approaches [7, 71].

1

When the

features are binary, the optimization problem in Eq. (2.2) can be solved by using Corrdinate
Greedy (alternatively known as iterative improvement) [58] which optimizes one randomly
chosen coordinate of the feature vector at a time, until a local optimum is reached. To
improve the quality of the resulting solution (considering that L(·) is typically non-concave),
the above process can be repated from several random starting points [58, 71].

2.3

Robust Learning

A large number of approaches have been proposed for defending against adversarial examples (e.g., [7, 9, 10, 86, 87, 91, 115, 121, 124]). While many have been shown inadequate [4,
13], the four generally eﬀective approaches are: (a) game-theoretic reasoning, (b) robust
optimization (a special case of (a) where the game is zero-sum), (c) adversarial training (an
approach for obtaining approximate (a) or (b) solutions [58, 71, 115]), and (d) randomized
smoothing [16, 57]. Game-theoretic methods in general, and robust optimization in particular,
are not general-purpose, as solving these directly requires special structure, such as a continuous feature space and diﬀerentiability [7, 9, 10], and often additional structure of the learning
model, such as linearity [124] or neural network architecture and activation functions [91,
121]. Finally, to date all have used the mathematical feature-space attack model at their core.
Next, we describe two categorizations of defense that have proved both suﬃciently scalable and
eﬀective even against adaptive attacks: adversarial training [16, 33, 71, 108] and randomized
smoothing [16, 57].
1

Generally, images are preprocessed such that pixels are divided by 255 for computational convenience in
training and testing. Consequently, a feasible pixel value should lie in [0,1] and is treated as real-valued.
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2.3.1

Adversarial Training

The basic idea of adversarial training is to produce adversarial examples and incorporate
these into the training process. Formally, adversarial training aims to solve the following
robust learning problem:

min
✓

1 X
max L (h✓ (x + ), y)
|D| x,y2D k kp ✏

(2.3)

where D is the training dataset. In practice, this problem is commonly solved by iteratively
using the following two steps [71]: 1) use any attack to produce adversarial examples in feature
space of the training data; 2) use any optimizer to minimize the loss of those adversarial
examples. It has been shown that adversarial training can significantly boost the adversarial
robustness of a classifier against `p attacks, and it can be scaled to neural networks with
complex architectures. Note that adversarial training is a general approach that can be also
incorporated with realizable attacks. That is, we can first use realizable attacks to produce
adversarial entities, then translate these into feature space, add them to the training data,
and re-train the classifier.

2.3.2

Randomized Smoothing

The second class of methods for robust learning considers adding random perturbations
to inputs at both training and test time. The basic idea is to construct a new smoothed
classifier g✓ (·) from a base classifier h✓ (·) as follows: first, the base classifier h✓ (·) is trained
with Gaussian data augmentation with variance

2

; then, for any input x at test time, the

smoothed classifier g✓ (·) returns the class that has the highest probability measure for the
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base classifier h✓ (·) when inputs are perturbed with isotropic Gaussian noise:
g✓ (x) = arg max P (h✓ (x + ⌘) = c)
c

where ⌘ ⇠ N 0,

2

.

(2.4)

I

It has been shown that randomized smoothing can provide certified robustness to adversarial
perturbations for `2 -norm-bounded attacks [16, 57].

2.4
2.4.1

Reinforcement Learning
Deep Reinforcement Learning

Reinforcement learning has received significant attention in recent years, which is in large
part due to the emergence of deep reinforcement learning. Deep reinforcement learning
combines classic reinforcement learning approaches, such as Q-learning [119], with deep
neural networks. Classic Q-learning is a model-free reinforcement learning approach, which is
guaranteed to find an optimal policy for any finite Markov decision process [118]. However, to
do so, it needs to learn and store an exact representation of the action-value function, which is
infeasible for a problem with large action or state spaces. Notable early successes combining
reinforcement learning with neural networks include TD-Gammon, a backgammon program
that achieved a level of play that was comparable to top human players in 1992 [110]. More
recently, Mnih et al. introduced the model-free Deep Q-Learning algorithm (DQN), which
achieved human-level performance in playing a number of Atari video games, using purely
visual input from the games [78, 79]. However, the actions spaces in all of these games were
small and discrete. Lillicrap et al. adapted the idea of Deep Q-Learning to continuous action
spaces by introducing an algorithm, called Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient (DDPG) [61].
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DDPG is a model-free actor-critic algorithm, whose robustness is demonstrated on a variety
of continuous control tasks. [117], A3C [77], Distributional DQN [5], and Noisy DQN [29]),
which had been proposed by the deep reinforcement learning community since the publication
of DQN, across 57 Atari games [40]. Further, they integrated these improvements into a
single agent, called Rainbow, and demonstrated its state-of-the-art performance on common
benchmarks.

2.4.2

Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning

Single-agent reinforcement learning approaches can train only one agent at a time, which
means that in a multi-agent setting, they must treat other agents as part of the environment.
As a result, they often provide policies that are not robust—especially in a non-cooperative
setting such as ours—since they cannot consider the possibility that other agents respond
by learning and updating their own policies. Multi-agent reinforcement learning approaches
attempt to provide more robust policies by training multiple adaptive agents together.
Littman proposed a framework for multi-agent reinforcement learning that models the
competition between two agents as a zero-sum Markov game [64]. To solve this game, the
author introduced a Q-learning-like algorithm, called minimax-Q, which is guaranteed to
converge to optimal policies for both players. However, the minimax-Q algorithm assumes
that the game is zero-sum (i.e., the player’s rewards are exact opposites of each other) and
every step of the training involves exhaustive searches over the action spaces, which limits
the applicability of the algorithm. A number of follow up eﬀorts have proposed more general
solutions. For example, Hu and Wellman extended Littman’s framework to general-sum
stochastic games [44]. They propose an algorithm that is based on each agent learning
two action-value functions (one for itself and one for its opponent), which is guaranteed to
converge to a Nash equilibrium under certain conditions. To relax some of these conditions,
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Littman introduced Friend-or-Foe Q-learning, in which each agent is told to treat each other
agent either as a “friend” or as a “foe” [63]. Later, Hu and Wellman proposed the NashQ
algorithm, which generalizes single-agent Q-learning to stochastic games with many agents by
using an equilibrium operator instead of expected utility maximization [45].
While the above approaches have the advantage of providing certain convergence guarantees,
they assume that action-value functions are represented exactly, which is infeasible for
scenarios with large action or state spaces. Deep multi-agent reinforcement-learning provides
a more scalable approach by representing action-value functions using deep neural networks.
For example, Lowe et al. proposed an adaptation of actor-critic reinforcement-learning
methods to multi-agent settings [70]. In the proposed approach, each agent learns a collection
of diﬀerent sub-policies, and for each episode, each agent randomly selects sub-policy from
this collection. Lanctot et al. introduced an algorithm, called policy-space response oracles,
which maintains a set of policies for each agent, but it does not incorporate actor-critic
methods, and it was evaluated in settings with relatively small discrete action spaces.

2.5

Alert Management and Prioritization

A multitude of research eﬀorts have studied the problem of reducing the number of alerts
without significantly reducing the probability of attack detection [48]. One of the most
common approaches is alert correlation and clustering, which attempt to group related alerts
together, thereby reducing the set of messages that are presented [93]. In distributed systems,
collaborative intrusion detection systems may be deployed, which include several monitoring
components and correlate alerts among the monitors to create a holistic view [114]. Since the
number of alerts may be too high even after correlation, research eﬀorts have also investigated
the prioritization of alerts. For example, Alsubhi et al. introduced a fuzzy-logic based alert
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management system, called FuzMet, which uses several metrics and fuzzy logic to score and
prioritize alerts [2]. However, these approaches do not consider the possibility of an attacker
adapting to the prioritization.
Prior work has successfully applied game theory to a variety of security problems, ranging from
physical security [3] to network security and privacy [73]. Our proposed work is most closely
related to alert-prioritization games. Laszka et al. introduced GAIN, the first game-theoretic
model for alert prioritization, which they solved with the help of a greedy heuristic [56]. The
performance of this approach is limited by its restrictive assumptions about the defender’s
decision making. In particular, this approach assumes that the defender’s policy is a strict
prioritization that investigates all higher-priority alerts before investigating any lower-priority
ones, and the prioritization is chosen before observing the actual number of alerts. Moreover,
the model considers only a single time slot, which further limits its usefulness. Yan et al.
improved upon GAIN by allowing the defender to specify a maximum budget that may be
spent on each alert types, thereby relaxing the strict prioritization of GAIN [127]. However,
this improved approach, which we denoted RIO in our experiments, still assumes that the
prioritization is chosen before observing any alerts and considers only a single time slot.
Schlenker et al. introduced a similar model, called Cyber-alert Allocation Game, which further
simplifies the problem by assuming that the number of false alerts is fixed and known by
both parties in advance [94].
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Part I
Systematizing Adversarial Evaluation of
Machine Learning Systems
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Chapter 3
Fine-Grained Robustness Evaluation for
Face Recognition Systems
The previous chapter has shown that machine learning techniques are often susceptible
to adversarial examples in diﬀerent domains and settings. Therefore, there are pressing
needs for methods to systematically and comprehensively evaluate robustness of machine
learning systems in adversarial settings, which in turn provide insights for designing robust
machine learning models. In this chapter, we present FaceSec, a framework for fine-grained
robustness evaluation of face recognition systems. FaceSec evaluation is performed along
four dimensions of adversarial modeling: the nature of perturbation (e.g., pixel-level or face
accessories), the attacker’s system knowledge (about training data and learning architecture),
goals (dodging or impersonation), and capability (tailored to individual inputs or across
sets of these). We use FaceSec to study five face recognition systems in both closed-set
and open-set settings, and to evaluate the state-of-the-art approach for defending against
physically realizable attacks on these. We find that accurate knowledge of neural architecture
is significantly more important than knowledge of the training data in black-box attacks.
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Moreover, we observe that open-set face recognition systems are more vulnerable than closedset systems under diﬀerent types of attacks. The eﬃcacy of attacks for other threat model
variations, however, appears highly dependent on both the nature of perturbation and the
neural network architecture. For example, attacks that involve adversarial face masks are
usually more potent, even against adversarially trained models, and the ArcFace architecture
tends to be more robust than the others.

3.1

Overview

Face recognition has received much attention [50, 65, 88, 95, 116, 120] in recent years.
Empowered by deep convolutional neural networks (CNNs), it has become widely used
in various areas, including security-sensitive applications, such as airport check-in, online
financial transactions, and mobile device login.
Despite its widespread success in computer vision applications, recent studies have found that
deep face recognition models are vulnerable to adversarial examples in both digital space [24,
71, 128] and physical space [97]. The former directly modifies an input face image by adding
imperceptible perturbations to mislead face recognition (henceforth, digital attacks). The
latter is characterized by adding adversarial perturbations that can be realized on physical
objects (e.g., wearing an adversarial eyeglass frame [97]), which are subsequently captured by
a camera and then fed into a face recognition model to fool prediction (henceforth, physically
realizable attacks). As such, the aforementioned domains, especially critical domains such
as security or finance, are subjected to risks of opening the backdoor for the attackers. For
example, in face recognition supported financial/banking services, an illegal user may bypass
biometric verification and steal money from victims’ accounts. Therefore, there exists a vital
need for methods that can comprehensively and systematically evaluate the robustness of
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face recognition systems in adversarial settings, which in turn can shed light on the design of
robust models for downstream face recognition tasks.
The main challenges of comprehensive evaluation of the robustness of face recognition lie in
dealing with the diversity of face recognition systems and adversarial environments. First,
diﬀerent face recognition systems consist of various key components (e.g., training data and
neural architecture); such diversity results in diﬀerent performance and robustness. To enable
comprehensive and systematic evaluations, it is crucial to assess the robustness of every
individual or a combination of face recognition components in adversarial settings. Second,
adversarial example attacks can vary by the nature of perturbations (e.g., pixel-level or
physical space), an attacker’s goal, knowledge, and capability. For a given face recognition
system, its robustness against a specific type of attack may not generalize to other kinds [122].
In spite of recent advances in adversarial attacks [24, 97, 128] that demonstrate the vulnerability of face recognition systems, most existing methods fail to address the aforementioned
challenges due to the following reasons. First, current eﬀorts appeal to either white-box
attacks or black-box attacks to obtain a lower bound or upper bound of robustness. These
bounds indicate the vulnerability of face recognition systems in adversarial settings but lack
the understanding of how each component of face recognition contributes to such vulnerability.
Second, while most existing approaches focus on a specific type of attack (e.g., digital attacks
that incur imperceptible noise [24, 128]), they fail to explore the diﬀerent levels of robustness
in response to various attacks (e.g., physically realizable attacks).
To bridge this gap, we propose FaceSec, a fine-grained robustness evaluation framework for
face recognition systems. FaceSec incorporates four dimensions in evaluation: the nature of
adversarial perturbations (pixel-level or face accessories), the attacker’s accurate knowledge
about the target face recognition system (training data and neural architecture), goals
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(dodging or impersonation), and capability (individual or universal attacks). Specifically, we
implement both digital and physically realizable attacks in FaceSec. We leverage the PGD
attack [71], the state-of-the-art digital attack paradigm, and the eyeglass frame attack [97]
as the representative of physically realizable attacks. Additionally, we propose two novel
physically realizable attacks: one involves pixel-level adversarial stickers on human faces,
and the other adds color grids on face masks. Moreover, to facilitate universal attacks that
produce image-agnostic perturbations, we propose a systematic approach that works on top
of the attack paradigms described above. We perform a comprehensive evaluation on five
publicly available face recognition systems in various settings to demonstrate the eﬃcacy of
FaceSec.

3.2

Methodology

In this section, we introduce FaceSec for fine-grained robustness evaluation of face recognition
systems. Our goal is twofold: 1) identify vulnerability/robustness of each essential component
that comprises a face recognition system, and 2) assess robustness in a variety of adversarial
settings. Fig. 3.1 illustrates an overview of FaceSec. Let S = f (h; D) be a face recognition
system with a neural architecture h that is trained on a training set D by an algorithm f
(e.g., stochastic gradient descent), FaceSec evaluates the robustness of S via a quadruplet:

Robustness = Evaluate(S, < P , K , G, C >),

(3.1)

where < P, K, G, C > represents an attacker who tries to produce adversarial examples to
fool S. P is the perturbation type, such as perturbations produced by pixel-level digital
attacks and physically realizable attacks. K denotes the attacker’s knowledge on the target
system S, i.e., the information about which sub-components of S are leaked to the attacker.

24

G: attacker’s goal
§ Dodging
§ Impersonation

K: attacker’s knowledge about S
§ Zero knowledge
§ Training set
§ Neural architecture
§ Full knowledge

S: target system
to be evaluated

Robustness = Evaluate(S, <P, K, G, C>)
P: perturbation type
§ Digital
§ Pixel-level physically realizable
§ Grid-level physically realizable

C: attacker’s capability
§ Individual attack for each image
§ Batch-based universal attack

Figure 3.1: An overview of FaceSec.
G is the goal of the attacker, such as the circumvention of detection and the misrecognition
as a target identity. C represents the attacker’s capability. For example, an attacker can
either individually perturb each input face image, or produce universal perturbations for
images batch-wise. Next, we will describe each element of FaceSec in details.

3.2.1

Perturbation Type (P)

In FaceSec, we consider three categories of attacks with diﬀerent perturbation types: digital
attack, pixel-level physically realizable attack, and grid-level physically realizable attack, as
shown in Fig. 3.2.
Digital Attack. Digital attack produces small perturbations on the entire input face image.
We use the `1 -norm version of the PGD attack [71] as the representative of this category.
Pixel-level Physically Realizable Attack. This category of attack features pixel-level
perturbations that can be realized in the physical world (e.g., by printing them on glossy
photo papers). In this case, the attacker adds large pixel-level perturbations on a small area
25
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Figure 3.2: Perturbation types in FaceSec.
Table 3.1: Optimization formulations of grid-level face mask attacks.
Target System
Closed-set
Closed-set
Open-set
Open-set

Attacker’s Goal
Dodging
Impersonation
Dodging
Impersonation

Formulation
max `(S(x + M · T ( )), y)
min `(S(x + M · T ( )), yt )
max d(S(x + M · T ( )), S(x⇤ ))
min d(S(x + M · T ( )), S(x⇤t ))

of the input image (e.g., face accessories). In FaceSec, we use two attacks of this category:
eyeglass frame attack [97] and sticker attack. The former allows large perturbations within an
eyeglass frame, and it can successfully mislead VGG-based face recognition systems [88]. We
propose the latter to produce pixel-level perturbations that are added on less important face
areas than the eyeglass frame, i.e., the two cheeks and forehead of human faces, as illustrated
in Fig. 2.3 and 3.2. Typically, the stickers are rectangular occlusions, which cover a total of
about 20% area of an input face image.
Grid-level Physically Realizable Attack. In practice, pixel-level perturbations are not
printable on face accessories made of coarse materials, such as face masks using cloths and
non-woven fabrics. To address this issue, we propose the grid-level physically realizable face
mask attack, which adds a color grid on face masks, as shown in Fig. 3.2.
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Figure 3.3: Transformations for the grid-level face mask attack.
Formulation. The optimization formulations of the proposed grid-level face mask attacks
under diﬀerent settings are presented in Table 3.1. Here, S is the target face recognition
model, x is the original input face image, and

is the adversarial perturbation. M denotes

the mask matrix that constrains the area of perturbation; it has the same dimension as
and contains 1s where perturbation is allowed, and 0s where there is no perturbation. For
closed-set systems, ` denotes the softmax cross-entropy loss function, y is the identity of x,
and yt is the target identity for impersonation attacks. For open-set settings, d is the cosine
distance (using one to minus cosine similarity), x⇤ is the gallery image of x, and x⇤t is the
target gallery image for impersonation. T represents a set of transformations that convert
the color matrix

to a face mask with a color grid in digital space. Specifically, T contains

two transformations: interpolation transformation and perspective transformation, which are
detailed below.
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Interpolation Transformation. The interpolation transform starts from a a ⇥ b color matrix
and uses the following two steps to scale

into a face image, as illustrated in Fig 3.3: First,

it resizes the color matrix from a ⇥ b to a rectangle

0

with c ⇥ d pixels, so as to reflect the

size of a face mask in a face image in digital space while preserving the layout of the color
grids represented by . Specifically, in FaceSec, each input face image has 224 ⇥ 224 pixels.
Let (a, b) = (8, 16) and (c, d) = (80, 160). Then, we put the face mask

0

into a background

image, such that the pixels in the rectangular area have the same value with

0

, and those

outside the face mask area have values of 0s.
Perspective Transformation. Once the rectangle

0

is embedded into a background image,

we use a 2-D alignment that relies on the perspective transformation by the following steps.
First, we divide

0

into a left half part

0
L

and a right half part

0
R;

each is rectangular with

four corners. Then, we apply the perspective transformation to project each part to be with
aligned coordinates, such that the new coordinates align with the position when a face mask
is put on a human face, as shown in Fig 3.3. Let

00

L

and

00

R

be the left and right part of the

aligned face mask, the perspective transformation aims to find a 3 ⇥ 3 matrix Nk (k 2 {L, R})
for each part such that the coordinates satisfy
00

k (x, y)

=

0
k (u, v),

k 2 {L, R},

where
u=

Nk (1, 1)x + Nk (1, 2)y + Nk (1, 3)
,
Nk (3, 1)x + Nk (3, 2)y + Nk (3, 3)

v=

Nk (2, 1)x + Nk (2, 2)y + Nk (2, 3)
.
Nk (3, 1)x + Nk (3, 2)y + Nk (3, 3)

and

Finally, we merge

00

L

and

00

R

to obtain the aligned grid-level face mask.
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Algorithm 1 Computing adversarial face mask.
Input: Target system S;
Input face image x and its identity y;
The number of iterations T ;
Step size ↵;
Momentum parameter µ.
Output: The color grid matrix of adversarial face mask T .
1: Initialize the color grid 0 := 0, momentum g0 := 0;
2: Use interpolation and perspective transformations to convert
3: for each t 2 [0, T
1] do
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:

r `(S(x+M ·

00

0:

00

0

:= T ( 0 );

),y)

t
t
gt+1 := µ · gt + ||`(S(x+M
;
00
· t ),y)||1
t+1 := t + ↵ · sign(gt+1 );
00
t+1 := T ( t+1 );
00
Clip t+1 such that pixel values of x + M ·
end for
return T .

00

t+1

are in [0, 255/255];

Computing Adversarial Face Masks. The algorithm for computing the color grid for adversarial
face mask attack is outlined in Algorithm 1. Here, we use the dodging attack on closed-set
systems as an example. The algorithms for other settings are similar. Note that
resulting color grid, and the corresponding adversarial example is x + M · T (

3.2.2

T

is the

T ).

Attacker’s System Knowledge (K)

The key components of a face recognition system S are the training set D and neural architecture h. It is natural to ask how do these two components contribute to the robustness against
adversarial attacks. From the attackers’ perspective, we propose several evaluation scenarios
in FaceSec, which represent adversarial attacks performed under diﬀerent knowledge levels
on D and h.
Zero Knowledge. Both D and h are invisible to the attacker, i.e., K = ;. This is the
weakest adversarial setting, as no critical information of S is leaked. Thus, it provides an
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upper bound for robustness evaluation on S. In this scenario, the attacks are referred to as
black-box attacks, where the attacker needs no internal details of S to compromise it.
There are two general ways towards black-box attacks, query-based attack [14, 83] and transferbased attack [84]. We employ the latter because the former attack requires a large number of
online probes to repeatedly estimate the loss gradients of S on adversarial examples, which is
less practical than fully oﬄine attacks when access to prediction decisions is unavailable. The
latter method is built upon the transferability of adversarial examples [23, 84]. Specifically,
an attacker first collects a suﬃcient of training samples and builds a surrogate training set
D0 . Then, a surrogate system S 0 is constructed by training a surrogate neural architecture
h0 on D0 for the same task as S, i.e., S 0 = f (h0 ; D0 ). Afterward, the attacker obtains a set
of adversarial examples by performing white-box attacks on the surrogate system S 0 , which
constitutes the transferable adversarial examples for evaluating the robustness of S.
Training Set. This scenario enables the assessment of the robustness of the training set
of S in adversarial settings. Here, only the training set D is visible to the attacker, i.e.,
K = {D}. Without knowing h, an attacker constructs a surrogate system S 0 by training
a surrogate neural architecture h0 on D, i.e., S 0 = f (h0 ; D). Then, the attacker performs
the transfer-based attack aforementioned on S 0 and evaluates S by using the transferred
adversarial examples.
Neural Architecture. Similarly, the attacker may only know the neural architecture h of
S but has no access to the training set D, i.e., K = {h}. This enables us to evaluate the
robustness of the neural architecture h of S. Without knowing D, the attacker can build its
surrogate system S 0 = f (h; D0 ) and conduct the transfer-based attack to evaluate S.
Full Knowledge. In the worst case, the attacker can have an accurate knowledge of both
the training set D and neural architecture h (i.e., K = {D, h}). Thus, it provides a lower
30

bound for robustness evaluation on S. In this scenario, the attacker can fully reproduce S in
an oﬄine setting and then performs white-box attacks on S.
The evaluation method described above is based on the assumption that the adversarial
examples in response to a surrogate system S 0 can always mislead the target system S.
However, there is no theoretical guarantee, and recent studies show that some transferred
adversarial examples can only fool the target system S with a low success rate [67].
To boost the transferability of adversarial examples produced on the surrogate system, we
leverage two techniques: momentum-based attack [23] and ensemble-based attack [23, 67].
First, inspired by the momentum-based attack, we integrate the momentum term into the
iterative process of the white-box attacks on the surrogate system S 0 to stabilize the update
directions and avoid the local optima. Thus, the resulting adversarial examples are more
transferable. Second, when the neural architecture h of the target system S is unavailable,
we construct the surrogate system S 0 using an ensemble of models with diﬀerent neural
architectures rather than a single model, i.e., h0 = {h0i }ki=1 , where {h0i }ki=1 is an ensemble of k
models. Specifically, we aggregate the output logits of hi (i  k) in a similar way to [23]. The
rationale behind this is that if an adversarial example can fool multiple models, it is more
likely to mislead other models.

3.2.3

Attacker’s Goal (G)

In addition to the attacker’s system knowledge about S, adversarial attacks can diﬀer in
specific goals. In FaceSec, we are interested in the following two types of attacks with
diﬀerent goals:
Dodging/Non-targeted. In a dodging attack, an attacker aims to have his/her face
misidentified as another arbitrary face. e.g., the attacker can be a terrorist who wants to
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Table 3.2: Optimization formulations by the attacker’s goal.
Target System
Closed-set
Closed-set
Open-set
Open-set

Attacker’s Goal
Dodging
Impersonation
Dodging
Impersonation

Formulation
max `(S(x + M ), y), s.t. || ||p  ✏
min `(S(x + M ), yt ), s.t. || ||p  ✏
max d(S(x + M ), S(x⇤ )), s.t. || ||p  ✏
min d(S(x + M ), S(x⇤t )), s.t. || ||p  ✏

bypass a face recognition system for biometric security checking. As the dodging attack
has no specific identity as which it aims to predict an input face image, it is also called the
non-targeted attack.
Impersonation/Targeted. In an impersonation/targeted attack, an attacker seeks to
produce an adversarial example that is misrecognized as a target identity. For example, the
attacker may try to camouflage his/her face to be identified as an authorized user of a laptop,
which uses face recognition for authentication.
In FaceSec, we formulate the dodging attack and impersonation attack as constrained
optimization problems, corresponding to diﬀerent face recognition systems and the attacker’s
goals, as shown in Table 3.2. Here, ` denotes the softmax cross-entropy loss used in closedset systems, d represents the distance metric for open-set systems (e.g., the cosine distance
obtained using one to minus cosine similarity), (x, y) is the input face image and the associated
identity,

is the adversarial perturbation, S represents a face recognition system which is

built on either a single model or an ensemble of models with diﬀerent neural architectures,
M denotes the mask matrix that constrains the area of perturbation (similar to Eq. (2.2)), ✏
is the `p -norm bound of . For closed-set systems, we use yt to represent the target identity
of impersonation attacks. For open-set systems, we use x⇤ to denote the gallery face image
that belongs to the identity as x, and x⇤t as the gallery image for the target identity of
impersonation.
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Note that the formulations listed in Table 3.2 work for both digital attacks and physically
realizable attacks: For the former, we use a small value of ✏ and let M be an all-one matrix
to ensure imperceptible perturbations on the entire image. For the latter, we use a large ✏
and let M to constrain

3.2.4

in a small area of x.

Attacker’s Capability (C)

In practice, even when the attackers share the same system knowledge and goal, their
capabilities can still be diﬀerent due to the time and/or budget constraints, such as the
budget for printing adversarial eyeglass frames [97]. Thus, in FaceSec, we consider two types
of attacks corresponding to diﬀerent attacker’s capabilities: individual attack and universal
attack.
Individual Attack. The attacker has a strong capability with enough time and budget to
produce a specific perturbation for each input face image. In this case, the optimization
formulations are the same as those shown in Table 3.2.
Universal Attack. The attacker has a time/budget constraint such that he/she is only able
to generate a face-agnostic perturbation that fools a face recognition system on a batch of
face images instead of every input.
One common way to compute a universal perturbation is to sequentially find the minimum
perturbation of each data point in the batch and then aggregate these perturbations [81].
However, this method requires orders of magnitude running time: it processes only one image
at each iteration, so a large number of iterations are needed to obtain a satisfactory universal
perturbation. Moreover, it only focuses on digital attacks and cannot be generalized to
physically realizable attacks, which seek large perturbations in a restricted area rather than
the minimum perturbations.
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Algorithm 2 Finding universal perturbations.
Input: Target system S;
Input face image batch {xi , yi }N
i=1 ;
The number of iterations T ;
Step size ↵;
Momentum parameter µ.
Output: The universal perturbation T for {xi , yi }N
i=1 .
1: Initialize 0 := 0, g0 := 0;
2: for each t 2 [0, T
1] do
3:
for each i 2 [1, N ] do
4:
`i,t := `(S(xi + M · t ), yi );
5:
end for
6:
`t = min{`i,t }N
i=1 ;
r `
7:
gt+1 := µ · gt + ||`tt||1t ;
8:
t+1 := t + ↵ · sign(gt+1 );
9:
Clip t+1 such that pixel values of x + M · t+1 are in [0, 255/255];
10: end for
11: return T .
To address these issues, we formulate the universal attack as a maxmin optimization as
follows (using the dodging attack on closed-set systems as an example):
max min{`(S(xi + M ), yi )}N
i=1 , s.t. || ||p  ✏,

(3.2)

where {xi , yi }N
i=1 is a batch of input images that share the universal perturbation . Compared
to [81], our approach has several advantages: First, we can significantly improve the eﬃciency
by processing images batchwise. Second, our formulation can explicitly control the universality
of the perturbation by setting diﬀerent values of N . Third, our method can be generalized to
both digital attacks and physically realizable attacks. Details of our algorithm for solving
the optimization problem in Eq. (3.2) is presented in Algorithm 2. Here, we use the dodging
attack on closed-set systems as an example. The algorithms for other settings are similar.
Note that in practice, the pseudocode from Line 3 to Line 6 in Algorithm 2 can be executed
in a paralleled manner by using GPUs. Therefore, compared to traditional methods that
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Table 3.3: Optimization formulations of universal dodging attacks.
Target System
Closed-set
Closed-set
Open-set
Open-set

Perturbation Type
Pixel-level
Grid-level
Pixel-level
Grid-level

Formulation
max min{`(S(xi + M ), yi )}N
i=1 , s.t. || ||p  ✏
max min{`(S(xi + M · T ( )), yi )}N
i=1
max min{d(S(xi + M ), S(x⇤i ))}N
s.t. || ||p  ✏
i=1 ,
max min{d(S(xi + M · T ( )), S(x⇤i ))}N
i=1

iterate every data point to find a universal perturbation [81], our approach can achieve a
significant speedup.
The formulations of universal perturbations in diﬀerent settings are presented in Table 3.3. In
FaceSec, we mainly focus on universal dodging attacks. Eﬀective universal impersonation
attack is still an open problem, and we leave it for future work.

3.3

Experimental Results

In this section, we evaluate a variety of face recognition systems using FaceSec on both
closed-set and open-set tasks under diﬀerent adversarial settings.

3.3.1

Experimental Setup

Datasets. For closed-set systems, we use a subset of the VGGFace2 dataset [12]. Specifically,
we select 100 classes, each of which has 181 face images. For open-set systems, we employ the
VGGFace2, MS-Celeb-1M [36], CASIA-WebFace [129] datasets for training surrogate models,
and the LFW dataset [47] for testing.
Neural Architectures. The face recognition systems with five diﬀerent neural networks
are evaluated in our experiments: VGGFace [88], InceptionResNet [107], IResNet18 [60],
IResNet50 [60], and IResNet101 [60].
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Table 3.4: Open-set face recognition systems in our experiments.
Target Model
VGGFace [88]
FaceNet [26]
ArcFace18 [90]
ArcFace50 [90]
ArcFace101 [90]

Training Set
VGGFace [88]
CASIA-WebFace [129]
MS-Celeb-1M [36]
MS-Celeb-1M [36]
MS-Celeb-1M [36]

Neural Architecture
VGGFace [88]
InceptionResNet [107]
IResNet18 [60]
IResNet50 [60]
IResNet101 [60]

Loss
Triplet [88]
Triplet [95]
ArcFace [22]
ArcFace [22]
ArcFace [22]

Attack Models. We perform both digital attacks and physically realizable attacks in our
evaluation. For digital attacks, we choose the PGD attack [71] as the representative. For
physical realizable attacks, we use the three attacks introduced in Section 3.2: the eyeglass
frame attack, the sticker attacks, and the grid-level face mask attacks.
Defense Baselines. Two defense strategies are used in our experiments. (1) Rectangular
occlusion attacks (henceforth, DOA) [122]: the state-of-the-art adversarially robust training
scheme for face recognition; (2) Randomized Smoothing (henceforth, RS) [16]: the provably
robust classification against `2 attacks. The defense strategies are evaluated when each face
recognition system is trained on non-adversarial data.
Evaluation Metric. We use attack success rate = 1 - accuracy as the evaluation metric.
Specifically, a higher attack success rate indicates that a face recognition system is more
fragile in adversarial settings, while a lower rate shows higher robustness against adversarial
attacks.
Implementation. For open-set face recognition, we directly applied five publicly available
pre-trained face recognition models using diﬀerent datasets and neural architectures, as
summarized in Table 3.4. At prediction stage, we used 100 photos randomly selected from
frontal images in the LFW dataset [47], each of which is aligned by using MTCNN [131] and
corresponds to one identity. And we used another 100 photos of the same identities as the
test gallery. We computed the cosine similarity between the feature vectors of the test and
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Eyeglass Fr ame

Sticker

Face M ask

Figure 3.4: Mask matrices for physically realizable attacks in FaceSec.
gallery photos. If the score is above a threshold corresponding to a False Acceptance Rate of
0.001, then the test photo is predicted to have the same identity as the gallery photo.
For closed-set face recognition, we randomly split each class of the VGGFace2 subset into
three parts: 150 for training, 30 for validation, and 1 for testing. To train closed-set models,
we used standard transfer learning with the open-set models listed in Table 3.4. Specifically,
we initialized each closed-set model with the corresponding open-set model, and then added a
final fully connected layer, which contains 100 neurons. Unless otherwise specified, each model
was trained for 60 epochs with a training batch size of 64. We used the Adam optimizer [53]
with an initial learning rate of 0.0001, then dropped the learning rate by 0.1 at the 20th and
35th epochs.
For each physically realizable attack in FaceSec, we used 255/255 as the `1 norm bound
for perturbations allowed, and ran each attack for 200 iterations. For the PGD attack [71],
we used an `1 bound 8/255 and 40 iterations. The dimension of the color grid for face mask
attacks is set to 16 ⇥ 8. The mask matrices that constrain the areas of perturbations for
physically realizable attacks are visualized in Fig. 3.4.
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Table 3.5: Attack success rate of dodging attacks on closed-set face recognition systems by
the attacker’s system knowledge. Z represents zero knowledge, T is training set, A is neural
architecture, and F represents full knowledge.
Target System
VGGFace

FaceNet

ArcFace18

ArcFace50

ArcFace101

3.3.2

Attack Type
PGD
Eyeglass Frame
Sticker
Face Mask
PGD
Eyeglass Frame
Sticker
Face Mask
PGD
Eyeglass Frame
Sticker
Face Mask
PGD
Eyeglass Frame
Sticker
Face Mask
PGD
Eyeglass Frame
Sticker
Face Mask

Attacker’s
Z
T
0.40 0.51
0.23 0.28
0.05 0.06
0.26 0.32
0.83 0.83
0.13 0.16
0.01 0.01
0.30 0.42
0.87 0.92
0.06 0.06
0.01 0.01
0.27 0.33
0.87 0.90
0.09 0.12
0.00 0.01
0.29 0.36
0.81 0.78
0.03 0.03
0.04 0.04
0.26 0.36

System Knowledge
A
F
0.93
0.94
0.70
0.99
0.47
0.98
0.63
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.90
1.00
0.92
1.00
0.83
1.00
0.97
1.00
0.44
1.00
0.37
1.00
0.71
1.00
0.81
0.99
0.44
0.99
0.14
0.94
0.67
0.99
0.86
0.96
0.26
0.98
0.08
0.95
0.54
0.99

Robustness of Face Recognition Components

We begin by using FaceSec to assess the robustness of face recognition components in
various adversarial settings. For a given target face recognition system S and a perturbation
type P , we evaluate the training set D and neural architecture h of S with the four evaluation
scenarios presented in Section 3.2.2. Specifically, when h is invisible to the attacker, we
construct the surrogate system S 0 by ensembling the models built on the other four neural
architectures shown in Table 3.4. In the scenarios where the attacker has no access to D,
we build the surrogate training set D0 with another VGGFace2 subset that has the same
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Table 3.6: Attack success rate of dodging attacks on open-set face recognition systems with
zero knowledge.
Target Model
VGGFace
FaceNet

PGD
0.26
0.55

Sticker
0.56
0.13

Attack Type
Eyeglass Frame
0.79
0.54

Face Mask
0.67
0.62

classes as D in closed-set settings, and use the other four training sets listed in Table 3.4
for open-set tasks. We present the experimental results for dodging attacks on closed-set
face recognition systems in Table 3.5, and the results for zero-knowledge dodging attacks on
open-set VGGFace and FaceNet in Table 3.6. The other results can be found in Appendix
A.1. Additionally, we evaluate the eﬃcacy of using momentum and ensemble methods to
improve transferability of adversarial examples, which is detailed in Appendix A.2.
It can be seen from Table 3.5 that: the neural architecture is significantly more fragile than
the training set in most adversarial settings. For example, when only the neural architecture
is exposed to the attacker, the sticker attack has a high success rate of 0.92 on FaceNet. In
contrast, when the attacker only knows the training set, the attack success rate significantly
drops to 0.01. In addition, by comparing each row of Table 3.5 that corresponds to the
same target system, we observe that digital attacks (PGD) are considerably more potent than
their physically realizable counterparts on closed-set systems, while grid-level perturbations on
face masks are noticeably more eﬀective than pixel-level physically realizable perturbations
(i.e., the eyeglass frame attack and the sticker attack). Moreover, by comparing the zero
knowledge attacks in Table 3.5 and 3.6, we find that open-set face recognition systems are
more vulnerable than closed-set systems such that nearly all perturbation types of attacks
(even the black-box sticker attack that often fails in closed-set) tend to be more likely to
successfully transfer across diﬀerent open-set systems (i.e., these are more susceptible to
black-box attacks), which should raise more concerns about their security.
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Table 3.7: Attack success rate of dodging attacks on closed-set face recognition systems by
the universality of adversarial examples. Here, N represents the batch size of face images
that share a universal perturbation.
Target System
VGGFace

FaceNet

ArcFace18

ArcFace50

ArcFace101

3.3.3

Attack Type
PGD
Eyeglass Frame
Sticker
Face Mask
PGD
Eyeglass Frame
Sticker
Face Mask
PGD
Eyeglass Frame
Sticker
Face Mask
PGD
Eyeglass Frame
Sticker
Face Mask
PGD
Eyeglass Frame
Sticker
Face Mask

Attacker’s Capability
N=1 N=5 N=10 N=20
0.94
0.86
0.31
0.15
0.99
0.91
0.52
0.23
0.98
0.66
0.34
0.09
1.00
1.00
0.88
0.56
1.00
1.00
0.80
0.21
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.62
1.00
1.00
0.98
0.61
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.91
1.00
1.00
0.64
0.08
1.00
0.96
0.44
0.08
1.00
0.56
0.09
0.00
0.99
0.92
0.90
0.67
1.00
0.80
0.37
0.05
0.99
0.81
0.38
0.07
0.91
0.28
0.06
0.00
0.99
0.98
0.81
0.72
0.96
0.91
0.24
0.03
0.98
0.71
0.19
0.02
0.93
0.15
0.03
0.00
0.99
0.92
0.90
0.67

Robustness Under Universal Attacks

Next, we use FaceSec to evaluate the robustness of face recognition systems with various
extents of adversarial universality by setting the parameter N in Eq. (3.2) to diﬀerent values.
For a given N , we split the testing set into mini-batches of size N , and produce a specific
perturbation for each batch. Note that when N = 1, a universal attack is reduced to an
individual attack. Table 3.7 shows the experimental results for universal dodging attacks on
closed-set systems. The other results are presented in Appendix A.3.
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Figure 3.5: Attack success rate of dodging physically realizable attacks on closed-set systems
with DOA retraining.
Our first observation is that face recognition systems are significantly more vulnerable to the
universal face masks than other types of universal perturbations. Under a large extent of
universality (e.g., when N = 20), face mask attacks remain > 0.5 success rates. Particularly
noteworthy is the universal face mask attacks on FaceNet, which can achieve a rate as high
as 0.91. In contrast, other universal attacks can have relatively low success rates (e.g., 0.08
for eyeglass frame attack on ArcFace18). The second observation is that the robustness of a
face recognition system against diﬀerent types of universal perturbations is highly dependent
on its neural architecture. For example, the ArcFace101 architecture is more robust than the
others in most settings, while FaceNet tends to be the most fragile one.

3.3.4

Is “Robust” Face Recognition Really Robust?

While numerous approaches have been proposed for making deep neural networks more robust
to adversarial examples, only a few [122] focus on defending against physically realizable
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attacks on face recognition systems. These defense approaches have achieved good performance
for certain types of realizable attacks and neural architectures, but their eﬀectiveness for
other types of attacks and face recognition systems remains unknown. In this section, we
apply FaceSec to evaluate the state-of-the-art defense paradigms. Specifically, we first use
DOA [122], a method that defends closed-set VGGFace against eyeglass frame attacks [97]
to re-train each closed-set system. We then evaluate the refined systems using the three
physically realizable attacks included in FaceSec. Fig. 3.5 shows the experimental results
for dodging attacks.
Our first observation is that the state-of-the-art defense approach, DOA, fails to defend against
the grid-level perturbations on face masks for most neural architectures. Specifically, face mask
attacks can achieve > 0.7 success rates on four out of the five face recognition systems refined
by DOA. Moreover, we observe that adversarial robustness against one type of perturbation
can not be generalized to other types. For example, while VGGface-DOA exhibits a relatively
high level of robustness (more than a 70% accuracy) against pixel-level perturbations (i.e.,
stickers and eyeglass frames), it is very vulnerable to grid-level perturbations (i.e., face masks).
In contrast, using DOA on FaceNet can successfully defend face mask perturbations with the
attack success rate significantly dropping from 1.0 to 0.24, but it’s considerably less eﬀective
against eyeglass frames and stickers. In summary, these results show that the eﬀectiveness of
defense is highly dependent on the nature of perturbation and neural architectures, which in
turn, indicates that it is critical to consider diﬀerent types of attacks and neural architectures
when evaluating a defense method for face recognition systems.
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3.4

Conclusion

In this chapter, we present FaceSec, a fine-grained robustness evaluation framework for
face recognition systems. FaceSec incorporates four evaluation dimensions and can work
on both face identification and verification of open-set and closed-set systems. To our best
knowledge, FaceSec is the first-of-its-kind platform that supports evaluating the risks of
diﬀerent components of face recognition systems from multiple dimensions and under various
adversarial settings. The comprehensive and systematic evaluations on five state-of-theart face recognition systems demonstrate that FaceSec can greatly help understand the
robustness of the systems against both digital and physically realizable attacks. We envision
that FaceSec can serve as a useful framework to advance future research of adversarial
learning on face recognition.
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Part II
Robust Learning against Decision-Time
Attacks
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Chapter 4
How Robust Is Robust ML?
Previous chapters have shown that ML models are often susceptible to decision-time attacks 2 ,
in which an adversary makes changes to the input (such as malware) in order to avoid being
detected. A conventional approach to evaluate ML robustness to such attacks, as well as to
design robust ML, is by considering simplified feature-space models of attacks, where the
attacker changes ML features directly to eﬀect evasion, while minimizing or constraining the
magnitude of this change. In this chapter, We investigate the eﬀectiveness of this approach to
designing robust ML in the face of attacks that can be realized in actual malware (realizable
attacks). We first propose a general methodological framework for evaluating the validity of
mathematical models of ML evasion attacks. We then demonstrate that in the context of
structure-based PDF malware detection, such techniques appear to have limited eﬀectiveness,
but they are eﬀective with content-based detectors. In other words, the widely used feature
space attack models can be inadequate as a means for ML defense.
2

In binary classification, such attacks are also called evasion attacks. We make these two terms interchangeable in this chapter.
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4.1

Overview

As shown in previous studies, ML-based techniques are often susceptible to adversarial
examples, an important special case of which are decision-time attacks, or evasion attacks in
the case of binary classification. In a prototypical case of a decision-time attack, an adversary
modifies malware code so that the resulting malware is categorized as benign by ML, but still
successfully executes the malicious payload [28, 34, 72, 103, 126]. An even broader class of
adversarial examples features attacks that manipulate an object, such as a stop sign, so that
a computer vision pipeline misclassifies it as another object (such as a speed limit sign) [25,
33, 97].
In response, a host of methods emerged for making ML robust to adversarial examples, the
most potent of which are those based on game-theoretic approaches, robust optimization
(including certified robustness), and adversarial retraining [10, 33, 58, 71, 91, 121, 124, 132].
A fundamental ingredient in all of these are feature-space models of attacks. Specifically, the
attacker is assumed to directly modify values of features, with either a constraint or a penalty
on the aggregate feature change measured in terms of an lp norm.
Such feature-space models of attacks are clearly abstractions of reality. First, arbitrary
modifications of feature values may not be realizable. For example, adding a benign object to
a malicious PDF (with no other changes) necessarily increases its size, and so setting the
associated feature to 1 (from 0) and simultaneously reducing file size may not be practically
feasible. Second, the key goal for an adversary is to create a target malicious eﬀect, such
as to execute a malicious payload. Limiting feature modifications to be small in some lp
norm clearly need not capture this: one can insert many no-ops (resulting in a large change
according to an lp norm) with no impact on malicious functionality, and conversely, minimal
changes (such as removing a Javascript tag) may break malicious functionality. Nevertheless,
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an implicit assumption in robust ML approaches is that the feature-space models capture
reality suﬃciently to yield ML models that are robust even to realizable attacks. The goal of
our work in this chapter is to evaluate the validity of this implicit assumption in the context
of PDF malware detection.
Our first contribution is a general methodological framework for evaluating the validity of
mathematical models of ML evasion attacks. At the core of the framework is a conceptual
model of defense and attack based on a Stackelberg game [10], where we assume to have
an attack oracle that can be queried to obtain an attack for a given defense. The second
ingredient is iterative adversarial retraining that can make use of an arbitrary learning
algorithm and automated attack, enabling general applicability of the framework, and a fair
comparison in validation (since the defensive approach is the same whether the attack is
realizable or in feature space). The third feature of the framework is an evaluation measure
which quantifies ML robustness by pitting ML against a realizable attack, which must avoid
being detected and preserve malicious functionality as validated using a sandbox [19, 35].
Our second contribution is to evaluate feature-space evasion attack models in the context of
PDF malware detection, using EvadeML as a realizable attack [126]. Specifically, we consider
four ML-based approaches for PDF malware detection: two based on features that capture
PDF file structure (SL2013 [102] and Hidost [104]), and two based on PDF file content (two
Mimicus variants of PDFRate [100, 103]). In all cases, we show that successful defense
against a given realizable attack is feasible (by retraining with this attack). In the case of
structure-based detectors, we demonstrate that adversarial retraining in the feature space
does not lead to adequate robustness against realizable attacks. In contrast, adversarial
retraining in the feature space is eﬀective in the case of content-based detectors. In other
words, the nature of the feature space can matter a great deal.
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defense

attack

q

Find best defense q

Figure 4.1: A conceptual model of how an attack (either realizable or using a feature-space
model) can be used in improving ML security. Let defense be parameterized by ✓, and an
attack reacting to the particular defense ✓ (e.g., attacker evades the learned ML model h(x)).
We wish to choose the best defense ✓ against such a reactive attacker, as captured by our
attack model.

4.2

A Framework for Validating Models of ML Evasion
Attacks

Our main goal is to evaluate whether robust ML approaches that make use of feature-space
models of evasion attacks are, indeed, robust against real —realizable—attacks.
We start with a conceptual model of defense and attack illustrated in Figure 4.1. We can
view this conceptual model as a Stackelberg game between ML (“defender”), who first chooses
a defense ✓ (in our case, the learned model h(x)) and the attacker, who finds an optimal
attack that reacts to the particular defense ✓. An attack model captures how the attacker
changes behavior in response to the defense ✓. The defender’s goal is to choose the best
defense ✓ against such a reactive attacker, as captured by the attack model. Indeed, this
is a common way to model the adversarial evasion problem in prior literature [10, 59, 115].
This model has two useful features. First, the attack is treated as an oracle in the sense
that it returns an attack for an arbitrary defense ✓. This allows us, in principle, to design
a defense against an arbitrary evasion attack, making no distinction between feature-space
attack models and realizable attacks. Second, we can separately consider defense against a
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specific attack (for example, a feature-space attack), and evaluation, which can use another
attack (e.g., a realizable attack).
To be more precise, let O(h; D) be an arbitrary attack which returns evasions given a dataset
D and a classifier h, and let u(h; O(h; D)) be the measure that the defender wishes to optimize
(for example, accuracy on data after evasions). Then defense against the attack O(h; D)
amounts to solving the following optimization problem:

max u(h; O(h; D)).
h

(4.1)

In practice, we need a means for approximately solving the optimization problem in Eq. ((4.1))
for an arbitrary attack. To this end, we make use of iterative retraining, an approach previously
proposed for hardening classifiers against evasion attacks [51, 58]. In particular, we use a
variant of iterative retraining with provable guarantees [58], which is outlined as follows:

1. Start with the initial classifier.
2. Execute the evasion attack for each malicious instance in training data to generate a
new feature vector.
3. Add all new data points to training data (removing any duplicates), and retrain the
classifier.
4. Terminate after either a fixed number of iterations, or when no new evasions can be
added.

Now, we describe our approach to validation.
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Consider a model of an evasion attack, Õ(h; D) (e.g., a feature-space attack model), which is a
proxy for a “real” (realizable) attack, O(h; D); note that each attack evades a given ML model
h. We first find the defense against Õ using the retraining procedure above; let the resulting
robust classifier be h̃. Next, we evaluate h̃ by running the target realizable attack O(h̃; D).
Finally, we create a baseline h⇤ , which is a robust classifier against a target realizable attack
O. We then evaluate how well h̃ performs, compared to h⇤ , against the target attack. For
example, if we find that h̃ is ineﬀective against the target attack, we say that Õ is a poor
attack proxy, whereas if it remains robust, we view Õ as a good proxy for the target attack
O.
Putting everything together, we propose the following framework for validating the eﬀectiveness of ML evasion models. Choose the ML algorithm that we wish to make robust. Next,
consider a model of an evasion attack, Õ(h) (e.g., a feature-space attack model), which is a
proxy for a “real” (realizable) attack, O(h); note that each attack evades a given ML model h.
Let u(h; O) be a measure of robustness of an ML model h against the realizable attack. Now,

1. Perform iterative retraining, using the model, Õ(h); let h̃ be the resulting “hardened”
ML model;
2. Perform iterative retraining, using the realizable attack, O(h); let h⇤ be the ML model
hardened against this attack;
3. The eﬀectiveness of Õ(h) relative to O(h) (for which it is a proxy) is max{u(h⇤ ; O)
u(h̃; O), 0}.

Note that we generally expect that ML hardened using the realizable attack will be more
robust against this attack than ML hardened using some other proxy (e.g., feature-space)
attack. However, this is not always the case, and we do not require it; we simply use u(h⇤ ; O)
50

as a fair baseline, and claim the model to be eﬀective as long as it’s nearly as good as this
baseline, and certainly when it’s better.
In the sequel, we use our framework to evaluate robustness of conventional feature-space
approaches for hardening ML when they are confronted with a realizable attack.

4.3

Experimental Methodology

We use malicious PDF detection as a case study to investigate robustness of ML hardened
using feature-space models of evasion attacks. We now describe our experimental methodology.
We start with some background on PDF structure, and proceed to describe the specific MLbased detectors, evasion attacks (both realizable, and feature-space), datasets, and evaluation
metrics used in our experiments.

4.3.1

PDF Document Structure

The Portable Document Format (PDF) is an open standard format used to present content
and layout on diﬀerent platforms. A PDF file structure consists of four parts: header, body,
cross-reference table (CRT), and trailer. The header contains information such as the magic
number and format version. The body is the most important element of a PDF file, which
comprises multiple PDF objects that constitute the content of the file. These objects can be
one of the eight basic types: Boolean, Numeric, String, Null, Name, Array, Dictionary, and
Stream. They can be referenced from other objects via indirect references. There are other
types of objects, such as JavaScript which contains executable JavaScript code. The CRT
indexes objects in the body, while the trailer points to the CRT.
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Table 4.1: Target classifiers.
Classifier
SL2013
Hidost
PDFRate-R
PDFRate-B

Feature type
Binary
Binary
Real-valued
Binary

Number of features
6,087
961
135
135

The relations between objects with cross-references can be described as a directed graph
that presents their logical structure by using edges representing reference relations and nodes
representing diﬀerent objects. As an object can be referred to by its child node, the resulting
logical structure is a directed cyclic graph. To eliminate the redundant references, the logical
structure can be reduced to a structural tree with the breadth-first search procedure.

4.3.2

Target Classifiers

Several PDF malware classifiers have been proposed [19, 100, 102, 104]. For our study, we
selected SL2013 [102], Hidost [104] and two variants of PDFRate [100] (termed PDFRate-R
and PDFRate-B respectively), displayed in Table 4.1. SL2013 and its revised version, Hidost,
are structure-based PDF classifiers, which use the logical structure of a PDF document to
construct and extract features used in detecting malicious PDFs. PDFRate, on the other
hand, is a content-based classifier, which constructs features based on metadata and content
information in the PDF file to distinguish benign and malicious instances. Evasion attacks on
both SL2013 and PDFRate classifiers, particularly of the realizable kind, have been developed
in recent literature [102, 103, 104, 126], providing a natural evaluation framework for our
purposes.
Structure-Based Classifiers. In this chapter, we use SL2013 and Hidost as the representatives of structure-based classifiers.
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SL2013: SL2013 is a well-documented and open-source machine learning system using
Support Vector Machines (SVM) with a radial basis function (RBF) kernel, and was shown
to have state-of-the-art performance [102]. It employs structural properties of PDF files to
discriminate between malicious and benign PDFs. Specifically, SL2013 uses the presence
of particular structural paths as binary features to present PDF files in feature space. A
structural path of an object is a sequence of edges in the reduced (tree) logical structure,
starting from the catalog dictionary and ending at this object. Therefore, the structural path
reveals the shortest reference path to an object. SL2013 uses 6,087 most common structural
paths among 658,763 PDF files as a uniform set for classification.
Hidost: Hidost is an updated version of SL2013. It inherits all the characteristics of SL2013
and employs structural path consolidation (SPC), a technique to consolidate features which
have the same or similar semantic meaning in a PDF. As the semantically equivalent structural
paths are merged, Hidost reduces polymorphic paths and still preserves the semantics of
logical structure, so as to improve evasion-robustness of SL2013 [104].
In our work, we employ the 961 features identified in the latest version of Hidost.
PDFRate: A Content-Based Classifier. The original PDFRate classifier uses a random
forest algorithm, and employs PDF metadata and content features. The metadata features
include the size of a file, author name, and creation date, while content-based features include
position and counts of specific keywords. All features were manually defined by Smutz and
Stavrou [100].
PDFRate uses a total of 202 features, but only 135 of these are publicly documented [99].
Consequently, in our work we employ the Mimicus implementation of PDFRate which was
shown to be a close approximation [103]. Mimicus trained a surrogate SVM classifier with
the documented 135 features and the same dataset as PDFRate, using both the SVM and
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random forest classifiers, both performing comparably. We use the SVM implementation
in our experiments to enable more direct comparisons with the structure-based classifiers
that also use SVM. An important aspect of Mimicus is feature standardization on extracted
data points performed by subtracting the mean of the feature value and dividing by standard
deviation, transforming all features to be real-valued and zero-mean (henceforth, PDFRate-R).
This surrogate was shown to have ⇠ 99% accuracy on the test data [100]. In addition, we
construct a binarized variant of PDFRate (henceforth, PDFRate-B), where each feature is
transformed into a binary feature by assigning 0 whenever the feature value is 0, and assigning
1 whenever the feature value is non-zero.

4.3.3

Realizable Evasion Attacks

The primary realizable attack in our study is EvadeML [126], which allows insertion, deletion,
and swapping of objects, and is consequently a stronger attack than most other realizable
attacks in the literature, which typically only allow insertion to ensure that malicious
functionality is preserved. EvadeML assumes that the adversary has black-box access to the
classifier and can only get classification scores of PDF files, and was shown to eﬀectively evade
both SL2013 and PDFRate [126]. It employs genetic programming (GP) to search the space
of possible PDF instances to find ones that evade the classifier while maintaining malicious
features. First, an initial population is produced by randomly manipulating a malicious PDF
repeatedly. The manipulation is either a deletion, an insertion, or a swap operation on PDF
objects. A deletion operation deletes a target object from the seed malicious PDF file. An
insertion operation inserts an object from external benign PDF files (provided exogenously)
after the target object. A swap operation replaces the entry of the target object with that
of another object in the external benign PDFs. After the population is initialized, each
variant is assessed by the Cuckoo sandbox [35] and the target classifier to evaluate its fitness.
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The sandbox is used to determine if a variant preserves malicious behavior, such as API or
network anomalies. The target classifier provides a classification score for each variant. If
the score is above a threshold, then the variant is classified as malicious. Otherwise, it is
classified as benign. If a variant is classified as benign but displays malicious behavior, or
if GP reaches the maximum number of generations, then GP terminates with the variant
achieving the best fitness score and the corresponding mutation trace is stored in a pool for
future population initialization. Otherwise, a subset of the population is selected for the next
generation based on their fitness evaluation. Afterward, the variants selected are randomly
manipulated to generate the next generation of the population. EvadeML was used to evade
SL2013 in [126]. The reported results show that it can automatically find evasive variants for
all 500 selected malicious test seeds.
In this chapter, we set the GP parameters in EvadeML as the same as in the experiments
by Xu et al. [126]. The population size in each generation is 48. The maximum number of
generations is 20. The mutation rate for each PDF object is 0.1. The mutation traces that
lead to successful evasion and promising variants are stored and applied in our experiments.
The fitness threshold of a classifier is 0. We use the same external benign PDF files as Xu et
al. [126] to provide ingredients for insertion and swap operations.

4.3.4

Feature-Space Evasion Model

In typical realizable attacks, including EvadeML, a consideration is not merely to move to
the benign side of the classifier decision boundary, but to appear as benign as possible. This
naturally translates into the following multi-objective optimization in feature space:
minimize Q(x) = f (x) + c(xM , x),
x
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(4.2)

where f (x) is the score of a feature vector x, with the actual classifier (such as SVM) g(x) =
sgn(f (x)), xM the malicious seed, x an evasion instance, c(xM , x) the cost of transforming
xM into x, and

a parameter which determines the feature transformation cost. We use l2
P
norm distance between xM and x as the cost function: c(xM , x) = i |xi xM,i |2 . Since in
most of our experiments features are binary, the choice of l2 norm (as opposed to another lp
norm) is not critical.
As the optimization problem in Eq. (4.2) is non-convex and variables are binary in three of
the four cases we consider, we use a stochastic local search method designed for combinatorial
search domains, Coordinate Greedy (alternatively known as iterative improvement), to
compute a local optimum (the binary nature of the features is why we eschew gradientbased approaches) [43, 58]. In this method, we optimize one randomly chosen coordinate
of the feature vector at a time, until a local optimum is reached. To improve the quality
of the resulting solution, we repeat this process from several random starting points. This
approach has been shown to be extremely eﬀective for computing evasion instances in binary
domains [58].

4.3.5

Datasets

The dataset we use is from the Contagio Archive.3 We use 5,586 malicious and 4,476
benign PDF files for training, and another 5,276 malicious and 4,459 benign files as the
non-adversarial test dataset. The training and test datasets also contain 500 seeds selected
by Xu et al. [126], with 400 in the training data and 100 in the test dataset. These seeds
are filtered from 10,980 PDF malware samples and are suitable for evaluation since they are
detected with reliable malware signatures by the Cuckoo sandbox [35]. We randomly select
3

Available
at
the
following
URL:
16800-clean-and-11960-malicious-files.html.
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http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2013/03/

40 seeds from the training data as the retraining seeds and use the 100 seeds in the test data
as the test seeds.

4.3.6

Implementation of Iterative Adversarial Retraining

We made a small modification to the general iterative retraining approach described in
Section 4.2 when it uses EvadeML as the realizable attack O(h; D). Specifically, we used only
40 malicious seeds to EvadeML to generate evasions, to reduce running time and make the
experiment more consistent with realistic settings where a large proportion of malicious data
is not adapting to the classifier. As shown below, this set of 40 instances was suﬃcient to
generate a model robust to evasions from held out 100 malicious seed PDFs.
We distribute both retraining and adversarial test tasks on two servers (Intel(R) Xeon(R)
CPU E5-2695 v4 @ 2.10GHz, 18 cores and 64 GB memory, running Ubuntu 16.04). For
retraining using EvadeML as the attack, we assign each server 20 seeds; each seed is processed
by EvadeML to produce the adversarial evasion instances. We then add the 40 examples
obtained to the training data, retrain the classifier, and then split the seeds between the two
servers in the next iteration. In the evaluation phase, we assign each server 50 seeds from the
100 test instances, and each seed is further used to evade the classifier by using EvadeML.

4.3.7

Evaluation Metrics

We evaluate performance in two ways: 1) evaluation of evasion robustness (which is central
to our specific inquiry), and 2) traditional evaluation. To evaluate robustness, we compute
the proportion of 100 malicious test seed PDFs for which EvadeML successfully evades the
classifier; this is our metric of evasion robustness, evaluated with respect to EvadeML. Thus,
evasion robustness of 0% means that the classifier is successfully evaded in every instance, while
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evasion robustness of 100% means that evasion fails every time. Our traditional evaluation
metric uses test data of malicious and benign PDFs, where no evasions are attempted. On this
data, we compute the ROC (receiver operating characteristic) curve and the corresponding
AUC (area under the curve).

4.4

Eﬃcacy of Feature-Space Attack Models

We now undertake our first task: evaluation of the eﬀectiveness of robust ML obtained by
using the abstract feature-space models of attack. We compare to a baseline classifier obtained
by retraining with the most potent attack on our menu, EvadeML (which, in addition to
inserting content, as done by other attacks [46, 72, 103], also allows the attacker to delete
and swap PDF objects). We can think of our baseline as assuming that the defender knows
that EvadeML is employed by the attacker, along with its hyperparameters. Throughout this
and next section, we also use EvadeML to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of classifiers hardened
using a feature-space model, in comparison with the above baseline.

4.4.1

Structure-Based PDF Malware Classification

Our first case study uses a state-of-the-art PDF malware classifier which engineers features
based on PDF structure. Indeed, we evaluate two versions of this classifier: an earlier version,
which we call SL2013, and a more recent version, which we call Hidost. The experiments by
Xu et al. [126] demonstrate that SL2013 can be successfully evaded. Since Hidost was a recent
redesign attempting in part to address its vulnerability to mimicry attacks by significantly
reducing the feature space, no data exists on its vulnerability to evasion attacks. Below we
demonstrate that Hidost is also vulnerable to evasion attacks (indeed, more so than SL2013).
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Figure 4.2: Evasion robustness under EvadeML test (left) and performance on non-adversarial
data (right) of diﬀerent classifiers for SL2013.
From the perspective of defense, we show that it is possible to harden both SL2013 and Hidost
against a powerful realizable EvadeML attack by simply retraining with this attack (RAR,
for realizable-attack retraining, henceforth refers to a model hardened using EvadeML). This
serves as a baseline we use to evaluate the eﬃcacy of a retraining defense with a feature-space
attack model (henceforth, FSR for feature-space retraining). We then show that for both
SL2013 and Hidost, FSR significantly underperforms RAR.
In our experiments, we empirically set the RBF parameters for training both SL2013 and
Hidost to C = 12 and

= 0.0025.

SL2013. We start our case study with SL2013. We first study adversarial retraining with
realizable attacks, we then proceed to evaluate feature-space retraining.
Retraining with a Powerful Realizable Attack First, we replicated the EvadeML attack on
the original SL2013; the classifier achieves only a 16% evasion robustness.4 Next, to create a
baseline, we conduct experiments in which EvadeML is employed to retrain SL2013. The
4

This result diﬀers from the experiments in [126] which show a 0% evasion robustness. We found a flaw in
the implementation of feature extraction in EvadeML which causes evaluation to be performed using the
wrong feature vectors. This bug has been fixed in the GitHub version of EvadeML.
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Figure 4.3: Evasion robustness with retraining iterations (left) and generations of the EvadeML
attack test (right).
process terminated after 10 iterations at which point no evasive variants of the 40 retraining
seeds could be generated. We observe (Figure 4.2 (left)) that the retrained classifier (RAR)
obtained by this approach achieves a 96% evasion robustness. Moreover, RAR is essentially
as accurate as the baseline SL2013 on non-adversarial data (Figure 4.2 (right)). Thus, it is
clearly possible to be highly robust to this evasion attack without significantly compromising
eﬀectiveness on data not featuring explicit evasion attacks.
Figure 4.3 (left) shows the gradual improvement of evasion robustness over the 10 retraining
iterations. This plot demonstrates non-trivial eﬀectiveness of EvadeML: the first few iterations
are clearly insuﬃcient, as re-running EvadeML creates many new evasions that cannot be
correctly detected by the classifier. Only after 6 iterations does EvadeML optimization loop
begin to show significant signs of failing. Figure 4.3 (right) shows how increasing the number
of generations in EvadeML attacks aﬀects robustness of the RAR classifier. At this point, we
can see that increasing the capability of the attack has minimal impact.
Feature-Space Retraining. Next, we experimentally evaluate the eﬀectiveness of retraining
with a feature-space model of evasion attacks in obtaining robust ML in the face of the
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EvadeML realizable attack. We consider the setting with
(henceforth, FSR-

1

= 0.05 and

= 0.005 in Eq. (4.2)

and FSR- 2 ).

The robustness results are shown in Figure 4.2 (left). Compared to the SL2013 baseline,
feature-space retraining (FSR) boosts evasion robustness from 16% to 62%. Crucially, the
robustness of the resulting classifier is far below the classifier achieved by RAR. This illustrates
that defense that relies on feature-space models of adversarial examples may not in fact lead
to robustness when it is faced with a real attack.
We again consider performance of FSR classifier on non-adversarial test data (Figure 4.2
(right)). We can see that robustness boosting again does not much degrade performance,
with AUC remaining above 99%. However, we do see a substantial degradation as we move
from

= 0.05 to 0.005; thus, as we increase adversarial power in the feature-space model,

while we do obtain a slightly more robust model, we incur a nontrivial hit in performance on
non-adversarial data.
Hidost. We now repeat our experiments above with another structure-based classifier,
Hidost. We set the retraining parameter

= 0.005, which appears to strike a reasonable

balance between robustness and accuracy on non-adversarial data. As before, we first
evaluated the robustness of the original Hidost [104] by EvadeML. The result shows a 2%
robustness—remarkably, significantly worse than SL2013.
Evasion robustness of Hidost, as well as improvements achieved by RAR and FSR, are shown
in Figure 4.4 (left), and the results are consistent with our observations for SL2013. First, by
retraining with the realizable attack, evasion robustness is boosted to 98%, a rather dramatic
improvement, and clear demonstration that successful defense is possible. In contrast, FSR
achieves a 70% evasion robustness, a significant boost over the original Hidost, to be sure,
but far below the evasion robustness of RAR.
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Figure 4.4: Evasion robustness under EvadeML test (left) and performance on non-adversarial
data (right) of diﬀerent classifiers for Hidost.
Evaluating these classifiers on non-adversarial test data in terms of ROC curves (Figure 4.4
(right)), we can observe that RAR achieves comparable accuracy (> 99.9% AUC) with the
original Hidost classifier on non-adversarial data, and provides even better True Positive Rate
(TPR) when False Positive Rate (FPR) is close to zero. On the other hand, FSR achieves
> 99% AUC, but yields a significant degradation of TPR when FPR< 0.01.

4.4.2

Content-Based PDF Malware Classification

Our next case study concerns another two PDF malware classifiers which use features based
on PDF file content, rather than logical structure. We trained both real-valued and binarized
PDFRate (henceforth, PDFRate-R and PDFRate-B) on the same dataset as SL2013 and
Hidost, and achieved > 99.9% AUC for both classifiers on test data. In our experiments,
we empirically set the SVM RBF parameters for training to C = 10 and

= 0.01. In our

evaluation of ML robustness, we again set the feature-space model parameter

to be 0.005.

PDFRate with Real-Valued Features. We begin with the variant of PDFRate—PDFRateR—which has been constructed in previous evaluations and shown comparable in performance
to the original implementation [103]. We again begin by replicating the EvadeML evasion
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Figure 4.5: Evasion robustness under EvadeML test (left) and performance on non-adversarial
data (right) of diﬀerent classifiers for PDFRate-R.
robustness evaluation of the baseline classifier. As expected, we find the classifier quite
vulnerable, with only 2% evasion robustness.
Next, we retrain PDFRate-R with EvadeML for 10 iterations (RAR baseline), and perform
feature-space retraining using the conventional feature space model above. Our results are
shown in Figure 4.5 (left). Observe that while RAR indeed achieves a highly robust classifier
(96% robustness), FSR actually performs even better, with 100% robustness.
Comparing RAR and FSR performance on non-adversarial data (Figure 4.5 (right)), we
observe that the high robustness of FSR does incur a cost: while RAR remains exceptionally
eﬀective (>99.99% AUC), FSR achieves AUC slightly lower than 99%, although most
significantly, the degradation is rather pronounced for low FPR regions (below 0.015).
PDFRate with Binarized Features. One of our great surprises is the robustness of
the binarized PDFRate: despite the fact that the real-valued PDFRate is quite vulnerable,
the same classifier using binary features was 100% robust to EvadeML (Figure 4.6 (left)).
Consequently, this will serve as our robust baseline (equivalently, RAR would terminate with
no iterations). Feature-space retrained PDFRate-B also exhibits 100% evasion robustness,
although it does require a number of iterations to converge.
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Figure 4.6: Evasion robustness under EvadeML test (left) and performance on non-adversarial
data (right) of diﬀerent classifiers for PDFRate-B.
Considering now the performance of PDFRate-B and FSR on non-adversarial test data
(Figure 4.6 (right)), we can make two interesting observations. First, the baseline PDFRate-B
is remarkably good even on this data; in a sense, it appears to hit the sweet spot of adversarial
robustness and non-adversarial performance. Second, FSR retrained classifier is competitive
in terms of AUC (⇠ 99.9%), but is observably worse than the baseline classifier for very low
false positive rates.

4.4.3

Discussion

While we observed some value of using feature-space methods for boosting classifier robustness
to evasion attacks, it falls far short of the robustness we know we can achieve by using a
realizable attack oracle. Despite the advantages—in some cases substantial—in terms of
running time, our results suggest that relying on feature space models may not be satisfactory
in practice. There are two general reasons for the observed gap. First, synthetically generated
adversarial instances may in actuality not preserve malicious functionality, since they need
not abide by the system-level attack constraints. This would introduce noise and potentially
bias into the retraining process. Second, realistic adversarial instances may not be generated,
as they do not possess a suﬃciently high objective value according to Eq. ((4.2)), in part
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because better solutions according to this evasion model may not abide by realistic attack
constraints.

4.5

Conclusion

We undertook an extensive exploration of the extent to which robust ML that uses the
conventional feature-space models of evasion attacks remains robust to “real” attacks that
can be implemented in actual malware and preserve malicious functionality (what we call
realizable attacks). Our intriguing observation is that defense based on feature-space models
can fail to achieve satisfactory robustness. This in itself raises some doubts about the nearly
universal focus on such models as a means for ML defense, and suggests that practical
usefulness of such approaches cannot be taken for granted. However, we also show that
changing the nature of the feature space can make a diﬀerence: robust ML with feature-space
models is quite robust in content-based detection (which uses content, rather than structural
paths, as features).
It is natural to wonder how our approach and results are applied to other domains. In
computer vision, the analog of realizable malware attacks are physical attacks, whereby the
physical environment is modified, rather than the digital object, such as an image. Here,
the corresponding foundational question is whether common robust ML methods based on
small-lp attacks successfully protect against physical attacks. The notion of conserved features
can also be seen as more generally applicable. For example, in a bag-of-words representation
for spam filtering, these could correspond to the existence of URL or file attachments, and in
SQL injection attacks, these may refer to the existence of specific SQL commands, such as
Select.
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The main limitation of our study is in the specific choices we had to make to ensure that it is
tractable. We chose a particular defensive paradigm—iterative retraining. As we have argued,
it is the only paradigm that can fit every case that we investigate; for example, there is no
other general approach for learning a robust SVM with non-linear kernels. However, it is
possible that approaches based on robust optimization, if they were developed, can improve
performance by taking advantage of the special structure of this problem. We implemented
a particular class of feature-space attacks, using l2 norm to measure the attacker’s cost of
feature manipulations, and stochastic local search to compute evasions. It is possible that
better attack algorithms for generating attacks over binary domains will be developed, and,
indeed, some alternatives exist. However, prior work suggests that this approach yields
attacks that are close to optimal [58], with the use of random restarts playing a crucial role.
Finally, our study was specific to PDF malware detection. However, our framework is quite
general, and could be used in the future to consider other similar questions, such as the
eﬀectiveness of robust deep learning against physical attacks.
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Chapter 5
Defending against Realizable Attacks in
PDF Malware Detection
In Chapter 4, we have shown that robust ML that uses feature-space attack models can
fail to defend against realizable attacks in the context of PDF malware detection. In spite
of the above limitations, the feature space methods have tremendous appeal due to their
relative speed and amenability to analysis. In this chapter, we present and evaluate a
surprisingly simple “fix” to enable feature-space model not merely to become competitive
with problem space approaches, but to actually exhibit better robustness. Specifically, we
show that augmenting the feature space models with conserved features (those that cannot
be unilaterally modified without compromising malicious functionality) significantly improves
performance. Moreover, we show that feature space models enable generalized robustness
when faced with a variety of realizable attacks, as compared to classifiers which are tuned to
be robust to a specific realizable attack.
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5.1

Overview

Thus far, we had observed that ML hardened with the standard mathematically convenient
feature-space evasion attack model may in some cases not yield satisfactory robustness against
real attacks. The key issue is that feature-space models are entirely disembodied from the
domain. This is crucial to enable us to have mathematical formulations of attacks, but
clearly has limitations. The key question is whether we can devise a simple way of anchoring
feature-space attacks in the application domain to allow us to meaningfully and minimally
constrain abstract attacks to reflect some of the constraints that real attacks face. Next, we
propose a refinement of the feature-space model that aims to do just that.
Specifically, in this chapter we introduce the idea of conserved features, which we define to
be features, the unilateral modification of which compromises malicious functionality. We
develop this idea specifically for binary features, as this notion is particularly crisp in such a
case (e.g., such features tend to correspond to the existence of particular objects in PDF).
To develop intuition about the nature of conserved features, consider SL2013, which employs
structural paths as features to discriminate between malicious and benign PDFs. On the
one hand, the structural paths like /Type are unessential to preserve malicious behaviors,
and we do not expect them to be conserved. On the other hand, as the shellcode which
triggers malicious functionality is embedded in certain PDF objects, those corresponding
structural paths are likely to be conserved in each variant crafted from the same malicious
seed (e.g., /OpenAction/JS). In addition, structural paths that facilitate embedded script
in PDF files also can be conserved features as removing them can break the script (e.g.,
/Names and /Pages). This further illustrates that conserved features are not necessarily
optimal for statistically distinguishing benign and malicious instances (indeed, these may be
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common to both); rather, they serve to anchor the feature-space attack model in the domain
by connecting features to malicious functionality.
Our first contribution is a method for boosting robustness of feature-space models without
compromising their mathematical convenience (crucial for most approaches for robust ML).
The key idea is to identify conserved features, that is, features that cannot be unilaterally
modified without compromising malicious functionality. We exhibit such features in our
setting, show that they cannot be identified with traditional statistical methods, and develop
an algorithm for automatically extracting them. Finally, we show that by simply constraining
that these features remain unmodified in adversarial training, feature-space approaches
become eﬀective even for robust structure-based PDF malware detection.
Our second contribution is to explore the extent to which ML robustness is generalizable to
multiple distinct realizable attacks. Specifically, we expose both a robust classifier that was
retrained by using a realizable attack (EvadeML), and a model hardened using a feature-space
attack (accounting for conserved features), to a series of realizable attacks. Our results
reveal a stark diﬀerence between the two: ML models hardened using EvadeML are quite
fragile; in contrast, ML models hardened using feature-space attacks exhibit uniformly high
robustness to the other attacks. Remarkably, we demonstrate that ML models hardened
using feature-space attacks remain robust even against realizable attacks that defeat conserved
features.

5.2

Identifying Conserved Features

We now describe a systematic automated procedure for identifying conserved features in the
context of PDF malware detection. We first introduce how to identify conserved features of
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SL2013 [102], and then describe how to generalize the approach to extract conserved features
of other classifiers which are employed in our case study in chapter 4.
The key to identifying the conserved features of a malicious PDF is to discriminate them
from non-conserved ones. Since merely applying statistical approaches on training data is
insuﬃcient to discriminate between these two classes of features, as demonstrated above, we
need a qualitatively diﬀerent approach which relies on the nature of evasions (as implemented
in EvadeML [126]) and the sandbox (which determines whether malicious functionality is
preserved) to identify features that are conserved.
We use a modified version of pdfrw [74]5 to parse the objects of PDF file and repack them
to produce a new PDF file. We use Cuckoo [35] as the sandbox to evaluate malicious
functionality. In the discussion below, we define xi to be the malicious file, Si the conserved
feature set of xi , and Oi the set of its non-conserved features. Initially, Si = Oi = ;.
At the high level, our first step is to sequentially delete each object of a malicious file and
eliminate non-conserved features by evaluating the existence of a malware signature in a
sandbox for each resulting PDF, which provides a preliminary set of conserved features. Then,
we replace the object of each corresponding structural path in the resulting preliminary set
with an external benign object and assess the corresponding functionality, which allows us to
further prune non-conserved features. Next, we describe these procedures in detail.

5.2.1

Structural Path Deletion

In the first step, we filter out non-conserved features by deleting each object and its corresponding structural path, and then checking whether this eliminates malicious functionality
(and should therefore be conserved). First, we obtain all the structural paths (objects) by
5

The modified version is available at https://github.com/mzweilin/pdfrw.
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parsing a PDF file. These objects are organized as a tree-topology and are sequentially
deleted. Each time an object is removed, we produce a resulting PDF file by repacking
the remaining objects. Then, we employ the sandbox to detect malicious functionality of
the PDF after the object deletion. If any malware signature is captured, the corresponding
structural path of the object is deleted as a non-conserved feature, and added to Oi . On the
other hand, if no malware signature is detected, the corresponding feature is added in Si as a
possibly conserved feature.
One important challenge in this process is that features are not necessarily independent.
Thus, in addition to identifying Si and Oi , we explore interdependence between features by
deleting objects. As the logic structure of a PDF file is with a tree-topology, the presence
of some structural path depends on the presence of other structural paths whose object
refers to the object of the prior one. We define that a structural path is a dependent of
another if unilateral deleting the object associated with the latter causes a flip from 1 to 0
on the feature value of the former. For any feature j of xi , we denote the set of features that
depend on j by Dji . Note that for a given structural path (feature), there could be multiple
corresponding PDF objects. In such a case, these objects are deleted simultaneously, so as
the corresponding feature value is shifted from 1 to 0.

5.2.2

Structural Path Replacement

In the second step, we subtract the remaining non-conserved features in the preliminary Si
and move them to Oi . Similar to the prior step, we first obtain all the structural paths and
objects of the malicious PDF file. Then for each object of the PDF that is in Si , we replace
it with an external object from a benign PDF file and produce the resulting PDF, which is
further evaluated in the sandbox. If the sandbox detects any malware signature, then the
corresponding structural path of the object replaced is moved from Si to Oi . Otherwise, the
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structural path is a conserved feature since both deletion and replacement of the corresponding
object removes the malicious functionality of the PDF file. Note that in the case of multiple
corresponding and identical objects of a structural path, all of these objects are replaced
simultaneously.
After structural path deletion and replacement, for each malicious PDF file xi , we can get its
conserved feature set Si , non-conserved feature set Oi , and dependent feature set Dj for any
feature j 2 Si [ Oi , which could be further leveraged to design evasion-robust classifiers.

5.2.3

Obtaining a Uniform Conserved Feature Set

The systematic approach discussed above provides a conserved feature set for each malicious
seed to retrain a classifier. Our goal, however, is to identify a single set of conserved features
which is independent of the specific malicious PDF seed file. We now develop an approach
for transforming a collection of Si , Oi , and Dji for a set of malicious seeds i into a uniform set
of conserved features.
Obtaining a uniform set of conserved features faces two challenges: 1) minimizing conflicts
among diﬀerent conserved features, as a conserved feature for one malicious instance could be
a non-conserved feature for another, and 2) abiding by feature interdependence if a conserved
feature should be further eliminated.
To address these challenges, we propose a Forward Elimination algorithm to compute the
uniform conserved feature set for a set of malicious seeds {x1 , x2 , ..., xn }, given the conserved
feature sets, non-conserved feature sets and dependent sets for each seed. As Algorithm 3
shows, we first obtain a union of the conserved feature sets. Then, we explore the contradiction
of each feature in the union with the others, by comparing the total number of the feature
being selected as a non-conserved feature and conserved feature. If the former one is greater
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Algorithm 3 Forward Elimination for uniform conserved feature set.
Input:
The set of conserved features for xi (i 2 [1, n]), Si ;
The set of non-conserved features for xi (i 2 [1, n]), Oi ;
The set of dependent features for j 2 Si [ Oi , Dji ;
Output:
The uniform
conserved feature set for {x1 , x2 , ..., xn }, S;
Sn
1: S
i=1 Si ;
0
2: S
S;
3: Q
;;
Sn
j
j
4: D = i=1 Di ;
0
5: for each j 2 S do
6:
if j 2
/PQ then
P
7:
if ni=1 j2Oi
· ni=1 j2Si then
8:
S
S \ ({j} [ Dj );
9:
Q
Q [ ({j} [ Dj );
10:
end if
11:
end if
12: end for
13: return S;
than

times the latter one, then this feature, together with its dependents, are eliminated

from the union. Otherwise, the feature is added to the uniform feature set. We use

as a

parameter to adjust the balance between conserved and non-conserved features. Typically,
> 1 as we are inclined to preserve malicious functionality associated with a conserved
feature, even it could be a non-conserved feature of another PDF file. We set

= 3 in our

experiments.

5.2.4

Identifying Conserved Features for Other Classifiers

Once we obtain conserved features of SL2013 for each malicious seeds, we can employ these
features to identify conserved features for other classifiers using binary features. As our
approach relies on the existence of malicious functionality and corresponding features, such
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a relation is not obvious for real-valued features; we therefore leave the question of how to
define and identify conserved features in real space for future work.
Hidost. Hidost and SL2013 are similar in nature in such a way that they employ structural
paths as features. The only diﬀerence is that Hidost consolidates features of SL2013 as
described in Chapter 4. Therefore, once the conserved features of SL2013 are identified,
we can simply apply the PDF structural path consolidation rules described in Srndic and
Laskov [104] to transform these features to the corresponding conserved features for Hidost.
Binarized PDFRate. We identify the conserved features for PDFRate-B by using the
conserved feature set Si of each seed xi . For each xi , we generate |Si | PDF files, each of
which corresponds to the PDF file when an element (structural path) in Si is deleted. We
then compare PDFRate-B features of these PDFs to the original xi . If any feature value of
xi is flipped from 1 to 0, then this feature will be added in the conserved feature set of xi
for PDFRate-B. Afterward, we use Algorithm 3 to obtain the uniform conserved feature set.
This approach can in fact be used for arbitrary PDF malware detectors over binary features
(leveraging conserved structural paths identified using SL2013).

5.3

Classifying Using Only Conserved Features

We begin by exploring the eﬀectiveness of using only conserved features for classification. We
identified 8 conserved features for SL2013 (out of ⇠6000), 7 for Hidost (out of ⇠1000), and 4
for PDFRate-B (out of 135); these are detailed in Table 5.1.
We start by considering four natural questions pertaining to conserved features: 1) are they
suﬃcient to make a classifier robust to evasions, 2) do they eﬀectively discriminate between
benign and malicious instances, 3) can they be identified using standard statistical methods
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Table 5.1: Conserved features and their relevance to JavaScript.
Classifier

SL2013

Hidost

PDFRate-B

Conserved features
/Names
/Names/JavaScript
/Names/JavaScript/Names
/Names/JavaScript/Names/JS
/OpenAction
/OpenAction/JS
/OpenAction/S
/Pages
/Names
/Names/JavaScript
/Names/JavaScript/Names
/Names/JavaScript/Names/JS
/OpenAction
/OpenAction/JS
/Pages
count_box_other
count_javascript
count_js
count_page

Involve JS?
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No

(such as sparse regularization), and 4) are they just detecting the presence of JavaScript in
PDF?
We explore these for SL2013. Specifically, we trained a classifier using only the 8 conserved
features (CF henceforth). As we can see in Figure 5.1 (left), this classifier is 100% robust
to EvadeML attacks, appearing to resolve the first question. However, we emphasize that
conserved features alone need not capture the full spectrum of adversarial behavior and
constraints. Indeed, in Section 5.5 we show that classifiers based solely on conserved features
can also be evaded, particularly if attacks are specifically designed to evade them. Rather, as
we show presently, they provide a suﬃcient anchoring in the problem domain for feature-space
attack models to succeed.
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Figure 5.1: Classifying with conserved features: comparing evasion robustness (left) and
ROC curves (right).
To address question (2), consider Figure 5.1 (right): clearly, if we desire a low false positive rate,
using only conserved features for classification yields subpar performance on non-adversarial
data.
To address the third question, we learn a linear SVM classifier for SL2013 with l1 regularization
(henceforth, Linear) where we empirically adjust the SVM parameter C to perform feature
reduction until the number of the features is also 8; we find that only 3 of these are conserved
features.

6

As we can see in Figure 5.1 (left), this classifier exhibits poor robustness; thus,

statistical methods are insuﬃcient to identify good conserved features.
To address the fourth question, we create a classifier using only one boolean feature which
identifies the presence of JavaScript in a PDF file (henceforth, we refer to this feature as
JS ). We find that this classifier is also robust to EvadeML. On non-adversarial data, JS
achieves FPR of 0.04 and FNR of 0.14 (in other words, 4% of the benign files in the nonadversarial dataset use JavaScript, while 14% of malicious instances use alternative attacks to
6

The sparse versions of Hidost includes only 3 of the conserved features, while sparse PDFRate-B includes
only 1. In another experiment, we adjusted C until all conserved features were selected. In this case, SL2013
requires 510 features, Hidost needs 154, and PDFRate-B needs 83.
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Javascript).7 To create an apples-to-apples comparison with the CF classifier, we empirically
adjust the classification threshold of CF until we get the same FPR with JS. The resulting CF
classifier exhibits FNR of 0.11, considerably better than JS. Nevertheless, it is clear that using
either CF (only conserved features), or only JS, is impractical, since both FNR and FPR of
these are quite high. Moreover, as we show in Section 5.5, classifiers based only on conserved
features can be defeated by other realizable attacks. Next, we show that identification of
conserved features is nevertheless crucial in creating highly eﬀective feature-space attack
models.

5.4

Feature-Space Model with Conserved Features

As discussed in chapter 4 , the feature-space evasion model in Eq. (4.2) may not suﬃciently
boost ML robustness. Since conserved features allow us to minimally tie the abstract featurespace representation to malicious functionality, we oﬀer a natural modification of the model
in Eq. (4.2), imposing the constraint that conserved features cannot be modified by the
attacker. We formally capture this in the new optimization problem in Eq. (5.1), where S is
the set of conserved features:
minimize
x

Q(x) = f (x) + c(xM , x),

(5.1)

subject to xi = xM,i , 8i 2 S.
Other than this modification, we use the same Coordinate Greedy algorithm with random
restarts as before to compute adversarial examples. We adopt the evasion model in Eq. (5.1)
to retrain the target classifier using the retraining procedure from Section 4.3. We denote
the classifier obtained by the retraining procedure using a feature-space model grounded by
7

We observe similar results for 5,000 benign PDFs obtained by using Google web searches [103], where 3%
of benign files use Javacript.
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Figure 5.2: Evasion robustness (left) and performance on non-adversarial data (right) of
diﬀerent variants of SL2013.
conserved features by CFR. We also study the eﬀectiveness of our automated procedure for
identifying conserved features as compared to using a subset that only considers Javascript
features (we can think of these as expert-identified conserved features, as this is what an
expert would naturally consider). To this end, we repeat the procedure above by replacing
the conserved feature set S in Eq. 5.1 with a subset that involves Javascript. The classifier
resulting from such restricted adversarial retraining with “expert”-identified conserved features
is termed CFR-JS.

5.4.1

SL2013

We now evaluate the robustness and eﬀectiveness of the feature space retraining approach,
which uses conserved features. We set the parameter

= 0.005 as before. The robustness

results are presented in Figure 5.2 (left). Observe that CFR now significantly improves
robustness of the original classifier, with evasion robustness rising from 16% to 87%. Moreover,
CFR-JS achieves a 100% evasion robustness against EvadeML. These results demonstrate
that by leveraging the conserved features, the feature-space evasion models are now quite
eﬀective as a means to boost evasion robustness of SL2013.
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Figure 5.3: Evasion robustness (left) and performance on non-adversarial data (right) of
diﬀerent variants of Hidost.
In Figure 5.2 (right) we evaluate the quality of these classifiers on non-adversarial test data
in terms of ROC curves. In all cases, be it original, RAR, CFR, and CFR-JS, AUC is
> 99.9%, although we can see a slight degradation of CFR for extremely low false positive
rates compared to the others. It is noteworthy that CFR performs much better than FSR
(robust ML using a standard feature-space approach, recall Figure 4.2 (right)).

5.4.2

Hidost

Next, we evaluate the eﬀectiveness of CFR for Hidost. The results are shown in Figure 5.3
(left) and are largely consistent with SL2013. In particular, CFR boosts evasion robustness
from 2% to 100% (slightly better than RAR), well above conventional FSR (recall Figure
4.4 (left)). In contrast, CFR-JS only boosts robustness to 53%, showing that our algorithmic
approach can in some cases oﬀer a considerable advantage to expert-chosen conserved features.
Evaluating the performance of CFR and CFR-JS on non-adversarial test data in terms of
ROC curves in Figure 5.3 (right), we find that the CFR classifier can achieve ⇠ 99.8%
AUC. This is somewhat worse than RAR, particularly for very low false positive rates, but
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Figure 5.4: Evasion robustness (left) and performance on non-adversarial data (right) of
diﬀerent variants of PDFRate-B.
better than CFR-JS—again, in this case using the full batch of conserved features exhibits a
significant advantage over solely looking for Javascript.

5.4.3

Binarized PDFRate

Finally, we evaluate the eﬀectiveness of the CFR variants of PDFRate-B. We observe that both
the CFR and CFR-JS classifiers in the PDFRate-B family achieve 100% evasion robustness
against EvadeML (Figure 5.4 (left)), just as the RAR and FSR counterparts had.
However, a close look at Figure 5.4 (right) demonstrates that CFR and CFR-JS achieve
far better performance on non-adversarial data, with >99.9% AUC, where improvements
are particularly significant for small false positive rates compared to FSR (recall Figure 4.6
(right)). Moreover, in this experiment, CFR achieves slightly higher TPR than CFR-JS
for low FPR regions (below 0.003). The main takeaway here is that although the featurespace approach already yields high robustness in this setting, introducing conserved features
significantly mitigates its degradation in performance on non-adversarial data.
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5.5

Additional Realizable Evasion Attacks

So far we used EvadeML [126] as the primary realizable attack in our experiments. This
choice is defensible, as EvadeML explores a significantly larger attack space than many other
evasion methods (e.g., Mimicry [103]), allowing deletions and swaps, in addition to insertions.
Nevertheless, it is natural to wonder whether classifiers robust to EvadeML remain robust
to other classes of evasion attacks. A particularly intriguing question is how the classifiers
hardened against EvadeML fare in comparison with classifiers hardened against feature-space
models, when faced with diﬀerent realizable attacks.
To answer these questions, we consider five additional realizable attacks: Mimicry [103], which
was one of the first realizable attacks on PDF malware detectors, Mimicry+, an enhanced
variant of Mimicry, MalGAN [46], which uses Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) to
create evasion attacks (but only targets binary classifiers), Reverse Mimicry [72], which inserts
malicious payloads into target benign files, and a new custom attack aimed at defeating
PDFRate-B conserved features, and our Custom Attack, which targets a feature extraction
bug in the Mimicus implementation of PDFRate in order to defeat the corresponding CF
classifier. The Mimicry/Mimicy+ attacks are designed specifically for PDFRate, and cannot
be usefully applied to SL2013 or Hidost, whereas the Reverse Mimicry attack and our custom
attack require zero knowledge of target classifiers. In our experiments, W=we use the same
100 malicious seeds employed in Chapter 4 and Section 5.4 as attack files.

5.5.1

Mimicry and Mimicry+ Attacks

We start by considering the Mimicry [103] and Mimicry+ attacks for both real-valued and
binarized variants of PDFRate.
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Mimicry assumes that an attacker has full knowledge of the features employed by a target
classifier. The mimicry attack then manipulates a malicious PDF file so that it mimics a
particular selected benign PDF as much as possible. The implementation of Mimicry is
simple and independent of any particular classification model.
Our mimicry attack uses the Mimicus [103] implementation, which was shown to successfully
evade the PDFRate classifier. To improve its evasion eﬀectiveness, Mimicus chooses 30
diﬀerent target benign PDF files for each attack file. It then produces one instance in feature
space for each target-attack pair by merging the malicious features with the benign ones.
The feature space instance is then transformed into a PDF file using a content injection
approach. The resulting 30 files are evaluated by the target classifier, and only the PDF
with the best evasion result is selected, which was submitted to WEPAWET [19] to verify
malicious functionality. To make Mimicry consistent with our framework, we employ the
Cuckoo sandbox [35] in place of WEPAWET (which was in any case discontinued) to validate
maliciousness of the resulting PDF file.
In addition to the original version of Mimicry, we implement an enhanced variation, Mimicry+,
with two modifications. First, Mimicry+ chooses the 30 most benign PDF files predicted
by the target classifier as target files (instead of randomly selecting those, as in Mimicry).
Second, for each attack file, all the resulting 30 files are evaluated by the sandbox and only
those verified to have malicious functionality are selected to evade the target classifier.
The results are shown in Figures 5.5 and 5.6, and oﬀer two noteworthy findings. First, as can
be seen in Figure 5.6, RAR classifiers (hardened specifically against EvadeML, recall that the
original PDFRate-B classifier is equivalent to RAR) can be quite vulnerable to the Mimicry+
attack, whereas both FSR and CFR classifiers remain robust. Second, Mimicry+ is indeed
a much stronger attack than Mimicry: the original Mimicry fails to significantly degrade
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Figure 5.5: Robustness to Mimicry attack. Left: PDFRate-R (note that our notion of CFR
is not applicable here). Right: PDFRate-B.

Figure 5.6: Robustness to Mimicry+ attack. Left: PDFRate-R (note that our notion of CFR
is not applicable here). Right: PDFRate-B.
RAR performance, whereas Mimicry+ largely evades the RAR variant of PDFRate-R, and is
somewhat more potent against PDFRate-B than Mimicry. This demonstrates that besides
its mathematical elegance, the abstract feature-space evasion models, once appropriately
anchored to the domain, are rather generally robust to evasion attacks.
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Figure 5.7: Robustness to MalGAN attack. SL2013 (left), Hidost (middle), PDFRate-B
(right).

5.5.2

MalGAN Attack

Next, we consider the MalGAN attack [46] on the three classifiers over binary feature space
we have previously studied: SL2013, Hidost, and PDFRate-B, with RAR and FSR/CFR
versions that have been shown robust to EvadeML.
MalGAN is a Generative Adversarial Network [32] framework to generate malware examples
which can evade a black-box malware detector with binary features. It assumes that an
attacker knows the features, but has only black-box access to the detector decisions. MalGAN
comprises three main components: a generator which transforms malware to its adversarial
version, a black-box detector which returns detection results, and a substitute detector which
is used to fit the black-box detector and train the generator. The generator and substitute
detector are feed-forward neural networks which work together to evade the black-box detector.
The results of [46] show that MalGAN is able to decrease the True Positive Rate on the
generated examples from > 90% to 0%. We note that strictly speaking, MalGAN variants are
not implemented as actual PDF files; however, we still treat it as a realizable attack since it
only adds features to a malicious file, which can be implemented (at least in structure-based
detection) by adding the associated objects into the PDF file.
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The results, shown in Figure 5.7, demonstrate that despite EvadeML being a powerful attack,
the RAR approaches which use it for hardening (with resulting classifiers no longer very
vulnerable to EvadeML) are highly vulnerable to MalGAN, with evasion robustness of 0%
in most cases. In contrast, CFR models which use conserved features remain highly robust
(100% in all cases), just as we had observed earlier.

5.5.3

Reverse Mimicry Attack

Next, we employ the Reverse Mimicry attack [72] on the EvadeML-robust variants of all the
classifier types (SL2013, Hidost, PDFRate-R, and PDFRate-B).
The Reverse Mimicry attack assumes that an attacker has zero knowledge of the target
classifier. The basic idea is to inject malicious payloads into target benign files to minimize
the structural diﬀerence between the resulting examples and targets. Our Reverse Mimicry
attack employs the adversarial examples provided by Maiorca et al. [72] which was shown to
successfully evade PDF classifiers based on structural analysis. Specifically, we use the 500
PDF files produced by injecting a malicious JavaScript code that does not contain references
to other objects to target benign PDF files. We selected the 376 files out of 500 that display
malicious behaviors detected by the Cuckoo sandbox.
Figure 5.8 presents the results, which are revealing in several ways. First, we again observe
that RAR (hardened specifically against EvadeML) is roundly defeated in most cases. Second,
consider the robustness results for the classifier using only the conserved features (CF), we can
see that reverse mimicry succeeds in defeating conserved features for a non-trivial proportion
of instances. It does so by including Javascript tags in structural paths that are not used
as features by SL2013/Hidost (since these classifiers only consider commonly occurring sets
of structural paths). Thus, this attack reveals an important vulnerability in the feature
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Figure 5.8: Robustness to Reverse Mimicry attack. SL2013 (top left), Hidost (top right),
PDFRate-R (bottom left), PDFRate-B (bottom right). Note that our notions of CFR and
CF for PDFRate-R is not applicable here.
extraction approach employed by these classifiers; indeed, it suggests that structure-based
classifiers may be inherently diﬃcult to harden. Remarkably, CFR remains more robust than
CF despite these vulnerabilities. The case of Hidost is particularly stark: CFR is nearly 20%
more robust than CF!

5.5.4

The Custom Attack

Our final custom attack exploits a feature extraction vulnerability in the Mimicus implementation of PDFRate. Normally, the characters used in the Name objects of a PDF file
are limited to a specific set. Since PDF specification version 1.2, a lexical convention has
86

Table 5.2: Transformation of entry names in the custom attack.
Entry
/Action
/Filter
/Length
/JavaScript
/JS
/S
/Type

Hexadecimal Representation
/#41#63#74#69#6f#6e
/#46#69#6c#74#65#72
/#4c#65#6e#67#74#68
/#4a#61#76#61#53#63#72#69#70#74
/#4a#53
/#53
/#54#79#70#65

Figure 5.9: Robustness to the custom attack. Left: PDFRate-R (note that our notions of
CFR and CF are not applicable here). Right: PDFRate-B.
been added to represent a character with its hexadecimal ANSI-code, e.g., #xx. Such a
modification enables us to create an arbitrary string in the form of #xx#xx#xx. In our
implementation, we replaced a set of entries in the attack PDF files with their hexadecimal
representations (see Table 5.2). These features were selected with the goal to obfuscate tags
crucial to the code execution in PDF, which are frequently used for feature extraction. With
this technique, the scanner would not be able to detect malicious code without dynamically
reconstructing the PDF structure. While it is theoretically possible to replace all the ASCII
text inside the document, we chose not to do that due to the concern on the expansion of file
size.
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The results are shown in Figure 5.9. We find that after this attack, CF robustness is 0. We
also observe that the robustness of RAR classifier for PDFRate-R also drops, although to
0.3 rather than 0. Significantly, the FSR classifiers for both PDFRate-R and PDFRate-B
remain 100% robust, and the CFR variant of PDFRate-B has nearly perfect robustness
(0.98) against this attack. Our latter observation is particularly remarkable: although the
conserved features are roundly defeated by this attack, the use of these as a part of a holistic
retraining approach yields a classifier that remains robust. Thus, not only is it possible to
construct a robust malware classifier without unduly relying on conserved features, but we
can accomplish this through iterative retraining in feature space.

5.6

Conclusion

In this chapter, we presented a refined version of the feature-space model that makes use of
conserved features (which we can identify automatically), and showed that where featurespace defense previously failed, it now succeeds. Our finding may well be the most intriguing:
feature-space approaches exhibit generalized robustness, in that the resulting robust ML (after
appropriate refinement using conserved features) exhibits robustness to multiple realizable
attacks. This contrasts with defense that is hardened using a specific realizable attack—even
one quite powerful on the surface (EvadeML)—which can fail dramatically when faced with a
diﬀerent attack. These findings demonstrate the power of eﬀective mathematical abstractions
in security.
There are several limitations of our method that can oﬀer further opportunities for future
work. One example is the fact that we only define conserved features when these are binary; it
may be that finding meaningful conserved features in continuous feature spaces is inherently
more diﬃcult. Another issue is the surprising finding that suﬃcient anchoring of feature-space
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defense in the domain using conserved features allows us to achieve robustness, even when
conserved features can be circumvented. It may be that conserved features are ultimately
only a part of the solution, and only help if they adequately capture the attack surface in the
abstract feature space. The extent to which small variations in the set of identified conserved
features matters is also an open question: our evidence is mixed, with “expert”-defined features
usually, but not always, suﬃcient for robustness.

89

Chapter 6
Defending against Non-Salient
Adversarial Examples in Image
Classification
In this chapter, we focus on robust learning in image classification. Despite the remarkable
success of deep neural networks, significant concerns have emerged about their robustness
to adversarial perturbations to inputs. While most attacks aim for being unsuspicious,
there is no universal notion of what it means for adversarial examples. Here, we focus on
salience as a way to capture whether perturbations are suspicious, and propose a general
approach for defending against non-salient attacks. To capture cognitive salience, we split
an image into foreground (salient region) and background (the rest), and allow significantly
larger adversarial perturbations in the background, while ensuring that cognitive salience of
background remains low. We describe how to compute the resulting non-salience-preserving
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dual-perturbation attacks on classifiers. We then show that adversarial training with dualperturbation attacks yields classifiers that are considerably more robust to such attacks,
as well as to background perturbations, than state-of-the-art robust learning approaches,
without compromising robustness to conventional attacks. In addition, our defense against
non-salient attacks results in classifiers that align well with human perception.

6.1

Overview

An observation by [108] that state-of-the-art deep neural networks that exhibit exceptional
performance in image classification are fragile in the face of small adversarial perturbations of
inputs has received a great deal of attention. A series of approaches for designing adversarial
examples followed [13, 33, 108], along with methods for defending against them [71, 87], and
then new attacks that defeat prior defenses, and so on. Attacks can be roughly classified
along three dimensions: 1) introducing small lp -norm-bounded perturbations, with the goal
of these being imperceptible to humans [71], 2) using non-lp -based constraints that capture
perceptibility (often called semantic perturbations) [6], and 3) modifying physical objects,
such as stop signs [25], in a way that does not arouse suspicion. One of the most common
motivations for the study of adversarial examples is safety and security, such as the potential
for attackers to compromise the safety of autonomous vehicles that rely on computer vision [25].
However, while imperceptibility is certainly suﬃcient for perturbations to be unsuspicious, it
is far from necessary, as physical attacks demonstrate. On the other hand, while there are
numerous formal definitions that capture whether noise is perceptible [13, 82], what makes
adversarial examples suspicious has been largely informal and subjective.
We propose a simple formalization of an important aspect of what makes adversarial perturbations unsuspicious based on the notion of cognitive salience [39, 55]. Specifically, we make
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Figure 6.1: Visualization of loss gradient of diﬀerent classifiers with respect to pixels of nonadversarial inputs. Clean is the model that takes no defense. AT-PGD denotes adversarial
training using the PGD attack. AT-Dual is our proposed defense. It can be seen that
AT-Dual aligns significantly better with human perception.
a distinction between image foreground and background based on how much attention a
human viewer pays to the diﬀerent parts of the captured scene. We capture this as a concrete
threat model by allowing significantly more noise in the background (which has low salience)
than the foreground (which has high salience). In eﬀect, we posit that perturbations in the
foreground, when visible, will arouse significantly more suspicion (by being cognitively more
salient) than perturbations made in the background.
Our first contribution is a formal model of such dual-perturbation attacks, which is a generalization of the lp -norm-bounded attack models that explicitly aims to ensure that the
adversarial perturbation does not make the background highly salient. Second, we propose
an algorithm for finding adversarial examples using this model, which is an adaptation of
the PGD (projected gradient descent) attack [71]. Since our ultimate goal is robustness to
non-salient adversarial examples, our third contribution is to embed the dual-perturbation
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attacks in the adversarial training loop [71] instead of PGD or other conventional variants;
we term the resulting defense AT-Dual. We then experimentally evaluate first our approach
to designing non-salient adversarial examples, and then the eﬀectiveness of this threat model
in making classifiers robust to a broad class of non-salient adversarial example attacks. We
show that the proposed approach indeed yields adversarial examples that do not significantly
increase the salience of background, despite adding substantially more noise to it. Most
significantly, we show that adversarial training which uses our dual-perturbation attack
model yields significantly higher robustness to such non-salience-preserving attacks than
state-of-the-art adversarial training alternative. Moreover, it maintains comparable robustness
to conventional lp -norm bounded attacks to state-of-the-art approaches. In addition, we
show increased robustness of our defense to background perturbation. Finally, as shown
in Figure 6.1 which visualizes the loss gradient of AT-Dual (proposed approach) with two
alternative image classifiers, our approach results in models that align better with human
perception than even adversarial training which uses PGD-based adversarial examples.

6.2
6.2.1

Dual-Perturbation Attacks
Motivation

Our threat model is motivated by the feature integration theory [111] in cognitive science:
regions that have features that are diﬀerent from their surroundings are more likely to catch
a viewer’s gaze. Such regions are called salient regions, or foreground, while the others are
called background. Accordingly, for a given image, the semantics of the object of interest
is more likely to be preserved in the foreground, as it catches more visual attention of a
viewer compared to the background. If the foreground of an image is corrupted, then the
semantics of the object of interest is broken. In contrast, the same extent of corruption in
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Figure 6.2: Semantic distinction between foreground and background. Left: Original image
of bears. Middle: Adversarial example with `1 bounded perturbations (✏ = 40/255) on the
background, the semantic meaning (bear) is preserved. Right: Adversarial example with `1
bounded perturbations (✏ = 40/255) on the foreground, with more ambiguous semantics.
the background nevertheless preserves the overall semantic meaning of the scene captured
(see, e.g., Figure 6.2).
Despite this important cognitive distinction between foreground and background, essentially
all of the attacks on deep neural networks for image classification make no such distinction,
even though a number of other semantic factors have been considered [6, 80]. Rather, much of
the focus has been on adversarial perturbations that are not noticeable to a human, but which
are applied equally to the entire image. However, in security applications, the important
issue is not merely that an attack cannot be noticed, but that whatever observed is not
suspicious. The main goal of the threat model we introduce next is therefore to capture more
precisely the notion that an adversarial example is not suspicious by leveraging the cognitive
distinction between foreground and background of an image.

6.2.2

Modeling Non-Salient Adversarial Examples

At the high level, our proposed threat model involves producing small (imperceptible)
adversarial perturbations in the foreground of an image, and larger perturbations in the
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background. This can be done by incorporating state-of-the-art attacks into our method:
we can use one attack with small ✏ in the foreground, and another with a large ✏ in the
background. Consequently, we term our approach dual-perturbation attacks. Note that these
clearly generalize the standard small-norm (e.g., PGD) attacks, since we can set the ✏ to be
identical in both the foreground and background. However, the key consideration is that
after we add the large amount of noise to the background, we must ensure that we do not
thereby make it highly salient to the viewer. We capture this second objective by including
in the optimization problem a salience term that decreases with increasing salience of the
background.
Formally, the dual-perturbation attack solves the following optimization problem:

||

max

F (x)||p ✏F ,||

B(x)||p ✏B

L (h✓ (x + ), y) +

· S (x + ) ,

where S (x + ) measure the non-salience of background after adversarial noise
added, with

(6.1)
has been

a parameter that explicitly balances the two objectives: maximizing predicted

loss on adversarial examples, and limiting background salience so that the adversarial example
produced is unsuspicious. Here F returns the mask matrix constraining the area of the
perturbation in the foreground, and B returns the mask matrix restricting the area of the
perturbation in the background, for an input image x. F(x) and B(x) have the same
dimension as x and contain 1s in the area which can be perturbed and 0s elsewhere.

denotes

element-wise multiplication for matrices. Hence, we have x = F(x) + B(x) which indicates
that any input image can be decomposed into two independent images: one containing just
the foreground, and the other containing the background.
We consider two approaches for modeling the suspiciousness S(x + ) of a perturbed image
x + . Our primary method is to make use of the variance of an image’s Laplacian as the

95

measure of salience [89]. The Laplacian approach highlights regions of an image containing
rapid intensity changes such as shape edges. Thus, a Laplacian with a larger variance indicates
a more focused and sharper image, while a smaller variance suggests a smooth image that is
less salient. We adopt this idea and measure background non-salience of a perturbed image
by using its negative variance of the background area of its Laplacian, which is defined as

S(x + ) =

Var({Lap(Gray(x + ))k |B(x)k 6= 0 }),

(6.2)

where Gray(·) converts an RGB image to grayscale, Lap(·) is the Laplacian filter, and Var(·)
computes the population variance of a set. Our alternative approach leverages a recent study
on human fixation prediction [55], which is detailed in Appendix B.1.

6.2.3

Identifying Foreground and Background

Given an input x, we aim to compute F(x), the foreground mask and B(x), the background
mask. We consider two approaches for this: fixation prediction and segmentation.
Our first method leverages the fixation prediction approach [55] to identify foreground
and background. This enables a general approach for foreground-background partition as
fixation predictions are not limited to any specific collection of objects. Specifically, we
first use DeepGaze II [55] to output predicted pixel-level density of human fixations on an
image. We then divide the image into foreground and background by setting a threshold
t = 0.5 · (smin (x) + smax (x)) for each input image x where (smin , smax ) are the minimum
and maximum values of human fixation on pixels of x. Pixels with larger values than t are
grouped into the foreground, and the others are identified as background subsequently.
Our second approach is to make use of semantic segmentation to provide a partition of the
foreground and background in pixel level. This can be done in two steps: First, we use
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state-of-the-art paradigms for semantic segmentation (e.g., [68]) to identify pixels that belong
to each corresponding object, as there might be multiple objects in an image. Next, we
identify the pixels that belong to the object of interest as the foreground pixels, and the
others as background pixels.
We use both of the above approaches in dual-perturbation attacks when evaluating the
robustness of classifiers, as well as designing robust models. Note that we use the same
foreground and background partition for a non-adversarial image x and its perturbed version
x+ . Specifically, we first use the above approaches to identify the foreground and background
of x; we then apply the same partition on x + . We purposefully choose not to use the above
deep-learning-based partition methods directly on x + , as the corresponding neural models
are trained on non-robust data, and they could lead to adversarial attacks on the partition.

6.2.4

Computing Dual-Perturbation Attacks

A natural approach for solving the optimization problem shown in Eq. (6.1) is to apply
an iterative method, such as the PGD attack. However, the use of this approach poses
two challenges in our setting. First, as in the PGD attack, the problem is non-convex,
and PGD only converges to a local optimum. We can address this issue by using random
starts, i.e., by randomly initializing the starting point of the adversarial perturbations, as
in [71]. Second, and unlike PGD, the optimization problem in Eq. (6.1) involves two hard
constraints ||

F(x)||p  ✏F and ||

adversarial perturbation

B(x)||p  ✏B . Thus, the feasible region of the

is not an `p ball, which makes computing the projection P✏

computationally challenging in high-dimensional settings. To address this challenge, we
split the dual-perturbation attack into two individual processes in each iteration, one for the
adversarial perturbation in the foreground and the other for the background, and then merge
these two perturbations when computing the gradients, like a standard PGD attack.
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We use the following steps to solve the optimization problem of dual-perturbation attacks:

1. Initialization. Start with a random initial starting point
sample a data point
by using

(0)

=

(0)
F

(0)
F

in `p ball

F(x) +

(✏F ) and

(0)
B

(0)
B

in

(0)

. To do this, randomly

(✏B ). Then,

(0)

can be obtained

B(x). This ensures that the initial perturbation is

feasible in both foreground and background.
2. Split. At the k-th iteration, split the perturbation
for background:
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(k)
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(6.3)

.

B(x)

Then update the foreground and background perturbations separately using the following
rules:
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>
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>
>
:

(k+1)
F
(k+1)
B

= P✏ (

(k)
F

+ ↵F · gF )

= P✏ (

(k)
B

+ ↵B · gB )

(6.4)

where gF is the update that corresponds to the normalized steepest descent constrained
in the foreground, and gB for the background. Specifically,
8
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>
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>
>
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(k)
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·S x+
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·S x+

(k)

}

(6.5)

}

where ↵F is the step size for foreground, and ↵B is the step size for background.
3. Merge. At the end of the k-th iteration, merge the perturbations obtained in the last
step by using
(k+1)

=

(k+1)
F

98

+

(k+1)
.
B

(6.6)

(k+1)

is further used to derive the update for the normalized steepest descent at the

next iteration.
4. Return to step 2 or terminate after either a fixed number of iterations.

6.3

Defense Approach

Once we are able to compute the dual-perturbation attack, we can incorporate it into
conventional adversarial training paradigms for defense, as it has been demonstrated that
adversarial training is highly eﬀective in designing classification models that are robust to a
given attack. Specifically, we replace the PGD attack in the adversarial training framework
proposed by [71], with the proposed dual-perturbation attack. We term this approach
AT-Dual, which aims to solve the following optimization problem:

min
✓

1 X
|D| x,y2D ||

max

F (x)||p ✏F ,
|| B(x)||p ✏B

L (h✓ (x + ), y) +

· S (x + ) .

(6.7)

Note that AT-Dual needs to identify background and foreground for any input when solving the
inner maximization problems in Eq. (6.7) at training time. At prediction time, our approaches
classify test samples like any standard classifiers, which is independent of the semantic
partitions so as to close the backdoors to attacks on object detection approaches [123].
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6.4
6.4.1

Experimental Results
Experimental Setup

Datasets. We conducted the experiments on the following three datasets (detailed in
Appendix B.2): The first is Segment-6 [17], which are images with 32 ⇥ 32 pixels obtained
by pre-processing the Microsoft COCO dataset [62] to make it compatible with image
classification tasks. We directly used the semantic segmentation based foreground masks
provided in this dataset. Our second dataset is STL-10, a subset that contains images with
96⇥96 pixels. Our third dataset is ImageNet-10, a 10-class subset of the ImageNet dataset [21].
We cropped all its images to be with 224 ⇥ 224 pixels. For STL-10 and ImageNet-10, we used
fixation prediction to identify foreground and background as described in Section 6.2.
Baselines. We consider PGD attack as a baseline adversarial model, and Adversarial
Training with PGD Attacks as a baseline robust classifier. We also consider a classifier
trained on non-adversarial data (henceforth, Clean). Additionally, we consider Randomized
Smoothing [16] and defer corresponding results to Appendix B.9.
Evaluation Metrics. We use two standard evaluation metrics for both attacks and defenses:
1) accuracy of prediction on clean test data where no adversarial attacks were attempted. 2)
adversarial accuracy, which is accuracy when adversarial inputs are used in place of clean
inputs.
Throughout our evaluation, we used both `2 and `1 norms to measure the magnitude of
added adversarial perturbations. We only present experimental results of the Clean model
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and classification models that are trained to be robust to `2 norm attacks using the ImageNet10 dataset. The results for `1 norm and other datasets are similar and deferred to the
Appendix B.
In the following experiments, all classifiers were trained with 20 epochs on a ResNet34
model [38] pre-trained on ImageNet and with a customized final fully connected layer.
Specifically, we trained AT-PGD by using 50 steps of `2 PGD attack with ✏ = 2.0, and
AT-Dual by using 50 steps of `2 dual-perturbation attack with {✏F , ✏B , } = {2.0, 20.0, 0.0}
at each training epoch. At test time, we used both `2 PGD and dual-perturbation attacks
with 100 steps to evaluate robustness.

6.4.2

Saliency Analysis of Dual-Perturbation Adversarial Examples

We begin by considering a natural question: is our particular distinction between foreground
and background actually consistent with cognitive salience? In fact, this gives rise to two
distinct considerations: 1) whether foreground as we identify it is in fact significantly more
salient than the background, and 2) if so, whether background becomes significantly more
salient as a result of our dual-perturbation attacks. We answer both of these questions by
appealing to DeepGaze II [55] to compute the foreground score (FS) of dual-perturbation
examples and using the accuracy of diﬀerent classifiers on dual-perturbation examples with
diﬀerent background salience. Concretely, DeepGaze II outputs predicted pixel-level density
of human fixations on an image with the total density over the entire image summing to 1.
Our measure of relative salience of the foreground, the foreground score (FS), is defined as
P
FS = i2{k|F (x)k 6=0} si , where si is the saliency score produced by DeepGaze II for pixel i of

image x. Since foreground, as a fraction of the image, tends to be around 50-60%, a score
significantly higher than 0.5 indicates that predicted human fixation is relatively localized to
the foreground.
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Figure 6.3: Saliency analysis. Dual-perturbation attacks are performed by using {✏F , ✏B } =
{2.0, 20.0} and a variety of displayed in the figure. Left: foreground scores of dualperturbation examples in response to diﬀerent classifiers. Right: accuracy of classifiers on
dual-perturbation examples with salience control.
Or iginal
Sample

For egr ound
Mask

Dual-per tur bation Dual-per tur bation
Example (
) Example (
)

Figure 6.4: An illustration of dual-perturbation attacks. Adversarial examples are with
large `1 perturbations on the background (✏B = 20/255) and small `1 perturbations on the
foreground (✏F = 4/255). A parameter is used to control background salience explicitly. A
larger results in less salient background under the same magnititude of perturbation.
Figure 6.3 presents the answer to both of the questions above. First, observe that in Figure 6.3,
FS (vertical axis) is typically well above 0.5, and in most cases above 0.8, for all attacks.
Second, this is true whether we attack the Clean model, or either AT-PGD or AT-Dual robust
models. Particularly noteworthy, however, is the impact that the parameter
especially when robust classifiers are employed. Recall that

has on the FS,

reflects the relative importance

of salience in generating adversarial examples, with larger values forcing our approach to
pay more attention to preserving unsuspiciousness of background relative to foreground. As
we increase , we note higher FS, i.e., lower background salience (again, Figure 6.3, left).
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Figure 6.5: Robustness to white-box `2 attacks on ImageNet-10. Left: dual-perturbation
attacks with diﬀerent foreground distortions. ✏B is fixed to be 20.0 and = 0.005. Middle:
dual-perturbation attacks with diﬀerent background distortions. ✏F is fixed to be 2.0 and
= 0.005. Right: PGD attacks.
Figure 6.4 oﬀers a visual illustration of this eﬀect. As significantly, Figure 6.3 (right) shows
that moderately increasing

does not significantly reduce the eﬀectiveness of the attack on

the Clean and AT-Dual classifiers.

6.4.3

Robustness against Non-Salient Adversarial Examples

Next, we evaluate the eﬀectiveness of dual-perturbation attacks against state-of-the-art
robust learning methods, as well as the eﬀectiveness of adversarial training that uses dualperturbation attacks for generating adversarial examples. We begin by considering white-box
attacks, and subsequently evaluate transferability.
The results for white-box attacks are presented in Figure 6.5. First, consider the dualperturbation attacks (left and middle plots). Note that in all cases these attacks are highly
successful against the baseline robust classifier (AT-PGD); indeed, even relatively small
levels of foreground noise yield near-zero accuracy when accompanied by suﬃciently large
background perturbations. For example, when the perturbation to the foreground is ✏F = 2.0
and background perturbation is ✏B = 20.0, AT-PGD achieves robust accuracy around 20%.
In contrast, AT-Dual remains significantly more robust, with an improvement of up to 30%

103

Figure 6.6: Robustness against adversarial examples transferred from other models on
ImageNet-10. Left: `2 dual-perturbation attacks performed by using {✏F , ✏B , } =
{2.0, 20.0, 0.005} on diﬀerent source models. Right: `2 PGD attacks with ✏ = 2.0 on
diﬀerent source models.
compared to the baseline. Second, consider the standard PGD attacks (right plot). It can be
observed that all of the robust models are successful against the `2 PGD attacks. However,
our defense exhibit moderately higher robustness than the baselines under large distortions
of PGD attacks, without sacrificing much in accuracy on clean data. For example, when the
perturbation of the `2 PGD attack is above ✏ = 3.0, AT-Dual can achieve 20% more accuracy.
Next, we measure the transferability of adversarial examples among diﬀerent classification
models. To do this, we first produced adversarial examples by using `2 PGD attack or
dual-perturbation attack on a source model. Then, we used these examples to evaluate the
performance of an independent target model, where a higher prediction accuracy means weaker
transferability. The results are presented in Figure 6.6. The first observation is that dualperturbation attacks exhibit significantly better transferability than the conventional PGD
attacks (transferability is up to 40% better for dual-perturbation attacks). Second, we can
observe that when AT-Dual is used as the target (i.e., defending by adversarial training with
dual-perturbation examples), these are typically resistant to adversarial examples generated
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against either the clean model, or against AT-PGD. This observation obtains even when we
use PGD to generate adversarial examples.

Figure 6.7: Robustness to white-box background attacks on ImageNet-10. ✏F is fixed to be
0.0 and = 0.005.

In addition, we evaluate robustness of classifiers against background perturbations. To do
this, we fixed ✏F = 0, and only background perturbations are allowed to be added to an image.
The results are shown in Figure 6.7. We can observe significantly increased robustness of
our defense to background perturbation, up to 25% than AT-PGD and 50% than the Clean
classifier.

6.4.4

Generalizability of Defense

It has been observed that models robust against lp -norm-bounded attacks for one value of p
can be fragile when facing attacks with a diﬀerent norm lp0 [98].
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Figure 6.8: Robustness to additional white-box attacks on ImageNet-10. Top left: 20 steps
of `1 PGD attacks. Top right: 20 steps of `1 dual-perturbation attacks with diﬀerent
foreground distortions. ✏B is fixed to be 20/255 and = 0.005. Bottom left: 20 steps of `1
dual-perturbation attacks with diﬀerent background distortions. ✏F is fixed to be 4/255 and
= 0.005. Bottom right: `0 JSMA attacks.
Here, our final goal is to present evidence that the approaches for defense based on dualperturbation attacks remain relatively robust even when faced with attacks generated using
diﬀerent norms. Here, we show this when our models are trained using the l2 -bounded attacks,
and evaluated against other attacks using other norms. The results are presented in Figure 6.8.
We consider three alternative attacks: 1) PGD using the l1 -bounded perturbations, as in
[71] (top left in Figure 6.8) 2) dual-perturbation attacks with l1 -norm bounds (top right
and bottom left in Figure 6.8), and 3) JSMA, a l0 -bounded attack [85] (bottom right in
Figure 6.8). We additionally considered l2 attacks, per Carlini and Wagner [13], but find that
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all of the robust models, whether based on PGD or dual-perturbation attacks, are successful
against these.
Our first observation is that AT-Dual is significantly more robust to l1 -bounded PGD attacks
than the adversarial training approach in which adversarial examples are generated using l2 bounded PGD attacks (Figure 6.8 (top left)). Consequently, training with dual-perturbation
attacks already exhibits better ability to generalize to other attacks compared to conventional
adversarial training.
The gap between dual-perturbation-based adversarial training and standard adversarial
training is even more significant when we consider l1 dual-perturbation attacks (top right and
bottom left figures of Figure 6.8). Here, we see that robustness of PGD-based adversarially
trained model is only marginally better than that of a clean model under large distortions
(e.g., when ✏B

20/255 in the bottom left plot of Figure 6.8), whereas AT-Dual remains

relatively robust.
Finally, considering JSMA attacks (see Figure 6.8 (right)), we can observe that both AT-Dual
and AT-PGD remain relatively robust. However, a deeper look at Figure 6.8 (bottom right)
reveals that compared to AT-PGD, AT-Dual exhibit moderately higher robustness than the
baselines under large distortions of JSMA attacks. Overall, in all of the cases, the model
made robust using dual-perturbation attacks remains quite robust even as we evaluate against
a diﬀerent attack, using a diﬀerent norm.

6.4.5

Analysis of Defense

Finally, we conduct a qualitative study of adversarial robustness by investigating which pixellevel features are important for diﬀerent classifiers at prediction time. To do this, we visualize
the loss gradient of diﬀerent classifiers with respect to pixels of the same non-adversarial
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inputs (as introduced in [113]), shown in Figure 6.1. Our first observation is that the
gradients in response to adversarially robust classifiers (AT-PGD and AT-Dual) align well
with human perception, while a standard training model (Clean) results in a noisy gradient
for the input images. Second, compared to adversarial training with the conventional PGD
attack (AT-PGD), the loss gradient of AT-Dual provides significantly better alignment with
sharper foreground edges and less noisy background. This indicates that adversarial training
with the dual-pertubation attack can extract more perceptual semantics from an input image
and is less dependent on the background at prediction time. In other words, our defense
approach can extract highly robust and semantically meaningful features, which contribute
to its robustness to a variety of attacks.

6.5

Conclusion

In this chapter, we proposed the dual-perturbation attack, a novel threat model that produces
unsuspicious adversarial examples by leveraging the cognitive distinction between image
foreground and background. As we have shown, our attack can defeat all state-of-theart defenses. By contrast, the proposed defense approaches using our attack model can
significantly improve robustness against unsuspicious adversarial examples, with relatively
small performance degradation on non-adversarial data. In addition, our defense approaches
can achieve comparable to, or better robustness than the alternatives in the face of traditional
attacks.
Our threat model and defense motivate several new research questions. The first is whether
there are more eﬀective methods to identify foreground of images. Second, can we further
improve robustness to dual-perturbation attacks? Finally, while we provide the first principled
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approach for quantifying suspiciousness, there may be eﬀective alternative approaches for
doing so.
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Part III
Robust Detection Pipeline
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Chapter 7
Finding Needles in a Moving Haystack:
Prioritizing Alerts with Adversarial
Reinforcement Learning
In this chapter, we focus on deciding which of a large number of alerts to choose for further
investigation—often a necessary step in the detection pipeline. One of the major challenges
in using detection systems in practice is in dealing with an overwhelming number of alerts
that are triggered by normal behavior (the so-called false positives), obscuring alerts resulting
from actual malicious activity. While numerous methods for reducing the scope of this
issue have been proposed, ultimately one must still decide how to prioritize which alerts to
investigate, and most existing prioritization methods are heuristic, for example, based on
suspiciousness or priority scores. We introduce a novel approach for computing a policy for
prioritizing alerts using adversarial reinforcement learning. Our approach assumes that the
attacker knows the full state of the detection system and the defender’s alert prioritization
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policy, and will dynamically choose an optimal attack. The first step of our approach is to
capture the interaction between the defender and attacker in a game theoretic model. To
tackle the computational complexity of solving this game to obtain a dynamic stochastic
alert prioritization policy, we propose an adversarial reinforcement learning framework. In
this framework, we use neural reinforcement learning to compute best response policies for
both the defender and the adversary to an arbitrary stochastic policy of the other. We then
use these in a double-oracle framework to obtain an approximate equilibrium of the game,
which in turn yields a robust stochastic policy for the defender. Extensive experiments using
case studies in fraud and intrusion detection demonstrate that our approach is eﬀective in
creating robust alert prioritization policies.

7.1

Overview

Building on the observation of the fundamental trade-oﬀ between false alert and attack
detection rate, in this chapter, we propose a novel computational approach for robust alert
prioritization to address the challenge. Our approach assumes a strong attacker who knows
the full state of the detection environment including which alerts have been triggered, which
have been investigated in the past, and even the defender’s policy. We also assumed that
the adversary is capable of finding and utilizing a near optimal attack strategy against the
defender policy based on his knowledge of the system and defending policy. To defend against
such a strong attacker, we propose to compute the optimal stochastic dynamic defender
policy that chooses the alerts to investigate as a function of the observable state, and that is
robust to our threat model. At the core of our technical approach is a combination of game
theory with adversarial reinforcement learning (ARL). Specifically, we model the problem
of robust alert prioritization as a game in which the defender chooses its stochastic and
dynamic policy for prioritizing alerts, while the attacker chooses which attacks to execute,
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also dynamically with full knowledge of the system state. Our computational approach first
uses neural reinforcement learning to compute approximately optimal policies for either player
in response to a fixed stochastic policy of their counterpart. It then uses these (approximate)
best response oracles as a part of a double-oracle framework, which iterates two steps: 1)
solve a game involving a restricted set of policies by both players, and 2) augment the policy
sets by calling the best response oracle for each player. Note that our approach is completely
orthogonal to methods for reducing the number of false positive alerts, such as alert correlation,
and is meant to be used in combination with these, rather than as an alternative. In particular,
we can first apply alert correlation to obtain a reduced set of alerts, and subsequently use our
approach for selecting which alerts to investigate. Since alert correlation cannot be overly
aggressive in order to ensure that we still capture actual attacks, the number of alerts often
still significantly exceeds the investigation budget.
We evaluate our approach experimentally in two application domains: intrusion detection,
where we use the Suricata open-source intrusion-detection system (IDS) with a network IDS
dataset, and fraud detection, with a detector learned from data using machine learning. In
both settings, we show that our approach is significantly more eﬀective than alternatives
with respect to our threat model. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our approach remains
highly eﬀective, and better than baseline alternatives in nearly all cases, even when certain
assumptions of our threat model are violated.

7.2

System Model

As displayed in Figure 7.1, our system is partitioned into four major components: a group of
regular users (RU), an adversary (also called attacker), a defender, and an attack detection
environment (ADE).
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Figure 7.1: System model. The Attack Oracle computes the attacker’s policy for executing
attacks, which is implemented by the Attack Generator and then triggers alerts observed
by the Attack Detection Environment. The Defense Oracle computes the defender’s alert
prioritization policy, which is implemented by the Alert Analyzer.
The regular users (RU) are the authorized users of a system. In contrast, the adversary
is a sophisticated actor who attacks the target computer system. The attack detection
environment (ADE) models the combination of the software artifact that is responsible for
monitoring the system (e.g., network traﬃc, files, emails) and raising alerts for observed
suspicious behavior, as well as relevant system state. System state includes attacks that have
been executed (unknown to the defender), and alerts that have been investigated (known to
both the attacker and defender). Crucially, the alerts triggered in the ADE may correspond
either to behavior of the normal users RU, or to malicious behavior (attacks) by the adversary.
We divide time into a series of discrete time periods. The defender is limited in how many
alerts it can investigate in each time period and must select a small subset of alerts for
investigation, while the adversary is limited in how many attacks it executes in each time
period. The full system operates as follows for a representative time period (see again the
schematic in Figure 7.1):
1. Benign alerts are generated by the ADE.
2. These alerts, and the remaining ADE system state (such as which alerts from past time
periods have not yet been investigated, but could be investigated in the future), are
observed by the attacker, who executes a collection of attacks.
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Table 7.1: Notation summary.
Notation
A
T
Ct
B
Ea
D
Pa,t (n)
Ft
La
⌧
(k)

Nt
(k)
Ma
(k)
Sa,t
(k)
R+1
↵v
⇡v
v

Interpretation
Constants and functions
Types of attacks
Types of alerts
Cost of investigating an alert of type t 2 T
Defender’s budget
Cost of mounting an attack of type a 2 A
Adversary’s budget
Probability that an attack a 2 A raises n alerts of type
t2T
Probability distribution of false alerts of type t 2 T
Loss inflicted by an undetected attack a 2 A
Temporal discounting factor
State variables (Time slot k 2 N)
Number of uninvestigated alerts of type t 2 T
Indicator of whether an attack of type a 2 A was mounted
Number of alerts of type t 2 T raised due to attack a 2 A
Reward obtained by the defender
Actions, policies, and strategies
Action of player v 2 { 1, +1}
Policy (i.e., pure strategy) of player v 2 { 1, +1}
Mixed strategy of player v 2 { 1, +1}

3. The attacks trigger new alerts. These are arbitrarily mixed into the full collection of
alerts, which is then observed by the defender.
4. The defender chooses a subset of alerts to investigate. The ADE state is updated
accordingly, and the process repeats in the next time period.

Next, we describe our model of the alert detection environment, our threat model, and our
defender model. The full list of notation that we use in the model is presented in Table 7.1.
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7.2.1

Attack Detection Environment (ADE) Model

Our model of the attack detection environment (ADE) captures a broad array of detection
settings, including credit card fraud, intrusion, and malware detection. In this model, the
ADE is composed of two parts: an alert generator (such as an intrusion detection system,
like Suricata) and system state.
An alert generator produces a sequence of alerts in each time period. We aggregate alerts
based on a finite predefined set of types T . For example, an alert type may be based on the
application layer it was generated for (HTTP, DNS, etc), port number or range, destination
IP address, and any other information that’s informative for determining the nature and
relative priority of alerts. We can also define alert types for meaningful sequences of alerts.
Indeed, the notion of alert types is entirely without loss of generality—we can define each
type to be a unique sequence of alerts, for example—but in practice it is useful (indeed,
crucial for scalability) to aggregate semantically similar alerts.
At the end of each time period the system generates a collection of alert counts for each alert
type t 2 T . We assume that normal or benign behavior generates alerts according to a known
distribution F, where Ft (n) is the marginal probability that n alerts of type t are generated.
We also refer to this as the distribution of false alarms, since if the defender were omniscient,
they would never trigger such alerts. Note that in practice it is not diﬃcult to obtain the
distribution F. Specifically, we can use past logs of all alerts over some time period to learn
the distribution F. Since the vast majority of alerts in real systems are in fact false positives,
any unidentified true positives in the logs will have a negligible impact.8
8

If we are concerned about these poisoning the data, we can use robust estimation approaches to mitigate
the issue [115].
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We use three matrices to represent the state of ADE at time period k. The first represents
the counts of alerts not yet investigated, grouped by type. Formally, we denote this structure
(k)

(k)

by N(k) = {Nt }t2T , where Nt

is the number of alerts of type t 2 T that were raised but

have not been investigated by the defender. This is observed by both the defender and the
attacker. The second describes which attacks have been executed by the adversary; formally,
(k)

(k)

M(k) = {Ma }a2A , where Ma

(k)

is a binary indicator where Ma

= 1 iﬀ the attack a was

executed. This matrix is only observed by the attacker. Finally, we represent which alerts are
(k)

(k)

raised specifically due to each attack. Formally, S(k) = {Sa,t }a2A,t2T , where Sa,t represents
the number of alerts of type t 2 T raised due to attack a. This is also only observed by the
attacker.

7.2.2

Threat Model

Adversary’s Knowledge. We consider a strong attacker who is capable of observing
the current state of the ADE. This obviates the need to make specific (and potentially
erroneous) assumptions about information actually available to the attacker about system
state; in practice, given the zero-sum nature of the encounter we consider below, having a less
informed attacker will only improve the defender’s utility. Additionally, the attacker knows
the randomized policy used by the defender for choosing which alerts to inspect (more on
this below), and inspection decisions in previous rounds, but not the inspection decision in
the current round (which happens after the attack).
Adversary’s Capabilities. In each time period, the adversary can execute multiple actions
a from a set of possible (representative) actions A.9 Each attack action a 2 A stochastically
triggers alerts according to the probability distribution P , where Pa,t (n) is the marginal
9

In practice, actions in A correspond to equivalence classes of attacks; for example, a 2 A could be a
representative denial-of-service attack.
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probability that action a generates n alerts of type t. These probabilities can be learned by
replaying known attack actions through actual detectors (as we do in the experiments below),
ideally as a part of a full dataset which includes a mix of benign and malicious behavior.
Commonly, alerts are generated deterministically for given attack actions; it is evident that
our model admits this as a special case (i.e., Pa,t 2 {0, 1}). However, our generality allows us
to handle important cases where alerts are, indeed, stochastic. For example, consider a Port
Scan attack (as a part of a reconnaissance step). Port scan alert rules commonly consider the
number of certain kinds of packets (such as ICMP packets) observed over a small time period
(say, several seconds), and raise an alert if this number exceeds a predefined threshold. The
number of such packets, of course, also depends on background traﬃc, which is stochastic, so
that the triggering of the alert is also stochastic if the attack is suﬃciently stealthy to avoid
exceeding such a threshold in isolation.
Let Ea be the cost for executing an attack a 2 A. One method to estimate these costs is
to examine the diﬃculty of executing the exploit based on the CVSS complexity metrics.
The main limitation to the attacker capabilities is a budget constraint D that limits how
many, and which combination of, attacks can be executed.10 While it is diﬃcult to reliably
estimate this budget, our case studies in Section 7.5 demonstrate that our approach is robust
to uncertainty about this parameter. Specifically, any attack decision ↵

1

with ↵

1,a

the

probability that the attack a is executed by the attacker in a given time period, must abide
by the following constraint:

X

↵

1,a Ea

a2A

10

 D.

(7.1)

Note that this easily admits the possibility of multiple attackers, where D becomes the total budget of
all attackers. This case is equivalent to assuming that attackers coordinate. This is a safe assumption, since
if they do not, the defender’s utility can only increase.
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For our purposes, it is useful to represent the attacker as consisting of two modules: Attack
Oracle and Attack Generator, as seen in Figure 7.1. The attack oracle runs a policy, which
maps observed the state of the ADE to attacks that are executed. In each time period, after
observing ADE state, the attack oracle chooses attack actions, which are then executed by
the attack generator, triggering alerts and thereby modifying the state of the ADE. Below we
present our approach for approximating the optimal attack policies.
Adversary’s Goals. The adversary aims to successfully execute attacks. Success entails
avoiding being detection by the defender, which only happens if alerts associated with an
attack are inspected. Thus, if an attack triggers a collection of alerts, but none of these are
chosen by the defender to be inspected in the current round, the attack succeeds. Diﬀerent
attacks, however, entail diﬀerent consequences and, therefore, diﬀerent rewards to the attacker
(and loss to the defender). As a result, the adversary will ultimately need to balance rewards
to be gained from successful attacks and the likelihood of being detected.

7.2.3

Defender Model

Defender’s Knowledge. Unlike the adversary, the defender can only partially observe the
state of the ADE. In particular, the defender only observes N(k) , the numbers of remaining
uninvestigated alerts, grouped by alert type (since clearly the defender cannot directly observe
actually attacks). In addition, we assume that the defender knows the attack budget and
costs of (representative) attacks. In our experiments, we study the impact of relaxing this
assumption (see Section 7.5), and provide practical guidance on this issue.
Defender’s Capabilities. The defender chooses subsets of alerts in N(k) to investigate in
each time period k. This choice is constrained by the defender’s budget, which in practice
can translate to time the defender has to investigate alerts. Since diﬀerent types of alerts may
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need diﬀerent amounts of time to investigate, or more generally, incur varying investigation
costs, the budget constraint is on the total cost of investigating chosen alerts. Formally, let
(k)

Ct be the investigation cost of an alert of type t, and let ↵+1,t be the number of alerts of type
t chosen to be investigated by the defender in period k. Then the budget constraint takes
the following mathematical form:
X
t2T

(k)

Ct ↵+1,t  B.

(7.2)

An additional constraint imposed by the problem definition is that the defender can only
investigate existing alerts:
(k)

(k)

8t 2 T : ↵+1,t  Nt .

(7.3)

Just as with the adversary, it is useful to represent the defender as consisting of two modules:
Defense Oracle and Alert Analyzer, as shown in Figure 7.1. The defense oracle runs a policy,
which maps partially observed state of the ADE to the choice of a subset of alerts to be
investigated. In each time period, after observing the set of as yet uninvestigated alerts, the
defense oracle chooses which alerts to investigate, and this policy is then implemented by the
alert analyzer, which thereby modifies ADE state (marking the selected alerts as having been
investigated). Below we present our approach for approximately computing optimal defense
policies that are robust to attacks as defined in our threat model above.
Defender’s Goals. The goal of the defender is to guard a computer system or network
by detecting attacks through alert inspection. To achieve its goal, the defender develops
an investigation policy to allocate its limited budget to investigation activities in order to
minimize consequences of successful attacks, where we assume that an attack will fail to
accomplish its primary objectives if the alerts it causes the ADE to emit are investigated in
a timely manner.
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7.2.4

An Illustrative Example

Since our system is built on top of an abstracted model of alert investigation, the results are
generally applicable to a wide range of real-world problems. We will use intrusion detection
as an illustrative example in this section. Port Scan reconnaissance attack is one of the most
common initial steps in remote exploitation and is a common occurrence faced by many
enterprise IT professionals. In a Suricata IDS system, each alert item has diﬀerent levels
of categorization. For example, at the lowest layer, the port scan may trigger two types
of alert, 1) Httprecon Web Server Fingerprint Scan, and 2) ET SCAN NMAP -sO. At a
higher level, these alerts can be categorized into attempted-recon (since both reflect potential
reconnaissance eﬀorts by the attacker), as is the case in the Emerging Threats Ruleset of
Suricata. A defender can choose diﬀerent granularities of attack categorization to map the
IDS alert types into the abstracted types in our proposed model based on individual needs.
Besides categorization, the defender can also make use of other attributes in the IDS alerts to
aid in abstracted type assignment. For example, a port scan on the enterprise file server can
be assigned to the abstracted type of high-risk-recon, while a port scan on employee desktop
can be assigned to attempted-recon.
In addition to the alerts corresponding to an actual attack action, normal user behavior can
generate false positive alerts. For example, a user who is scraping the web for weather data
monitoring may trigger the ET POLICY POSSIBLE Web Crawl using Curl, which is grouped
into the attempted-recon type by the same Emerging Threats Suricata ruleset. Leveraging
the proposed game-theoretic model on these abstracted alerts, it is possible for the defender
to devise an optimal defense policy for a wide range of alert applications even in the face of
possible false positives.
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7.3

Game Theoretic Model of Robust Alert Prioritization

We now turn to the proposed approach for robust alert prioritization. We model the
interaction between the defender and attacker as a zero-sum game, which allows us to define
and subsequently compute robust stochastic inspection policies for the defender. In this
section, we formally describe the game model. We then present the computational approach
for solving it in Section 7.4.

7.3.1

Strategies

The game has two players: the defender (denoted by v = +1) and the adversary (denoted
by v =

1). Each player’s strategies are policies, that is, mappings from an observed ADE

state to the probability distribution over actions to take in that state. In a given state, the
defender chooses a subset of alerts to investigate; thus, the defender’s set of possible actions
is the set of all alert subsets that satisfy the constraints (7.2) and (7.3). The attacker’s
choices in a given state correspond to subsets of actions A to take. Consequently, the set
of adversary’s actions is the set of all subsets of attacks satisfying constraint (7.1). Note
that the combinatorial nature of both players’ action spaces and of the state space makes
even representing deterministic policies non-trivial; we will deal with this issue in Section 7.4.
Moreover, we will consider stochastic policies. An equivalent way to represent stochastic
policies is as probability distributions over deterministic policies, which map observed state
to a particular action (subset of alerts for the defender, subset of attacks for the adversary).
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Henceforth, we call deterministic policies of the players their pure strategies and stochastic
policies are termed mixed strategies, following standard terminology in game theory.11
Let ⇡

1

denote the attacker’s policy, which maps the fully observed state of ADE, O

hN(k) , M(k) , S(k) i, to a subset of attacks. Let ↵
are (for the moment) binary indicators with ↵
the attacker. In other words, the vector ↵

(k)
1

(k)
1

(k)
1,a

= ⇡ 1 (O

(k)
1 ),

where ↵

(k)
1

= {↵

(k)
1

=

(k)
1,a }a2A

= 1 iﬀ an action a 2 A is chosen by

represents the choice of actions made by the

adversary. Similarly, ⇡+1 denotes the defender’s policy, which maps the portion of ADE state
(k)

O+1 = N(k) observed by the defender to the number of alerts of each type to investigate.
(k)

(k)

(k)

(k)

Analogously to the attacker, ↵+1 = ⇡+1 (O+1 ), where ↵+1 = {↵+1,t }t2T are the counts of
alerts chosen to be investigated for each type t. Now, notice that all alerts of type t are
equivalent by definition; consequently, it makes no diﬀerence to the defender which of these
are chosen, and we therefore choose the fraction

(k)

↵+1,t
(k)

Nt

of alerts of type t uniformly at random.

Let ⇧v be player v’s set of pure strategies, where each pure strategy ⇡v 2 ⇧v is a policy
as defined above. A mixed strategy of player v is then a probability distribution
{ v (⇡v )}⇡v 2⇧v over the player’s pure strategies ⇧v where

v (⇡v )

v

=

is the probability that

player v uses policy ⇡v . Since a mixed strategy v is a distribution over a finite set of pure
P
strategies, it satisfies 0  v (⇡v )  1 and ⇡v 2⇧v v (⇡v ) = 1. Let ⌃v denote the set of all
mixed strategies of player v.

11
At decision time, players can sample from their respective mixed strategies in each round, thereby
determining their decisions in that round. We assume that while the defender’s mixed strategy is known to
the attacker, the realizations, or samples, of deterministic policies drawn in each round are not observed by
the attacker; for example, the sampling process can take place after the entire set of alerts in that round
are observed. Note that if we re-sample independently in each round, the attacker learns no additional
information about the defender’s policy from past rounds.
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7.3.2

Utilities

For any strategy profile of the two players, (⇡v , ⇡ v ), we denote the utility of each player
P
v by Uv (⇡v , ⇡ v ), v 2 {+1, 1}. Since our game is zero-sum, v2{+1, 1} Uv (⇡v , ⇡ v ) = 0.

When player v chooses pure strategy ⇡v 2 ⇧v and its opponent
v

v plays mixed strategy

2 ⌃ v , then the expected utility of v is
Uv (⇡v ,

v)

=
⇡

X

(7.4)

v (⇡ v )Uv (⇡v , ⇡ v ).

v 2⇧

v

Similarly, the expected utility of player v when it chooses the mixed strategy
its opponent play the mixed strategy

Uv (

v,

v

v) =

2⌃

X

v

v

2 ⌃v and

is

v (⇡v )Uv (⇡v ,

(7.5)

v ).

⇡v 2⇧v

Next, we describe how to compute the utility of player v, Uv (⇡v , ⇡ v ), when its policy is ⇡v
and the opponent’s policy ⇡

v

are given.

Consider arbitrary pure strategies of both players, ⇡+1 and ⇡ 1 . The game begins with an
initial system state hN (0) , M (0) , S (0) i = h0, 0, 0i. The system state is then updated in each
time period k as follows:
1. Alert investigation. The defender first investigates a subset of alerts produced thus
far. Specifically, the defender chooses the number of alerts of each type to investigate
(k)

(k)

(k)

{↵+1,t }t2T according to its policy ⇡+1 (O+1 ) given current observed state O+1 . For
fa(k) be an indicator of whether attack a has been executed by
each attack a 2 A, let M
(k)

the beginning of time period k, but has not been investigated. If Ma

= 0, we have

fa(k) = 0 as no attack a 2 A has been executed. If Ma(k) = 1, then M
fa(k) = 1 with
M
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probability
p(k)
a =

Y
t2T

(

(k)

C(Nt

(k)

(k)

Sa,t , ↵+1,t )
(k)

(k)

C(Nt , ↵+1,t )

)

(7.6)

,

where C(n, r) is the number of possible combinations of r objects from a set of n objects.
(k)

pa is then the probability that attack a is not detected by the defender.
2. Attack generation. The adversary produces attacks by executing actions according
to its policy {↵
(k+1)

Ma

=↵

(k)
1,a

(k)
1,a }a2A

= ⇡ 1 (O

(k)
1)

given the fully observed ADE state O

(k)
1.

Then

for each a 2 A.

3. Triggering alerts. Each attack a 2 A can trigger alerts as follows. For each attack
(k+1)

a 2 A and alert type t 2 T , if Ma
n

(k+1)

= 1, then Sa,t

= n with probability Pa,t (n) for

0. This probability can be estimated, for example, by feeding inputs which include

representative attacks into an attack detector and observing relative frequencies of alerts
that are triggered. In addition, false alerts are generated according to the distribution
Ft , which we can estimate from data of normal behavior and associated alert counts.
(k)

Let ft

be the number of false alerts of type t 2 T that have been generated. Then
(k+1)

the total number of alerts in the next time period k + 1 is Nt

(k)

= ft

(k+1)

+ Sa,t

.

In order to define the reward received by the defender in time period k, we make the following
assumption: if any of the alerts raised by an attack is chosen to be inspected, then the attack
is detected; otherwise, the attack is not detected. Let La be the loss incurred by the defender
when an attack a 2 A is not detected. Then the reward of the defender obtained in time
period k is
(k)

R+1 =

X
a2A

fa(k) .
La · M

(7.7)

For an arbitrary pure strategy profile of the defender and adversary, (⇡+1 , ⇡ 1 ), the defender’s
utility from the game is the expected total discounted sum of the reward accrued in each
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time period:
U+1 (⇡+1 , ⇡ 1 ) = E

"

1
X
k=0

(k)

#

(7.8)

⌧ k · R+1 ,

where ⌧ 2 (0, 1) is a temporal discounting factor which implies that future rewards are less
important than current rewards. That is, imminent losses are more important to the defender
than potential future losses. The adversary’s utility is then U 1 (⇡+1 , ⇡ 1 ) =

7.3.3

U+1 (⇡+1 , ⇡ 1 ).

Solution Concept

Our goal of finding robust alert investigation policies amounts to computing a mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium (MSNE) of our game by the well-known equivalence between MSNE,
maximin, and minimax solutions in zero-sum games [54]. A mixed-strategy profile (

⇤
v,

⇤

v)

of the two players is an MSNE if it satisfies the following condition for all v 2 {+1, 1}
Uv (

⇤
v,

⇤

v)

Uv (

v,

That is, each player v chooses a stochastic policy
v) when its opponent chooses

⇤

v.
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⇤

v)

⇤
v

8

v

2 ⌃v .

(7.9)

that is the best response (is optimal for

7.4
7.4.1

Computing Robust Alert Prioritization Policies
Solution Overview

For given sets of policies, ⇧+1 and ⇧ 1 , a standard approach to computing the MSNE of a
zero-sum game is to solve a linear program of the following form:
max Uv⇤
P
s.t.
⇡v 2⇧v Uv (⇡v , ⇡ v ) ·
P
⇡v 2⇧v v (⇡v ) = 1
v (⇡v )

v (⇡v )

Uv⇤ ,8⇡

⇤
+1

2⇧

v

(7.10)

8⇡v 2 ⇧v

0

where in our case the optimal solution

v

yields the robust alert prioritization policy for

the defender. However, using this approach for our problem entails two principal technical
challenges: 1) the space of policies for both players is intractably large, and 2) it is even
intractable to explicitly represent individual policies, since they map a combinatorial set of
states to a combinatorial set of actions for both players.
We propose an adversarial reinforcement learning approach to address these challenges,
which combines a double oracle framework [75] with neural reinforcement learning. The
general double oracle approach is illustrated in Figure 7.2. We start with an arbitrary
small collection of policies for both players, (⇧+1 , ⇧ 1 ), and solve the linear program (7.10),
obtaining provisional equilibrium mixed strategies (

+1 ,

1)

of the restricted game. Next, we

query the attack oracle to compute the adversary’s best response ⇡ 1 (
equilibrium mixed strategy
defender’s best response ⇡+1 (

+1 ,

+1 )

to the defender’s

and, similarly, query the defense oracle to compute the

1)

to the adversary’s equilibrium mixed strategy

1.

The

best response policies are then added to the policy sets (⇧+1 , ⇧ 1 ) of the players, and we then
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Figure 7.2: The game solver based on the double oracle algorithm.
re-solve the linear program and repeat the process. The process stops when neither player’s
best response policy yields appreciable improvement in utility compared to the provisional
equilibrium mixed strategy. Since the space of possible policies in our case is infinite, this
process may not converge.
However, in our experiments the procedure converged in fewer than 15 iterations (see
Figure 7.12 in Section 7.5.4), with the fast convergence in part due to the way we represent
policies, as discussed below. The main question that remains is how to compute or approximate
the best response oracles for both players. To this end, we use reinforcement learning
techniques with policies represented using neural networks. Below, we explain both our
double oracle approach and our neural reinforcement learning methods (including the specific
way in which we represent policies) in further detail.

7.4.2

Policy-Based Double Oracle Method

As displayed in Figure 7.2, our game solver is an extension of the double oracle algorithm
proposed in [112] and is partitioned into four parts: a policy container, a linear programming
(LP) optimizer, a defense oracle, and an attack oracle. The policy container stores the
policies of the two players, ⇧+1 and ⇧ 1 , as well as a utility matrix U , whose elements are
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U+1 (⇡+1 , ⇡ 1 ) for all ⇡+1 2 ⇧+1 and ⇡

2 ⇧ 1 . The LP optimizer solves the game by

1

computing the current mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium given the utility matrix U . The
defense and attack oracles are agents that apply reinforcement learning to compute the optimal
responses to their opponents’ mixed strategies, which are provided by the LP optimizer.
Our solver works in an iterative manner such that the players’ policies and the utility matrix
grow incrementally. Initially, ⇧+1 , ⇧

1

can be set up with some basic policies, for example,

uniformly allocating each player’s budget among their choices. Then, the policy sets, jointly
encapsulated in a policy container, are updated in each iteration as follows:

1. First, the LP optimizer computes the mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium (

0

0

+1 ,

1)

of

the current iteration by solving the optimization problems presented in Eq. (7.10).
2. The oracle of player v computes the best response policy ⇡v0 given that its opponent
uses its equilibrium mixed-strategy
3. If Uv (⇡v0 ,

0

v)

 Uv (

nates and returns (

0
v,
0
+1 ,

0

v)
0

1)

0

v,

for v 2 {+1, 1}.

for all v 2 {+1, 1}, the double oracle algorithm termias the approximate MSNE. Otherwise, add ⇡v0 to the

corresponding ⇧v , update the utility matrix U and continue from Step 2.

The resulting (

0

+1 ,

0

1)

is an approximate mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (

⇤
+1 ,

⇤

1 ).

Next, we describe how the defense and attack oracles apply neural reinforcement learning to
compute their best responses to an arbitrary mixed-strategy of the opponent.
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7.4.3

Approximate Best Response Oracles with Neural Reinforcement Learning

We now turn to our approach to compute ⇡v0 , the optimal response of player v when its
opponent uses a mixed strategy

0

v

such that

⇡v0 = arg max Uv (⇡v ,
⇡v

0

v ).

(7.11)

This problem poses a major technical challenge, since the spaces of possible policies for
both the defender and the attacker are quite large. To address this, we propose using the
reinforcement learning (RL) paradigm. However, the use of RL poses two further challenges
in our setting. First, for a given state, each player’s set of possible actions is combinatorial.
For example, the attacker is choosing subsets of attacks, whereas the defender is choosing
subsets of alerts. Consequently, we cannot use common methods such as Q-learning, which
requires explicitly representing the action-value function Q(x, a) for every possible action a,
even if we approximate this function over states x using, e.g., a neural network, as is common
in deep RL. We can address this issue by appealing to actor-critic methods for RL, where the
policy is represented as a parametric function ⇡v;✓ with parameters ✓. However, this brings
up the second challenge: actor-critic approaches learn policies using gradient-based methods,
which require that the actions are continuous. In our case, however, the actions are discrete.
One solution is to learn the action-value function Q(x, a) over a vector-based representation
of actions, such as using a binary vector to indicate which attacks are used. The problem
with this approach, however, is that the resulting policy ⇡v 2 arg maxa2A Q(x, a) is hard to
compute in real time, since it involves a combinatorial optimization problem in its own right.
We therefore opt for a much more scalable solution that uses the actor-critic paradigm with an
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alternative representation of the adversary and defender policies, which admits gradient-based
learning.
We start with the adversary. Recall that the adversary’s policy maps a state to a subset
of attack actions A, with the constraint on the total budget used by the chosen actions.
Instead of returning a discrete subset of actions, we map the adversary’s policy to a probability
distribution over actions, overloading our prior notation so that ↵

(k)
1,a

now denotes the

probability that action a 2 A is executed. Now the policy can be used with actor-critic
methods, but it may violate the budget constraint. To address this final issue, we simply
project the probability distribution into the feasible space at execution time by normalizing
it by the total cost of the distribution, and then multiplying by the budget constraint.
Notice that in this process we have relaxed the attacker’s budget constraint to hold only in
expectation; however, this only makes the attacker stronger. An interesting side-eﬀect of our
transformation of the adversary’s policy space is that the RL method will now eﬀectively
search in the space of stochastic adversary policies. An associated benefit is that it leads to
faster convergence of the double oracle approach.
Next, consider the defender. In this case, we can simply represent the policy as a mapping to
fractions of the total defense budget allocated to each alert type t. In other words, for each
alert type t, the policy will output the maximum fraction of the defense budget that will be
used to inspect alerts of type t. This simultaneously makes the mapping continuous, and
obviates the need to explicitly deal with the budget constraint.
The final nuance is that RL methods are typically designed for a fixed environment, whereas
our setting is a game. However, note that since we are concerned only with each player’s best
response to the other’s mixed strategy, we can embed the mixed strategy of the opponent as
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Figure 7.3: The interactions among actor, critic and environment.
a part of the environment. Next, we describe our application of actor-critic methods to our
problem, given the alternative representations of adversary and defender policies above.
The basic idea of the actor-critic method is that we can iteratively learn and improve a
policy without enumerating actions by using two parallel processes that interact with each
other: an actor which develops a policy, and a critic network which evaluates the policy. The
interaction between the actor and critic in illustrated in Figure 7.3. In each iteration, the
actor and critic proceed as follows:

1. The actor executes an action according to its policy given the observation of the
environment.
2. Upon receiving the action, the environment updates its system state and returns a
reward to the critic.
3. The critic updates its evaluation method and provides feedback to the actor.
4. The actor updates its policy according to the feedback given by the critic.
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We propose DDPG-MIX, actor-critic algorithm that operates in continuous action spaces
and computes an approximate best response to an opponent who uses a stochastic policy.
DDPG-MIX is an extension of the Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient (DDPG) approach
proposed in [61] to our setting, and the full algorithm is outlined in Algorithm 4. For each
player v, DDPG-MIX employs two neural networks to represent the actor and critic: a policy
network ⇡v (Ov |✓v⇡ ) for the actor, which has parameters ✓v⇡ and maps an observation Ov into
an action, and a value network Qv (Ov , ↵v |✓vQ ) for the critic, which has parameters ✓vQ and
maps an observation Ov and an action ↵v into a value. Initially, these two neural networks
are randomly initialized. Then, we train these two iteratively with multiple episodes, each
of which contains multiple steps. At the beginning of each episode, the opponent samples a
deterministic policy ⇡

v

with its mixed-strategy

v.

The policy network and value network

are then updated as follows. First, we generate an action by using the ✏-greedy method:
we randomly choose an action with probability ✏ (called exploration in RL), and apply the
policy network ⇡v (Ov |✓v⇡ ) to produce an action corresponding to the current state with
probability 1

✏ (called exploitation). Player v then executes the action produced and so

does its opponent, which executes an action ↵

v

returned by ⇡ v . Once the system state

of the environment is updated, player v receives the reward and stores the transition into a
memory buﬀer. Player v then samples a minibatch, a subset of transitions randomly sampled
from the buﬀer, to update the value network Qv (Ov , ↵v |✓vQ ) by minimizing a loss function
as in most regression tasks. The sampled gradient of the value network with respect to ↵v
is then forwarded to the policy network, which is further applied to update ⇡v (Ov |✓v⇡ ) as
presented in Eq. (7.12) in Algorithm 4. After a fixed number of episodes, the resulting policy
network ⇡v (Ov |✓v⇡ ) is returned as the parameterized optimal response to an opponent with
mixed-strategy

v.
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Algorithm 4 DDPG-MIX Algorithm: Compute the pure-strategy best response of player v
when its opponent takes mixed-strategy
v.
Input:
The set of opponent’s pure strategies, ⇧ v ;
Mixed strategy of the opponent,
v;
Output:
The value network of player v, Qv (Ov , ↵v |✓vQ );
The policy network of player v, ⇡v (Ov |✓v⇡ );
1: Randomly initialize Qv (Ov , ↵v |✓vQ ) and ⇡v (Ov |✓v⇡ );
2: Initialize replay memory D;
3: for episode = 0, M
1 do
4:
Initialize the system state hN (0) , M (0) , S (0) i = h0, 0, 0i;
5:
Sample the opponent’s policy ⇡ v by using
v over ⇧ v ;
6:
for k = 0, K 1 do
(k)
(k)
(k)
7:
With probability ✏ select a random action ↵v ; Otherwise, select ↵v = ⇡v (Ov |✓vµ );
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:

(k)

(k)

L(✓vQ ) =
13:

(k)

(k)

Execute ↵v and ↵ v = ⇡ v (O v ), observe reward rv and transit the system state
to S k+1 ;
(k)
(k) (k)
(k+1)
Store transition (Ov , ↵v , rv , Ov
) in D;
(i)
(i) (i)
(i+1)
Sample a random minibatch of N transitions (Ov , ↵v , rv , Ov ) from D;
(i)
(i)
(i+1)
(i+1)
Set yv = rv + ⌧ Qv (Ov , ⇡(Ov |✓v⇡ )|✓vQ );
Update the value network by minimizing the loss
1 X (i)
(y
N i v

Update the policy network by using the sampled policy gradient:
r✓v⇡ J ⇡
where

14:
15:
16:

Q 2
Qv (Ovi , ↵(i)
v |✓v )) ;

(

1 X
J a · J✓
N i

Ja = r↵v Qv (Ov , ↵v |✓vQ )|Ov =Ov(i) ,↵v =⇡v (Ov(i) )
J✓ = r✓v⇡ ⇡(Ov |✓v⇡ )|Ov(i)

end for
end for
return Player v’s policy network, ⇡v (Ov |✓v⇡ ).
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(7.12)

(7.13)

7.4.4

Preprocessing

An important consideration in applying the above approaches is scalability of training. One
way to significantly improve scalability is through preprocessing, and pruning alerts for which
the (near-)optimal decision is obvious. We use the following pruning step to this end. Suppose
that there is an alert type t which is generated by benign traﬃc with probability at most ✏,
where ✏ is very small (for example, ✏ = 0, in which case alerts of type t never correspond to
a false positive). In most realistic cases, it is nearly optimal to always inspect such alerts.
Consequently, we prune all alerts with false positive rate below a small pre-defined ✏ (in
our implementation below, we set ✏ = 0), and mark them for inspection (correspondingly
reducing the available budget for inspecting other alerts).

7.5

Experimental Results

In this section, we present case studies to investigate the robustness of our proposed approach
for alert prioritization. We conduct our experiments in two applications: intrusion detection
which employs a signature-based detection system and fraud detection which applies a
learning-based detection system. We start with a broad introduction of the experimental
methodology, including the details of the implementation of our approach and evaluation
methods. We then proceed to describe each case study in detail.

7.5.1

Experimental Methodology

Implementation. The DDPG-MIX algorithm was implemented in TensorFlow [1], an opensource library for neural network learning. The architecture of the policy and value networks
for both players are displayed in Table 7.2. We used Adam for learning the parameters of
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Table 7.2: Architecture of the implemented policy and value networks.
Neural network
Policy network
Value netwrok

Layer
Input
Hidden
Output
Input
Hidden
Output

Number of units
T (defender); |T | + |A| · (1 + |T |) (adversary)
16 (Fraud detection); 32 (Intrusion detection)
|T | (defender); |A| (adversary)
2 · |T | (defender); |T | + |A| · (2 + |T |) (adversary)
32 (Fraud detection); 64 (Intrusion detection)
1

Activation function
Tanh
Sigmoid
Relu
Relu

Initializer
Xavier [31]
Xavier
He Normal [37]
He Normal

the neural networks with learning rates of 0.001 and 0.002 for the policy and value networks,
respectively. The discount factor ⌧ was set to be 0.95, and we set the size of the memory
buﬀer to 40,000. The learning process contained 500 episodes, each with 400 learning steps.
The collection of policies used in the double-oracle framework was initialized with a pair of
policies that uniformly allocate each player’s budget among their choices.
Our experiments were conducted on a server running Ubuntu 16.04 with Intel(R) Xeon(R)
CPU E5-2695 v4 @ 2.10GHz, 18 cores and 64 GB memory. Each experiment was repeatedly
executed 20 times with 20 diﬀerent random seeds.
Evaluation Method. We use the expected loss of the defender (equivalently, gain of the
adversary) as the metric throughout our evaluation. Specifically, for a given defense policy,
we evaluate the loss of the defender using several models of the adversary. First, we used
Algorithm 4 to compute the best response of the adversary, as anticipated by our approach.
In addition, to evaluate the general robustness of our approach, we employed two alternative
policies for the adversary: Uniform, a policy which uniformly distributes the adversary’s
budget over attack actions; and Greedy, a policy which allocates the budget to attacks in the
order of expected adversary utility. Specifically, the Greedy adversary prioritizes the attack
actions according to La · min{ cD̃a , 1}, where D̃ is the available attack budget, adding actions
in this priority order until the adversary’s budget is exhausted.
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We first conduct our experiments by assuming that the defender knows the adversary’s
capabilities. Subsequently, we evaluate the robustness of our approach when the defender is
uncertain about the adversary’s capabilities, and use it to provide practical guidance. Finally,
we provide results on the computational cost of our approach.

7.5.2

Case Study I: Network Intrusion Detection

Our first case study involves a signature-based network intrusion detection scenario, using
the Suricata, a state-of-the-art open source intrusion detection system (IDS), combined with
the CICIDS2017 dataset. Our case study evaluates our alert prioritization method in two
cases: i) the defender has full knowledge of the adversary; and ii) the defender is uncertain
about the adversary’s capabilities.
CICIDS2017 dataset. The CICIDS2017 dataset [96] records benign and malicious network
flows in pcap format, captured in a real-world network between 07/03/2017 and 07/27/2017.
The network consists of 10 desktops belonging to regular users and 5 laptops owned by
attackers. The desktops are used to generate natural benign background traﬃc by using a
profile system that abstracts the behaviors of regular users. The laptops are employed to
produce malicious traﬃc of the following classes of attacks: Brute Force, Botnet, DDoS, DoS,
Heartbleed, Infiltration, Portscan, and Web Attack.
Suricata IDS. We employ Suricata12 to conduct our case study on the CICIDS2017 dataset.
Suricata is an open-source network intrusion detection system which performs analysis of
passing traﬃc on a network by using a set of signatures (also called rules). If a traﬃc pattern
matches any of the signatures, then a corresponding alert is triggered and sent to the network
administrator.
12

Available at https://suricata-ids.org/about/open-source/.
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Table 7.3: Alert types of Suricata in our experiments.
Alert type
attempted-recon
attempted-user
bad-unknow
misc-acticity
not-suspicious
policy-violation
protocol-command-decode
trojan-activity
unsuccessful-user
web-application-attack

Description
Attempted Information Leak
Attempted User Privilege Gain
Potentially Bad Traﬃc
Misc activity
Not Suspicious Traﬃc
Potential Corporate Privacy Violation
Generic Protocol Command Decode
A Network Trojan was Detected
Unsuccessful User Privilege Gain
Web Application Attack

Priority
2
1
2
3
3
1
3
1
1
1

A Suricata signature contains the following parts: action, header, rule options, and priority.
Action describes the operation of Suricata when a signature is matched, which can be either
dropping a packet or raising an alert. Header defines the protocol, port, and IP addresses of
the source and destination in a signature. Rule options include a list of keywords, for example,
the corresponding alert type associated with a priority. Finally, the priority keyword comes
with a numerical value ranging from 1 to 255 where 1 indicates the highest priority and 255
the lowest.
In our experiments, we use Suricata to scan the pcap files in the CICIDS2017 dataset.
Specifically, we use the Emerging Threats Ruleset (ETR) 13 to analyze the network traﬃc in
the dataset. ETR defines a total of 33 alert types, and we select the 10 most common alert
types exhibited during our experiments, which are shown in Table 7.3.
Experimental Setup. We use the following steps to set up our experiments for the case
study. First, we used 30 minutes as the fixed length of each time period. Then, we utilized
the Suricata IDS to scan and detect intrusions for both malicious and benign traﬃc in the
CICIDS2017 data. By doing so, we obtained the number of alerts of each type raised by each
attack action, as well as the number of false alerts in each time period. In the preprocessing
13

Available at https://rules.emergingthreats.net/open/suricata/.
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Table 7.4: Attack actions and alert types used in the case study of intrusion detection.
Attack action
Brute Force
Botnet
DoS
Heartbleed
Infiltration
PortScan
Web Attack

attempted-recon
1230
0
0
0
710
138
0

attempted-user
0
4
0
0
2
0
0

Number of each alert type raised
bad-unknown misc-activity not-suspicious policy-violation
0
0
0
0
2
106
0
54
0
0
0
24
4
0
10
0
862
12
0
80
320
30
0
0
6
0
0
0

protocol-command-decode
0
0
0
0
600
0
0

Ea

La

120
60
74
20
52
80
62

3.6
6.0
4.0
3.6
1.4
1.4
2.7

Table 7.5: Average number of false alerts triggered in each time period
Alert type
attempted-recon
attempted-user
bad-unknown
misc-activity
not-suspicious
policy-violation
protocol-command-decode

Avg. number of false alerts in each period
7,200
44,100
1,600
7,300
17,400
4,000
10,200

step we pruned alert types that were triggered only by malicious traﬃc, as discussed in
Section 7.4.4. As a result, we were left with 7 out of the 10 alert types to consider using our
full adversarial RL framework. In addition, we filtered out the attack actions that do not
raise any alerts, since those attacks will never be detected using Suricata, leaving 7 out of 8
representative attacks for our experiments. The final attack actions and alert types that we
use in the experiments are given in Table 7.4.
We used Poisson distribution to fit the distribution of alerts raised by benign traﬃc in each
time period. Since the benign traﬃc in the CICIDS2017 dataset was captured from only 10
desktop which is far less than the number of computers in a real-world local area network,
we amplified the corresponding mean of each type of alert by a factor of 100. The resulting
average numbers are shown in Table 7.5. We set the cost of investigating each alert to
1.0 (i.e., equal for all alerts). Next, we used the base score of the Common Vulnerability
Scoring System (CVSS) to measure the loss of defender if an attack action was not detected.
Specifically, we employed CVSS v3.014 to compute La for a 2 A. Note that since the defender
14

Available at https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0.
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observes only alerts but not the actual attacks, alert-investigation decisions in deployment
cannot directly take advantage of the CVSS scores to quantify the risk of underlying attack.
However, since the ground truth is available during training and evaluation, CVSS scores are
used to provide additional information on the impact of the attack. For example, the cost of
mounting a Brute Force attack is 120 minutes. We document La (loss to the defender from a
successful attack) and Ea (execution cost of the attack) for a 2 A in Table 7.4.
Baselines. The performance of the proposed approach is compared with two alternative
policies for alert prioritization: Uniform, a policy which uniformly allocates the defender’s
budget over alert types, and Suricata priorities, where the defender exhausts the defense
budget according to the built-in prioritization of the Suricata IDS, shown in Table 7.3. We
tried two additional baselines from prior literature that use game theoretic alert prioritization:
GAIN [56] and RIO [127], but these do not scale computationally to the size of our IDS
case study (we compare to these in our second, smaller, case study). We did not compare to
alert correlation methods for reducing the number of false alerts, since these techniques are
entirely orthogonal and complementary to our setting (we address the issue of limited alert
inspection budget in the face of false alerts, whatever means are used to generate alerts).
Throughout, we refer to our proposed approach as ARL.
Results. Figure 7.4 presents our evaluation of the robustness of alert prioritization approaches
when the defender knows the adversary’s capabilities, and the results suggest that our approach
significantly outperforms the other baselines. Specifically, the proposed approach is 50%
better than the Uniform policy, which in turn is significantly better than using Suricata
priorities. There are a few reasons why deterministic priority-based approaches perform so
poorly. First, determinism allows attackers to easily circumvent the policy by focusing on
attacks that trigger alerts which are rarely inspected. Moreover, such naive deterministic
policies also fail to exploit the empirical relationships between attacks and alerts they tend to
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Figure 7.4: Intrusion detection: loss of the defender when it knows the attack budget.
Left: Defender’s loss for diﬀerent defense budgets, with attack budget fixed at 120. Right:
Defender’s loss for diﬀerent attack budgets, with defense budget fixed at 1000.

Figure 7.5: Intrusion detection: loss of the defender when it is uncertain of the attack
budget. Left: def. budget=500. Right: def. budget=1500. The defender’s estimate of
the attack budget is 120 in all cases. Thus, if the actual attack budget is 60, then the
defender overestimates the adversary’s budget; if the actual attack budget is 180, then it is
underestimated by the defender.
trigger: for example, if an attack triggers multiple alerts, but one of these alert types happens
to have very few alerts in current logs, static priority-based policies will not leverage this
structure. In contrast, by learning a policy of alert inspection which maps arbitrary alert
observations to a decision about which to inspect, we can make decisions at a significantly
finer granularity.
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Figure 7.6: Intrusion detection: loss of the defender when it has diﬀerent estimates of the
attack budget.
Evaluating the alert prioritization methods when the defender is uncertain about the attack
budget (Figures 7.5 and 7.6), we can observe that the proposed ARL approach still achieves the
lowest defender loss both when the attack budget is underestimated and when overestimated,
and it is still far better than the baselines. In addition, Figure 7.6 shows that when the attack
budget is underestimated or overestimated, there is only a 5% performance degradation
compared to when the defender has full knowledge of the adversary. This demonstrates
that our approach remains robust to a strategic adversary even when the defender does not
precisely know the adversary’s capabilities. Moreover, in this domain we can see that neither
over- nor underestimating adversary’s budget is particularly harmful, although overestimation
appears to be slightly better.
Our final consideration is the impact of uncertainty about the adversary’s rationality (Figure 7.7). Specifically, we now study how our approach performs, compared to the baselines,
if the adversary is in some way myopic, either using a simple uniform strategy (Uniform)
or greedily choosing attacks in order of impact (Greedy). We can observe that although
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Figure 7.7: Intrusion detection: loss of the defender when it is certain of the attack budget
but is uncertain of the attack policy. The attack budget is fixed as 120. Left: def. budget=500.
Right: def. budget=1500.
we assume a very strong adversary, our ARL approach significantly outperforms the other
baselines even when the adversary is using a diﬀerent attack policy.

7.5.3

Case Study II: Fraud Detection

While NIDS settings are a natural fit for our approach, we now demonstrate its generalizability
by considering a very diﬀerent problem in which our goal is to identify fraudulent credit
card transactions. Just as with the first case study, we will present the results first when
the defender has full knowledge of the adversary’s capabilities, and subsequently study the
impact of defender’s uncertainty about these.
Fraud dataset. The fraud dataset15 contains 284,807 credit card transactions, of which
482 are fraudulent. Each transaction is represented by a vector of 30 numerical features,
28 of which are transformed using Principle Component Analysis (PCA). In addition, each
feature vector is associated with a binary label indicating the type of transaction (regular or
fraudulent). In order to make it meaningful in our context, we cluster the set of fraudulent
15

Available at: https://www.kaggle.com/mlg-ulb/creditcardfraud.
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Table 7.6: Number of transactions in the modified fraud dataset
Original transaction type
Genuine

Fraudulent

Label
0
1
2
3
4
5
6

Count
284,308
11
21
72
250
14
124

transactions into n subsets, indicating a type of attack, using a Gaussian Mixture model [8].
In our experiments, we set n = 6, and modify the dataset with fraudulent labels replaced by
cluster assignments. The counts of each type of transaction is shown in Table 7.6.
Learning-based fraud detector. We developed a fraud detector using supervised learning
on the fraud dataset. The main challenge is that the dataset is highly imbalanced, as shown
in Table 7.6: the fraudulent transactions only account for < 0.2% of all transactions. To
address this challenge, we apply Synthetic Minority Over-sampling Technique (SMOTE) to
produce synthetic data for the minority classes to balance the data. Our implementation
contains the following steps:
(i) Dataset splitting: We use stratified split to partition the modified fraud dataset into
training and test data with equal size, which contain roughly the same proportions of the
fraudulent and non-fraudulent data.
(ii) Binary classification: We use SMOTE and linear SVM to learn a binary classifier to
predict whether a transaction is fraudulent. The resulting classifier has an AUC >99%
and a recall >90% on the test data, which indicates that more than 90% of the fraudulent
transactions can be detected.
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(iii) Multi-class classification: We now restrict attention to only the fraudulent transactions to
learn a conditional classifier to predict the type of fraud. Specifically, we learn 6 independent
classifiers each of which corresponds to one fraud type and returns a binary classification
result indicating whether a fraudulent transaction belongs to this type. Similarly to Step (ii),
we use SMOTE and linear SVM to learn these classifiers, each of which admits > 94% recall.
Once the fraud detector is implemented, we evaluate the detector using the test dataset. We
first predict the test data by using the binary classifier obtained in Step (ii) above. If any
transaction in the test data is classified as fraudulent, then it is further inspected by the 6
classifiers we construct for multi-class classification. If a fraudulent transaction is predicted as
any type of fraud, then a corresponding alert is triggered. Otherwise, an alert corresponding
to the fraud type which is predicted with the highest classification score is triggered.
Experimental Setup. To evaluate the robustness of the proposed approach for alert
prioritization in fraud detection, we first computed the distributions of the true and false
alerts identified by the fraud detector that we implemented. By doing so, we obtained the
probability that any attack a 2 A triggers an alert t 2 T , as well as the number of false
alarms associated with each type of alert, each of which has a value of 1 as the investigation
cost. We filtered out alert types that were triggered only by fraudulent transactions (as we
had done before), leaving 3 out of 6 alert types. We also filtered out the attack actions which
are associated with the alert types omitted above, as these attacks can always be detected by
investigating the corresponding alerts. The resulting distribution of the alerts triggered by
frauds is given in Table 7.7.
We used [1, 3, 2] as the adversary’s cost of the mounting each type of attack action. We
employed the mean amount of each type of fraudulent transaction as the loss of the defender
if any such type of attack action is not detected, measured by the unit of 10 Euros. The
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Table 7.7: Probability that an attack action triggers each type of alert
Attack action
1
2
3

Alert type
1
2
3
0.9 0.61
0
0.09 0.87 0.12
0
0.41 0.85

corresponding defender’s loss for each undetected attack was [9.4, 12.1, 16.0]. In addition, we
used 30 minutes as the fixed length of each time period in our experiments. Based on our
classification results, the average number of false alerts that occur of each type in a time
period was [10, 47, 39]. Similar to our IDS case study, we simulated the distribution of false
alerts by using Poisson processes with the above mean values.
Baselines. The performance of the proposed approach is investigated by comparing with
three alternative policies for alert prioritization: Uniform, a policy which uniformly allocates
the defender’s budget over each alert type; GAIN [56], a game theoretic approach which
prioritizes alert types, and always inspects all alerts of a selected type; and RIO [127], another
game theoretic approach which prioritizes alerts, and computes an approximately optimal
number of alerts of each type to inspect.
Results. Figure 7.8 shows the results when the defender has full knowledge of the adversary’s
capabilities. We can observe that the proposed approach (ARL) outperforms other baselines
in all settings, typically by at least 25%. The main reason for the advantage is similar to that
in the IDS setting: the ability to have a policy that is carefully optimized and conditional on
state significantly increases its eﬃciency. Interestingly, the alternative game theoretic alert
prioritization approaches, GAIN and RIO, are in some cases worse than the uniformly random
policy. The key reason is that they can be myopic in that they independently optimize for a
single time period, whereas attacks can be adaptive. The proposed approach, in contrast,
explicitly considers such adaptivity.
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Figure 7.8: Fraud detection: loss of the defender when it knows the attack budget. Left:
Defender’s loss by its budget, with attack budget adv_budget being fixed as 2. Right:
Defender’s loss by attack budget, with defense budget def_budget being fixed as 20.

Figure 7.9: Fraud detection: loss of the defender when it is uncertain of the attack budget.
Left: def. budget=10. Right: def. budget=30. The defender’s estimate of the attack budget
is 2. If the actual attack budget is 1, then the defender overestimates the adversary’s budget;
if the actual attack budget is 3, then it is underestimated.
Figures 7.9 and 7.10 investigate performance of our approach when the attack budget is
uncertain. It can be seen in Figure 7.9 that ARL remains the best approach to use, despite
this uncertainty. Interestingly, GAIN can, in contrast, be rather fragile to such uncertainty.
Considering Figure 7.10, both under- and overestimation of the attack budget incurs a
limited performance impact (< 10%). More interesting, however, is the observation that it
is actually better to slightly underestimate the adversary’s budget: in the worst case, this
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Figure 7.10: Fraud detection: loss of the defender when it has diﬀerent estimates of the
attack budget.
hurts performance less than 3%. Eﬀectively, the approach remains quite robust even against
stronger attacks, whereas overestimating the budget does not take suﬃcient advantage of
weaker adversaries.
Finally, we study the robustness of ARL compared to other baselines when the attacker is
using diﬀerent policies (Uniform or Greedy) instead of the RL-based policy that is assumed by
our approach (Figure 7.11). Here, the results are slightly more ambiguous than we observed
in the IDS domain: when the adversary is using the Greedy policy, RIO does outperform
ARL by 8% when the defender’s budget is small, and by 13% when the defender’s budget is
large. However, in these cases, the adversary can gain a great deal by more carefully designing
its policy. Thus, when the defender’s budget is large, a rational adversary can cause RIO to
degrade by nearly 18%, where ARL is quite robust to such adversaries.
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Figure 7.11: Fraud detection: loss of the defender when it is certain of the attack budget
but is uncertain of the attack policy. The attack budget is fixed as 2. Left: def. budget=10.
Right: def. budget=30.

Figure 7.12: Computational cost. Left: Number of double oracle iterations in network
intrusion detection with adv. budget=120. Right: Number of double oracle iterations in
fraud detection with adv. budget=2.

7.5.4

Computational Cost

Figure 7.12 presents our evaluation of the computational cost of the proposed alert prioritization approach. The results show that the double oracle algorithm can converge very fast in
practice, with fewer than 15 iterations in most cases; indeed, in the vast majority of instances
we need fewer than 10 iterations.
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Another interesting observation is non-monotonicity of convergence time (in terms of iterations)
as we increase the defense budget. In the IDS setting, for example, increasing the defense
budget increases the number of iterations when we go from a budget of 500 to 1000, but the
computational cost remains stable as we further increase the budget to 1500. In contrast,
in the fraud detection case study, increasing the budget from 10 to 20 has little impact on
the number of iterations, but further increasing it to 30 actually reduces the number of
iterations necessary for convergence. To understand this phenomenon, note that increasing
the defender’s budget has two opposing eﬀects: on the one hand, the search space for the
defender increases significantly, but on the other hand, it may become much easier to compute
a near-optimal defense with a larger budget (for example, with a large enough budget, we
can almost always inspect all alerts).

7.6

Conclusion

Since even after applying techniques for reducing the alert burden (e.g., alert correlation)
there often remain vastly more alerts than time to investigate them, the success of detection
often hinges on how defenders prioritize certain alerts over others. In practice, prioritization
is typically based on non-strategic heuristics (e.g., Suricata’s built-in priority values), which
may easily be exploited by a strategic attacker who can adapt to the prioritization. Strategic
prioritization approaches attempt to prevent this by using game-theory to capture adaptive
attackers; however, existing strategic approaches severely restrict the defender’s policy (e.g.,
strict prioritization) for the sake of computational tractability.
In contrast,in this chapter we introduced a general model of alert prioritization that does not
impose any restrictions on the defender’s policy, and we proposed a novel double oracle and
reinforcement learning based approach for finding approximately optimal prioritization policies
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eﬃciently. Our experimental results—based on case studies of IDS and fraud detection—
demonstrate that these policies significantly outperform non-strategic prioritization and prior
game-theoretic approaches. Further, to demonstrate the strength of our attacker model, we
also showed that the attacker policies found by our approach outperform multiple baseline
policies.
For practitioners, the key task in applying our approach is estimating the parameter values
of our model. In our case studies, we showed how to estimate parameters in two domains
(e.g., for NIDS, using CVSS score to estimate attack impact and CVSS complexity for
attack cost). The most diﬃcult parameter to estimate is the attacker’s budget; however, our
experimental results show that our approach is robust to uncertainty in the attacker’s budget
and outperforms other approaches even when the budget is misestimated. We leave studying
the sensitivity to other parameters to future work.
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Part IV
Robust Decentralized Learning
Ecosystem

152

Chapter 8
One VS. Many: Adversarial Regression
with Multiple Learners
In previous chapters, we have investigated robust machine learning with a single learner against
an adversary. However, in many situations an adversary’s decision is aimed at a collection of
learners, rather than specifically targeted at each independently. In this chapter, we study
the problem of adversarial linear regression with multiple learners. We first approximate
the resulting game by exhibiting an upper bound on learner loss functions, and show that
the resulting game has a unique symmetric equilibrium. We then present an algorithm for
computing this equilibrium, and show through extensive experiments that equilibrium models
are significantly more robust than conventional regularized linear regression.

8.1

Overview

In this chapter, we investigate the problem of adversarial regression with a collection of learners
and a single adversary. We model the resulting game as an interaction between multiple
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learners, who simultaneously learn linear regression models, and an attacker, who observes the
learned models (as in white-box attacks [103]), and modifies the original feature vectors at test
time in order to induce incorrect predictions. Crucially, rather than customizing the attack to
each learner (as in typical models), the attacker chooses a single attack for all learners. We
term the resulting game a Multi-Learner Stackelberg Game, to allude to its two stages, with
learners jointly acting as Stackelberg leaders, and the attacker being the follower. Our first
contribution is the formal model of this game. Our second contribution is to approximate this
game by deriving upper bounds on the learner loss functions. The resulting approximation
yields a game in which there always exists a symmetric equilibrium, and this equilibrium is
unique. In addition, we prove that this unique equilibrium can be computed by solving a
convex optimization problem. Our third contribution is to show that the equilibrium of the
approximate game is robust, both theoretically (by showing it to be equivalent to a particular
robust optimization problem), and through extensive experiments, which demonstrate it to
be much more robust to attacks than standard regularization approaches.

8.2

Model

We investigate the interactions between a collection of learners N = {1, 2, ..., n} and an
attacker in regression problems, modeled as a Multi-Learner Stackelberg Game (MLSG). At
the high level, this game involves two stages: first, all learners choose (train) their models
from data, and second, the attacker transforms test data (such as features of the environment,
at prediction time) to achieve malicious goals. Below, we first formalize the model of the
learners and the attacker, and then formally describe the full game.
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8.2.1

Modeling the Players

At training time, a set of training data (X, y) is drawn from an unknown distribution D.
X 2 Rm⇥d is the training sample and y 2 Rm⇥1 is a vector of values of each data in X. We
let xj 2 Rd⇥1 denote the jth instance in the training sample, associated with a corresponding
value yj 2 R from y. Hence, X = [x1 , ..., xm ]> and y = [y1 , y2 , ..., ym ]> . On the other hand,
test data can be generated either from D, the same distribution as the training data, or from
0

D , a modification of D generated by an attacker. The nature of such malicious modifications
is described below. We let

(0 

 1) represent the probability that a test instance

0

is drawn from D (i.e., the malicious distribution), and 1

be the probability that it is

generated from D.
The action of the ith learner is to select a d ⇥ 1 vector ✓i as the parameter of the linear
regression function ŷi = X✓i , where ŷi is the predicted values for data X. The expected cost
function of the ith learner at test time is then
0

0

ci (✓i , D ) = E(X0 ,y)⇠D0 [`(X ✓i , y)]
+ (1
where `(ŷ, y) = ||ŷ

(8.1)

)E(X,y)⇠D [`(X✓i , y)].

y||22 . That is, the cost function of a learner i is a combination of its

expected cost from both the attacker and the honest source.
Every instance (x, y) generated according to D is, with probability , maliciously modified
by the attacker into another, (x0 , y), as follows. We assume that the attacker has an instancespecific target z(x), and wishes that the prediction made by each learner i on the modified
0

instance, ŷ = ✓i> x , is close to this target. We measure this objective for the attacker by
`(ŷ, z) = ||ŷ

z||22 for a vector of predicted and target values ŷ and z, respectively. In
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0

addition, the attacker incurs a cost of transforming a distribution D into D , denoted by
0

R(D , D).
0

After a dataset (X , y) is generated in this way by the attacker, it is used simultaneously
against all the learners. This is natural in most real attacks: for example, spam templates
are commonly generated to be used broadly, against many individuals and organizations,
and, similarly, malicious executable programs are often produced to be generally eﬀective,
rather than custom made for each target. The expected cost function of the attacker is then
0

a sum of its total expected cost for all learners plus the cost of transforming D into D with
coeﬃcient

> 0:
0
ca ({✓i }ni=1 , D )

=

n
X
i=1

0

0

E(X0 ,y)⇠D0 [`(X ✓i , z)] + R(D , D).

(8.2)

As is typical, we estimate the cost functions of the learners and the attacker using training
data (X, y), which is also used to simulate attacks. Consequently, the cost functions of each
learner and the attacker are estimated by
0

0

ci (✓i , X ) = `(X ✓i , y) + (1
and
0
ca ({✓i }ni=1 , X )

=

n
X

(8.3)

)`(X✓i , y)

0

0

(8.4)

`(X ✓i , z) + R(X , X)

i=1

0

where the attacker’s modification cost is measured by R(X , X) = ||X
Frobenius norm.
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0

X||2F , the squared

8.2.2

The Multi-Learner Stackerlberg Game

We are now ready to formally define the game between the n learners and the attacker. The
MLSG has two stages: in the first stage, learners simultaneously select their model parameters
0

✓i , and in the second stage, the attacker makes its decision (manipulating X ) after observing
the learners’ model choices {✓i }ni=1 . We assume that the proposed game satisfies the following
assumptions:

1. The learners have complete information about parameters ,

and z. This is a strong

assumption, and we relax it in our experimental evaluation (Section 8.6), providing
guidance on how to deal with uncertainty about these parameters.
2. Each learner has the same action (model parameter) space ⇥ ✓ Rd⇥1 which is nonempty,
compact and convex. The action space of the attacker is Rm⇥d .
3. The columns of the training data X are linearly independent.

We use Multi-Learner Stackelberg Equilibrium (MLSE) as the solution for the MLSG, defined
as follows.
Definition 1 (Multi-Learner Stackelberg Equilibrium (MLSE)). An action profile ({✓i⇤ }ni=1 , X⇤ )
is an MLSE if it satisfies
✓i⇤ = arg min ci (✓i , X⇤ (✓)), 8i 2 N
✓i 2⇥

s.t.

⇤

X (✓) =

0
arg min ca ({✓i }ni=1 , X ).
X0 2Rm⇥d

where ✓ = {✓i }ni=1 constitutes the joint actions of the learners.
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(8.5)

At the high level, the MLSE is a blend between a Nash equilibrium (among all learners) and
a Stackelberg equilibrium (between the learners and the attacker), in which the attacker plays
a best response to the observed models ✓ chosen by the learners, and given this behavior by
the attacker, all learners’ models ✓i are mutually optimal.
The following lemma characterizes the best response of the attacker to arbitrary model choices
{✓i }ni=1 by the learners.
Lemma 1 (Best Response of the Attacker). Given {✓i }ni=1 , the best response of the attacker
is
⇤

X =( X+z

n
X

✓i> )(

I+

i=1

n
X

✓i ✓i> ) 1 .

(8.6)

i=1

Proof. We derive the best response of the attacker by using the first order condition. Let
0

0

rX 0 ca ({✓i }ni=1 , X ) denote the gradient of ca with respect to X . Then
rX ca = 2
0

n
X

0

z)✓i> + 2 (X

(X ✓i

0

X).

i=1

Due to convexity of ca , let rX 0 ca = 0, we have
X⇤ = ( X + z

n
X

✓i> )( I +

i=1

n
X

✓i ✓i> ) 1 .

i=1

Lemma 1 shows that the best response of the attacker, X⇤ , has a closed form solution, as a
function of learner model parameters {✓i }ni=1 . Let ✓

158

i

= {✓j }j6=i , then ci (✓i , X⇤ ) in Eq. (8.5)

can be rewritten as
ci (✓i , ✓ i ) = `(X⇤ (✓i , ✓ i )✓i , y) + (1

)`(X✓i , y).

(8.7)

Using Eq. (8.7), we can then define a Multi-Learner Nash Game (MLNG):
Definition 2 (Multi-Learner Nash Game (MLNG)). A static game, denoted as hN , ⇥, (ci )i
is a Multi-Learner Nash Game if

1. The set of players is the set of learners N ,
2. the cost function of each learner i is ci (✓i , ✓ i ) defined in Eq. (8.7),
3. all learners simultaneously select ✓i 2 ⇥.

We can then define Multi-Learner Nash Equilibrium (MLNE) of the game hN , ⇥, (ci )i:
Definition 3 (Multi-Learner Nash Equilibrium (MLNE)). An action profile ✓ ⇤ = {✓i⇤ }ni=1
is a Multi-Learner Nash Equilibrium of the MLNG hN , ⇥, (ci )i if it is the solution of the
following set of coupled optimization problem:

min ci (✓i , ✓ i ), 8i 2 N .

✓i 2⇥

(8.8)

Combining the results above, the following result is immediate.
Theorem 1. An action profile ({✓i⇤ }ni=1 , X⇤ ) is an MLSE of the multi-learner Stackelberg
game if and only if {✓i⇤ }ni=1 is a MLNE of the multi-learner Nash game hN , ⇥, (ci )i, with X⇤
defined in Eq. (8.6) for ✓i = ✓i⇤ , 8i 2 N .
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Theorem 1 shows that we can reduce the original (n + 1)-player Stackelberg game to an nplayer simultaneous-move game hN , ⇥, (ci )i. In the remaining sections, we focus on analyzing
the Nash equilibrium of this multi-learner Nash game.

8.3

Theoretical Analysis

In this section, we analyze the game hN , ⇥, (ci )i. As presented in Eq. (8.6), there is an
inverse of a complicated matrix to compute the best response of the attacker. Hence, the
cost function ci (✓i , ✓ i ) shown in Eq. (8.7) is intractable. To address this challenge, we first
derive a new game, hN , ⇥, (e
ci )i with tractable cost function for its players, to approximate
hN , ⇥, (ci )i. Afterward, we analyze existence and uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium of
hN , ⇥, (e
ci )i.

8.3.1

Approximation of The Game

P
We start our analysis by computing ( I + ni=1 ✓i ✓i> ) 1 presented in Eq. (8.6). Let matrix
P
P
An = I + ni=1 ✓i ✓i> , and A i = I + j6=i ✓j ✓j> . Then, An = A i + ✓i ✓i> . Similarly, let
P
P
matrix Bn = X+z ni=1 ✓i> , and B i = X+z j6=i ✓j> , which implies that Bn = B i +z✓i>
The best response of the attacker can then be rewritten as X⇤ = Bn An 1 . We then obtain the
following results.
Lemma 2. An and A
1. An and A

i

i

satisfy

are invertible, and the corresponding invertible matrices, An 1 and A 1i ,

are positive definite.
2. An 1 = A

1
i

1
1
>
i ✓i ✓i A i
1
>
1+✓i A i ✓i

A

.

3. ✓i> A 1i ✓i  1 ✓i> ✓i .
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Proof. The proof is included in the Appendix C.1.
Lemma 2 allows us to relax `(X⇤ (✓i , ✓ i )✓i , y) as follows:
Lemma 3.
`(X⇤ (✓i , ✓ i )✓i , y)  `(B i A 1i ✓i , y)
+

1

2

||z

y||22 (✓i> ✓i )2 .

(8.9)

Proof. The proof is included in the Appendix C.2.
Note that in Eq. (8.9), B

i

and A

i

only depend on {✓j }j6=i . Hence, the RHS of Eq. (8.9)

is a strictly convex function with respect to ✓i . Lemma 3 shows that `(X⇤ (✓i , ✓ i )✓i , y)
can be relaxed by moving ✓i out of X⇤ (✓i , ✓ i ) and adding a regularizer (✓i> ✓i )2 with its
coeﬃcient

||z y||22
2

. Motivated by this method, we iteratively relax `(X⇤ (✓i , ✓ i )✓i , y) by

adding corresponding regularizers. We now identify a tractable upper bound function for
ci (✓i , ✓ i ).
Theorem 2.
ci (✓i , ✓ i )  c̄i (✓i , ✓ i )
= `(X✓i , y) +

||z
2

y||22

n
X

(✓j> ✓i )2 + ✏,

(8.10)

j=1

where ✏ is a positive constant and ✏ < +1.
Proof. We prove by extending the results in Lemma 3 and iteratively relaxing the cost
function. The details are included in Appendix C.3.
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As represented in Eq. (8.10), c̄i (✓i , ✓ i ) is strictly convex with respect to ✓i and ✓j (8j 6= i).
We then use the game hN , ⇥, (c̄i )i as an approximation of hN , ⇥, (ci )i. Let
e
ci (✓i , ✓ i ) = c̄i (✓i , ✓ i )

✏

= `(X✓i , y) +

||z
2

y||22

n
X

(✓j> ✓i )2 ,

(8.11)

j=1

then hN , ⇥, (e
ci )i has the same Nash equilibrium with hN , ⇥, (c̄i )i if one exists, as adding or
deleting a constant term does not aﬀect the optimal solution. Hence, we use hN , ⇥, (e
ci )i to
approximate hN , ⇥, (ci )i, and analyze the Nash equilibrium of hN , ⇥, (e
ci )i in the remaining
sections.

8.3.2

Existence of Nash Equilibrium

As introduced in Section 8.2, each learner has identical action spaces, and they are trained with
the same dataset. We exploit this symmetry to analyze the existence of a Nash equilibrium
of the approximation game hN , ⇥, (e
ci )i.
We first define a Symmetric Game [15]:
Definition 4 (Symmetric Game). An n-player game is symmetric if the players have the
same action space, and their cost functions ci (✓i , ✓ i ) satisfy

ci (✓i , ✓ i ) = cj (✓j , ✓ j ), 8i, j 2 N
if ✓i = ✓j and ✓

i

= ✓ j.

In a symmetric game hN , ⇥, (e
ci )i it is natural to consider a Symmetric Equilibrium:
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(8.12)

Definition 5 (Symmetric Equilibrium). An action profile {✓i⇤ }ni=1 of hN , ⇥, (e
ci )i is a symmetric equilibrium if it is a Nash equilibrium and ✓i⇤ = ✓j⇤ , 8i, j 2 N .
We now show that our approximate game is symmetric, and always has a symmetric Nash
equilibrium.
Theorem 3 (Existence of Nash Equilibrium). hN , ⇥, (e
ci )i is a symmetric game and it has
at least one symmetric equilibrium.
Proof. As described above, the players of hN , ⇥, (e
ci )i use the same action space and complete
information of others. Hence, the cost function ci is symmetric, making hN , ⇥, (e
ci )i a
symmetric game. As hN , ⇥, (e
ci )i has nonempty, compact and convex action space, and the
cost function e
ci is continuous in {✓i }ni=1 and convex in ✓i , according to Theorem 3 in [15],
hN , ⇥, (e
ci )i has at least one symmetric Nash equilibrium.

8.3.3

Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium

While we showed that the approximate game always admits a symmetric Nash equilibrium,
it leaves open the possibility that there may be multiple symmetric equilibria, as well as
equilibria which are not symmetric. We now demonstrate that this game in fact has a unique
equilibrium (which must therefore be symmetric).
Theorem 4 (Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium). hN , ⇥, (e
ci )i has a unique Nash equilibrium,
and this unique NE is symmetric.
Proof. We have known that hN , ⇥, (e
ci )i has at least one NE, and each learner has an
nonempty, compact and convex action space ⇥. Hence, we can apply Theorem 2 and

163

Theorem 6 of [92]. That is, for some fixed {ri }ni (0 < ri < 1,

Pn

i=1 ri

= 1), if the matrix in

Eq. (8.13) is positive definite, then hN , ⇥, (e
ci )i has a unique NE.
2

3

c1 (✓) . . . r1 r✓1 ,✓n e
c1 (✓) 7
6 r1 r✓1 ,✓1 e
6
7
..
..
7
Jr(✓) = 6
.
.
6
7
4
5
rn r✓n ,✓1 e
cn (✓) . . . rn r✓n ,✓n e
cn (✓)

We first let r1 = r2 = ... = rn =

1
n

Jr(✓) =

(8.13)

and decompose Jr(✓) as follows,
2
2 ||z y||22
P+
(Q + S + T),
2n
n

(8.14)

where P and Q are block diagonal matrices such that Pii = X> X, Pij = 0, Qii = 4✓i ✓i> +
✓i> ✓i I and Qij = 0, 8i, j 2 N , j 6= i. S and T are block symmetric matrices such that
P
Sii = ✓i> ✓i I, Sij = ✓i> ✓j I, Tii = j6=i ✓j ✓j> and Tij = ✓j ✓i> , 8i, j 2 N , j 6= i.

Next, we prove that P is positive definite, and Q, S and T are positive semi-definite. Hence,
Jr(✓) is positive definite, which indicates that hN , ⇥, (e
ci )i has a unique NE. As Theorem 3
points out, the game has at least one symmetric NE. Therefore, the NE is unique and must be
symmetric. Due to space limitation the details of this proof are included in Appendix C.4.

8.4

Computing the Equilibrium

Having shown that hN , ⇥, (e
ci )i has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, we now consider
computing its solution. We exploit the symmetry of the game which enables to reduce the
search space of the game to only symmetric solutions. Particularly, we derive the symmetric
Nash equilibrium of hN , ⇥, (e
ci )i by solving a single convex optimization problem. We obtain
the following result.
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Theorem 5. Let
f (✓) = `(X✓, y) +

(n + 1)
||z
2 2

y||22 (✓ > ✓)2 ,

(8.15)

Then, the unique symmetric NE of hN , ⇥, (e
ci )i, {✓i⇤ }ni=1 , can be derived by solving the following
convex optimization problem
(8.16)

min f (✓)
✓2⇥

and then letting ✓i⇤ = ✓ ⇤ , 8i 2 N , where ✓ ⇤ is the solution of Eq. (8.16).
Proof. We prove this theorem by characterizing the first-order optimality conditions of each
learner’s minimization problem in Eq. (8.8) with ci being replaced with its approximation e
ci .
Let {✓i⇤ }ni=1 be the NE, then it satisfies
(⌘

✓i⇤ )> r✓i e
ci (✓i⇤ , ✓ ⇤ i )

0, 8⌘ 2 ⇥, 8i 2 N

(8.17)

where r✓i e
ci (✓i⇤ , ✓ ⇤ i ) is the gradient of e
ci (✓i , ✓ i ) with respect to ✓i and is evaluated at {✓i⇤ }ni=1 .
Then, Eq. (8.17) is equivalent to the equations as follows:
8
>
<(⌘

✓1⇤ )> r✓1 e
c1 (✓1⇤ , ✓ ⇤ 1 )

>
:✓ ⇤ = ✓ ⇤ , 8j 2 N \ {1}
1
j

0, 8⌘ 2 ⇥,

(8.18)

The reasons are: first, any solution of Eq. (8.17) satisfies Eq. (8.18), as {✓i⇤ }ni=1 is symmetric;
Second, any solution of Eq. (8.18) also satisfies Eq. (8.17). By definition of symmetric game,
if ✓1⇤ = ✓j⇤ , then r✓1 e
c1 (✓1⇤ , ✓ ⇤ 1 ) = r✓j e
cj (✓j⇤ , ✓ ⇤ j ), and we have
(⌘

✓j⇤ )> r✓j e
cj (✓j⇤ , ✓ ⇤ j ), 8⌘ 2 ⇥, 8j 2 N \ {1}
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Hence, Eq. (8.17) and Eq. (8.18) are equivalent. Eq. (8.18) can be further rewritten as

(⌘
We then let

✓1⇤ )> r✓1 e
c1 (✓1⇤ , ✓ ⇤ 1 )|✓1⇤ =...=✓n⇤

F (✓1⇤ ) = r✓1 e
c1 (✓1⇤ , ✓ ⇤ 1 )|✓1⇤ =...=✓n⇤
= 2X

>

(X✓1⇤

y) +

2 (n + 1)
2

0, 8⌘ 2 ⇥.

||z

y||22 ✓1⇤ > ✓1⇤ ✓1⇤ .

(8.19)

(8.20)

Then, F (✓1⇤ ) = r✓1 f (✓1⇤ ) where f (·) is defined in Eq. (8.15). Hence, we have
(⌘

✓1⇤ )> r✓1 f (✓1⇤ )

0, 8⌘ 2 ⇥,

(8.21)

This means that ✓1⇤ is the solution of the optimization problem in Eq. (8.16) which finally
completes the proof.
A deeper look at Eq. (8.15) reveals that the Nash equilibrium can be obtained by each learner
independently, without knowing others’ actions. This means that the Nash equilibrium can
be computed in a distributed manner while the convergence is still guaranteed. Hence, our
proposed approach is highly scalable, as increasing the number of learners does not impact the
complexity of finding the Nash equilibrium. We investigate the robustness of this equilibrium
both using theoretical analysis and experiments in the remaining sections.

8.5

Robustness Analysis

We now draw a connection between the multi-learner equilibrium in the adversarial setting,
derived above, and robustness, in the spirit of the analysis by [125]. Specifically, we prove
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the equivalence between Eq. (8.16) and a robust linear regression problem where data is
maliciously corrupted by some disturbance 4. Formally, a robust linear regression solves the
following problem:
(8.22)

(X + 4)✓||22 ,

min max ||y
✓2⇥ 42U

where the uncertainty set U = {4 2 Rm⇥d | 4T 4 = G : |Gij |  c|✓i ✓j | 8i, j}, with
c=

(n+1)
||z
2 2

y||22 . Note that ✓ is a vector and ✓i is the i-th element of ✓.

From a game-theoretic point of view, in training phase the defender is simulating an attacker.
The attacker maximizes the training error by adding disturbance to X. The magnitude of the
disturbance is controlled by a parameter c =

(n+1)
||z
2 2

y||22 . Consequently, the robustness

of Eq. (8.22) is guaranteed if and only if the magnitude reflects the uncertainty interval. This
sheds some light on how to choose ,

and z in practice. One strategy is to over-estimate

the attacker’s strength, which amounts to choosing small values of , large values of

and

exaggerated target z. The intuition of this strategy is to enlarge the uncertainty set so as to
cover potential adversarial behavior. In Experiments section we will show this strategy works
well in practice. Another insight from Eq. (8.22) is that the fundamental reason MLSG is
robust is because it proactively takes adversarial behavior into account.
Theorem 6. The optimal solution ✓ ⇤ of the problem in Eq. (8.16) is an optimal solution to
the robust optimization problem in Eq. (8.22).
Proof. Fix ✓ ⇤ , we show that

max ||y
42U

(X + 4)✓ ⇤ ||22 = ||y
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2

X✓ ⇤ ||22 + c(✓ ⇤ T ✓ ⇤ ) .

The left-hand side can be expanded as:

max ||y
42U

(X + 4)✓ ⇤ ||22

= max ||y

X✓ ⇤

 max ||y

X✓ ⇤ ||22 + max ||4✓ ⇤ ||22

= max ||y

X✓ ⇤ ||22 + max ✓ ⇤ T 4T 4✓ ⇤

42U
42U
42U

4✓ ⇤ ||22
42U
42U

(substitute 4T 4 = G)
=||y

X✓ ⇤ ||22 + max ✓ ⇤ T G✓ ⇤

=||y

X✓ ⇤ ||22

||y
=||y
=||y

G

+ max

X✓ ⇤ ||22 + c
X✓ ⇤ ||22 + c

G

d
X
i=1

d
X
i=1

|✓i⇤ |2 Gii

|✓i⇤ |4 + 2c

d
X
i=1

|✓i⇤ |2

+2

j 1
d X
X

✓i⇤ ✓j⇤ Gij

j=1 i=1

j 1
d X
X

(✓i⇤ ✓j⇤ )2

j=1 i=1

2

2

X✓ ⇤ ||22 + c(✓ ⇤ T ✓ ⇤ ) .

p
p
Now we define 4⇤ = [ c✓1⇤ u, · · · , c✓n⇤ u], where ✓i⇤ is the i-th element of ✓ ⇤ and u is defined
as:
u,

8
>
>
<

y X✓ ⇤
,
||y X✓ ⇤ ||2

if y 6= X✓ ⇤

>
>
:any vector with unit L2 norm, otherwise
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(8.23)

Then we have:
(X + 4)✓ ⇤ k22

max ky
42U

||y

(X + 4⇤ )✓ ⇤ ||22

=||y

X✓ ⇤

=||y

⇤

X✓

4⇤ ✓ ⇤ ||22
d
X
p
i=1

c|✓i⇤ |2 u||22

(u is in the same direction as y
=||y
=||y

8.6
8.6.1

X✓ ⇤ ||22

+ ||

d
X
p
i=1

(8.24)
X✓ ⇤ )

c|✓i⇤ |2 u||22

X✓ ⇤ ||22 + c(✓ ⇤ T ✓ ⇤ )

2

Experimental Results
Experimental Setup

As previously discussed, a dataset is represented by (X, y), where X is the feature matrix and
y is the vector of labels. We use (xj , yj ) to denote the j-th instance and its corresponding
label. The dataset is equally divided into a training set (Xtrain , ytrain ) and a testing set
(Xtest , ytest ). We conducted experiments on three datasets: Wine Quality (red wine),PDF
malware (PDF), and Boston Housing Market (Boston). The number of learners is set to
5. Due to space limitation the experimental results for the Boston dataset are included in
Appendix C.6.
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The Wine Quality dataset [18] contains 1599 instances and each instance has 11 features.
Those features are physicochemical and sensory measurements for wine. The response
variables are quality scores ranging from 0 to 10, where 10 represents for best quality and 0
for least quality. The PDF malware dataset consists of 18658 PDF files collected from the
internet. We employed an open-sourced tool mimicus 16 to extract 135 real-valued features
from PDF files [103]. We then applied peepdf 17 to score each PDF between 0 and 10, with a
higher score indicating greater likelihood of being malicious.
Throughout, we abbreviate our proposed approach as MLSG, and compare it to three other
algorithms: ordinary least squares (OLS ) regression, as well as Lasso, and Ridge regression
(Ridge). Lasso and Ridge are ordinary least square with L1 and L2 regularizers. In our
evaluation, we simulate the attacker for diﬀerent values of

(the probability that a given

instance is maliciously manipulated). The specific attack targets z vary depending on the
dataset; we discuss these below. For our evaluation, we compute model parameters (for the
equilibrium, in the case of MLSG) on training data. We then use test data to compute optimal
attacks, characterized by Eq. (8.6). Let X0test be the test feature matrix after adversarial
A
manipulation, ŷtest
the associated predicted labels on manipulated test data, ŷtest predicted

labels on untainted test data, and ytest the ground truth labels for test data. We use root
expected mean square error (RMSE) as an evaluation metric, where the expectation is
with respect to the probability
q
T
A
A
(ŷtest
ytest ) (ŷtest
ytest )+(1
N

16
17

of a particular instance being maliciously manipulated:

)(ŷtest ytest )T (ŷtest ytest )

https://github.com/srndic/mimicus
https://github.com/rohit-dua/peePDF
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, where N is the size of the test data.

8.6.2

The Red Wine Dataset

Recall that the response variables in red wine dataset are quality scores ranging from 0 to
10. We simulated an attacker whose target is to increase the overall scores of testing data.
In practice this could correspond to the scenario that wine sellers try to manipulate the
evaluation of third-party organizations. We formally define the attacker’s target as z = y + ,
where y is the ground-truth response variables and

is a real-valued vector representing the

diﬀerence between the attacker’s target and the ground-truth. Since the maximum score is
10, any element of z that is greater than 10 is clipped to 10. We define

to be homogeneous

(all elements are the same); generalization to heterogeneous values is direct. The mean and
standard deviation of y are µr = 5.64 and

r

= 0.81. We let

=5

r

⇥ 1, where 1 is a

vector with all elements equal to one. The intuition for this definition is to simulate the
generating process of adversarial data. Specifically, by setting the attacker’s target to an
unrealistic value (i.e. in current case outside the 3

r

of µr ), the generated adversarial data

0

X is supposed to be intrinsically diﬀerent from X. For ease of exposition we use the term
defender to refer to MLSG.
Remember that in Eq. ((8.11)) there are three hyper-parameters in the defender’s loss
function:

, , and z.

is the regularization coeﬃcient in the attacker’s loss function shown

in Eq. ((8.4)). It is negatively proportional to the attacker’s strength.

is the probability of a

test data being malicious. z is the predication targets of the attacker. In practice these three
hyper-parameters are externally set by the attacker. In the first experiment below we assume
the defender knows the values of these three hyper-parameters, which corresponds to the best
case. The result is shown in Figure 8.1. Each bar is averaged over 50 runs, where at each run
we randomly sampled training and test data. The regularization parameters of Lasso and
Ridge were selected by cross-validation. Figure 8.1 demonstrates that MLSG approximate
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Figure 8.1: RMSE of y0 and y on the red wine dataset. The defender knows , , and z.
equilibrium solution is significantly more robust than conventional linear regression learning,
with and without regularization.
In the second experiment we relaxed the assumption that the defender knows ,

and z, and

instead simulated the practical scenario that the defender obtains estimates for these (for
example, from historical attack data), but the estimates have error. We denote by ˆ = 0.5 and
ˆ = 0.8 the defender’s estimates of the true
of an instance being malicious and

and .18 Remember that

is the probability

is negatively proportional to the attacker’s strength.

So the estimation characterizes a pessimistic defender that is expecting very strong attacks.
We experimented with two kinds of estimation about z: 1) the defender overestimates z:
ẑ = y + t1, where t is a random variable sampled from a uniform distribution over [5 r , 10];
and 2) the defender underestimates z: ẑ = y + t1, where t is sampled from [0, 5 r ]. Here, we
only present the results for the latter; the former can be found in Appendix C.5. In Figure 8.2
the y-axis represents the actual values of , and the x-axis represents the actual values of .
The color bar on the right of each figure visualizes the average RMSE. Each cell is averaged
over 50 runs. The result shows that even if there is a discrepancy between the defender’s
18

We tried alternative values of ˆ and ˆ, and the results are consistent. We include these in Appendix C.5.
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Figure 8.2: The average RMSE across diﬀerent values of actual and on the red wine
dataset. Upper Left: MLSG; Upper Right: Lasso; Lower Left: Ridge; Lower Right: OLS.
estimation and the actual adversarial behavior, MLSG is consistently more robust than the
other approaches.

8.6.3

The PDF Dataset

The response variables of this dataset are malicious scores ranging between 0 and 10. The
mean and standard deviation of y are µp = 5.56 and

p

= 2.66. Instead of letting the

be

non-negative as in previous two datasets, the attacker’s target is to descrease the scores of
malicious PDFs. Consequently, we define

=

2

p

⇥ 1M , where M is the set of indices of

malicious PDF and 1M is a vector with only those elements indexed by M being one and
others being zero. Our experiments were conducted on a subset (3000 malicious PDF and
3000 benign PDF) randomly sampled from the original dataset. We evenly divided the subset
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Figure 8.3: RMSE of y0 and y on PDF dataset. The defender knows , , and z.
into training and testing sets. We applied PCA for dimensionality reduction of the data and
selected the top-10 principal components as features. The result for best case is displayed in
Figure 8.3. Notice that when
as

= 0, MLSG is less robust than Lasso. This is to be expected,

= 0 corresponds to non-adversarial data.

Similarly as before we relaxed the assumption that the defender knows ,
defender’s estimation of the true

and

and z and let the

be ˆ = 1.5 and ˆ = 0.5. We also experimented with

both overestimation and underestimation of z. The defender’s estimation is ẑ = y

t1M .

For overestimation setting t is sampled from [2 p , 3 p ], and for underestimation setting it
is sampled from [ p , 2 p ]. The result for underestimated ẑ is showed in Figure 8.4. Notice
that in the upper left plot of Figure 8.4 the area inside the blue rectangle corresponds to
those cases where ˆ and ˆ are overestimated and they are more robust than the remaining
underestimated cases. Similar patterns can be observed in Figure 8.2. This further supports
our claim that it is advantageous to overestimate adversarial behavior.
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Figure 8.4: The average RMSE across diﬀerent values of actual and on PDF dataset.
Upper Left: MLSG; Upper Right: Lasso; Lower Left: Ridge; Lower Right: OLS.

8.7

Conclusion

In this chapter, we study the problem of linear regression in adversarial settings involving
multiple learners learning from the same or similar data. In our model, learners first
simultaneously decide on their models (i.e., learn), and an attacker then modifies test
instances to cause predictions to err towards the attacker’s target. We first derive an upper
bound on the cost functions of all learners, and the resulting approximate game. We then
show that this game has a unique symmetric equilibrium, and present an approach for
computing this equilibrium by solving a convex optimization problem. Finally, we show
that the equilibrium is robust, both theoretically, and through an extensive experimental
evaluation.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion and Future Directions
This thesis focuses on the security problem of deploying machine learning systems in adversarial
settings. Starting with face recognition systems, we proposed FaceSec, a fine-grained
adversarial robustness evaluation framework in Chapter 3. FaceSec incorporates four
evaluation dimensions and can support evaluation of the vulnerability of diﬀerent components
of face recognition systems. Using FaceSec, we performed a comprehensive evaluation on
five publicly available face recognition systems in various adversarial settings, and obtain
some meaningful findings. We believe that FaceSec can serve as a useful framework to
advance future research of adversarial learning in a broad array of machine learning systems
in addition to face recognition.
Before moving toward our own defense approaches, we revisited robust ML that uses the
conventional feature-space attack models. In Chapter 4, we proposed a general methodological
framework for evaluating the validity of robust ML against real attacks. We showed that
in the context of PDF Malware detection, defense approaches based on these feature-space
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models may fail to yield ML models that are robust to realizable attacks. Our results suggest
that the practical usefulness of such approaches cannot be taken for granted.
To refine the feature-space attack model, we proposed to use conserved features in Chapter 5
to boost the robustness of feature-space models without compromising their mathematical
convenience. We showed that conserved features do exist, and once augmented with these
features, Robust ML exhibits generalizable robustness against multiple distinct realizable
attacks.
In addition to PDF malware detection, we also investigated adversarial robustness in image
classification. Specifically, in Chapter 6, we focused on cognitive modeling of non-salient
adversarial examples. We proposed the dual-perturbation attack, and showed that adversarial
training with our attack yields significantly greater generalizable robustness to diﬀerent `p
attacks and aligns better with human perception than conventional robust ML models. We
believe these properties make our method a promising candidate for improving adversarial
training, the robustness of which is typically limited when facing diﬀerent attacks.
After investigating robust ML models, we focused on deciding which of a large number of
alerts to choose for further investigation—often a necessary step in the detection pipeline. In
Chapter 7, we proposed a novel model and principled computational approach for robust alert
prioritization. The results showed that our method significantly outperforms non-strategic
approaches in nearly all cases, and prior strategic methods where these are feasible, even
when the assumptions of our threat model are violated. Our study reveals the benefits of
considering robustness of end-to-end systems when designing the full detection pipeline.
The last part of this thesis studied robust learning involving multiple learners and a single
attacker. In Chapter 8 we proposed a game-theoretic model for adversarial regression
with multiple learners. We showed that the proposed model has a unique pure-strategy
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Nash Equilibrium, which is theoretically and empirically robust in adversarial settings. We
envision that our work can serve as a useful framework to advance future research of robust
decentralized learning.
Looking ahead, there are several future research directions.
Identifying Robust Features. In Chapter 5, we have shown that the key to robust ML
against realizable attacks is the collection of conserved features. However, the proposed
method for identifying conserved features is quite heuristic and incurs a large amount of
execution time on classifiers that employ a vast number of features (e.g., ML-based android
malware detectors can have one million features). On the other hand, recent work has
shown that adversarial examples can be directly attributed to the presence of non-robust
features [49]. Several open problems can be explored: How can we automatically identify
robust features? Can we construct robust features from non-robust features, e.g., by using a
non-linear combination of those?
General Defense against Realizable Attacks in Image Classification. Previous
studies have shown that CNNs are often vulnerable to physically realizable attacks [25, 97].
Particularly, in Chapter 3, our systematic and comprehensive adversarial evaluation has shown
the vulnerability of each component of face recognition systems. While there is numerous
work on adversarial defense against realizable attacks in image classification, none of them
provides a general paradigm in various settings. For example, [122], the state-of-the-art
defense for face recognition only works on particular neural architectures and attacks (as
shown in Chapter 3). Therefore, there are pressing needs for designing a general approach
against such realizable attacks.
Robust Machine Learning Inspired by Cognitive Science. In Chapter 6, we have
shown that the performance of adversarial training can be significantly improved if augmented
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by cognitive science, and the resulting model aligns better with human perception than
conventional methods. This work motivates several new research questions. The first is how
we can eﬀectively and reliably identify the foreground of an image. Most fixation models work
on all objects, but they can fail to provide an accurate foreground. In contrast, semantic
segmentation methods can provide a more accurate partition of foreground and background,
but are limited to specific objects. This calls for a principled paradigm to achieve both
accuracy and generalizability. Second, how can we quantify suspiciousness? While we provide
the first model to do so, there may be more eﬀective ways.
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Appendix A
Supplement for Chapter 3

A.1
A.1.1

Robustness of Face Recognition Components
Open-Set Systems Under Dodging Attacks

To study the robustness of open-set system components under dodging attacks, we employ six
diﬀerent face recognition systems and then evaluate the attack success rates of dodging attacks
corresponding to diﬀerent target and surrogate face recognition models. Specifically, besides
the five systems (VGGFace, FaceNet, ArcFace18, ArcFace50, and ArcFace101) presented in
Table 3.4 of Chapter 3, we build a face recognition model by training FaceNet [95] using the
VGGFace2 dataset [12] (henceforth, FaceNet+). Here, FaceNet and FaceNet+ are trained
using the same neural architecture but diﬀerent training sets, while the ArcFace variations
share the same training data but with diﬀerent architectures. The results are presented in
Fig. A.1.
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Figure A.1: Attack success rate of dodging attacks with diﬀerent open-set target and surrogate
models. Upper left: PGD attack. Upper right: Eyeglass frame attack. Lower left: Sticker
attack. Lower right: Face mask attack.
We have the following two observations, which are similar to those observed from dodging
attacks on closed-set systems in the main paper. First, in most cases, an open-set system’s
neural architecture is more fragile than its training set. For example, under the PGD attack,
adversarial examples in response to FaceNet+ have a 94% success rate on FaceNet (which
is trained using the same architecture but diﬀerent training data), while the success rates
among the ArcFace systems (which are built with the same training set but diﬀerent neural
architectures) are only around 50%. However, there are also some cases where the neural
architecture exhibits similar robustness to the training set. For example, when black-box
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Table A.1: Attack success rate of impersonation attacks on closed-set face recognition systems
by the attacker’s system knowledge. Z represents zero knowledge, T is training set, A is
neural architecture, and F represents full knowledge.
Target System
VGGFace

FaceNet

ArcFace18

ArcFace50

ArcFace101

Attack Type
PGD
Eyeglass Frame
Sticker
Face Mask
PGD
Eyeglass Frame
Sticker
Face Mask
PGD
Eyeglass Frame
Sticker
Face Mask
PGD
Eyeglass Frame
Sticker
Face Mask
PGD
Eyeglass Frame
Sticker
Face Mask

Attacker’s
Z
T
0.11 0.21
0.01 0.01
0.00 0.00
0.00 0.01
0.23 0.32
0.00 0.00
0.01 0.00
0.00 0.00
0.18 0.25
0.01 0.01
0.00 0.00
0.01 0.01
0.13 0.15
0.02 0.02
0.00 0.00
0.01 0.01
0.14 0.16
0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00
0.01 0.01

System Knowledge
A
F
0.35
1.00
0.03
0.95
0.00
1.00
0.02
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.28
0.99
0.21
1.00
0.26
0.99
0.69
1.00
0.05
0.89
0.01
0.94
0.03
0.77
0.45
0.87
0.03
0.67
0.00
0.58
0.01
0.60
0.42
0.96
0.03
0.58
0.00
0.50
0.04
0.73

attacks are too weak (under sticker attack), both neural architecture and training set are
robust; when the attacks are too strong (under face mask attack), these two components
exhibit similar levels of vulnerability. Second, the grid-level face mask attack is considerably
more eﬀective than the PGD attack, and significantly more potent than other physically
realizable attacks. Like dodging attacks in closed-set settings, most black-box pixel-level
physically realizable attacks have relatively low transferability on open-set face recognition
systems, with only about 20% success rate.
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Figure A.2: Attack success rate of impersonation attacks with diﬀerent open-set target and
surrogate models. Upper left: PGD attack. Upper right: Eyeglass frame attack. Lower left:
Sticker attack. Lower right:Face mask attack.

A.1.2

Closed-Set Systems Under Impersonation Attacks

Here, we use impersonation attacks to evaluate the robustness of closed-set systems. In our
experiments, all the closed-set models are 100-class classifiers, as introduced in Section 3.3.
For any input face image x and its identity y 2 [0, 99], we let the target identity of the
impersonation attack to be yt = (y + 1)%100. An impersonation attack is successful only
when the resulting adversarial example is misclassified as the target identity yt . The results
are shown in Table A.1.
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We have two key findings. First, compared to Table 3.5 of Chapter 3, we observe that closedset systems are significantly more robust to impersonation attacks than dodging attacks.
Especially when an attacker has no accurate knowledge about the target system, the attack
success rate of physically realizable attacks can be as low as 0%. Second, it can be seen that
closed-set systems exhibit moderate robustness against digital impersonation attacks. In
such attacks, the knowledge of neural architecture is significantly more important than the
training set. For example, by knowing the neural architecture of ArcFace18, a PGD attack
can achieve a 69% success rate. In contrast, this rate drops to 25% when only the training
set is visible to the attacker.

A.1.3

Open-Set Systems Under Impersonation Attacks

To evaluate impersonation attacks on open-set systems, we randomly select 100 pairs from the
LFW dataset [47]. Each pair contains two face images corresponding to diﬀerent identities. We
let one image as the input x and the other as the target gallery image x⇤t . An impersonation
attack is successful only when the resulting adversarial example and x⇤t are verified as the
same identity. The experimental results are presented in Fig. A.2.
Similar to the impersonation attacks on closed-set systems, we have the following two
observations that are consistent with our previous summary. First, open-set systems are very
robust to black-box impersonation physically realizable attacks. In most cases, these attacks
can only achieve a success rate of less than 10%. In contrast, the PGD attack is significantly
more potent. And under this attack, the neural architecture is considerably more vulnerable
than the training set (e.g., comparing FaceNet variations to ArcFace models).
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A.2

Eﬃcacy of Using Momentum and Ensemble Models
in Transfer-based Attacks

Next, we evaluate the eﬃcacy of using momentum and ensemble-based surrogate models in
transfer-based dodging attacks. For a given closed-set target face recognition system, we
first train a surrogate model using the same training data. Specifically, we use both a single
surrogate trained on a diﬀerent architecture19 , and an ensembled surrogate by ensembling
the other four systems in the way described in Section 3.2 of the main paper. We then
produce white-box dodging attacks on the surrogate and evaluate the resulting examples’
attack success rate on the target model. For each attack, we compare the momentum method
(i.e., w/ mmt) and the conventional gradient-based approach (i.e., w/o mmt). The results
are shown in Table A.2, A.3, A.4, and A.5.
We have two key observations. First, both ensemble and momentum contribute to stronger
transferability, although in most cases, ensemble contributes more. For example, the ensemble
method can boost the transferability of PGD attacks on FaceNet by 31%, while the improvement by momentum is only about 10%. Second, the eﬃcacy of momentum and ensemble
models is highly dependent on the nature of perturbation. For digital attacks, these methods
combined can significantly improve transferability by up to 55%. In grid-level face mask
attacks, the improvement is as considerable as up to 16%. However, both methods can only
marginally boost the transferability of pixel-level realizable attacks. Especially in the sticker
attacks, the improvement is nearly negligible. We leave eﬀective transfer-based pixel-level
physically realizable attacks as an open problem for future research.

19

For a given target model, we trained four single surrogates corresponding to the other four architectures.
Below, we only present the result of the surrogate that has the highest attack success rate.
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Table A.2: Attack success rate of dodging PGD attacks on closed-set face recognition systems.
Here, only the target system’s training data is visible to the attacker, and we use diﬀerent
surrogate models.
Target System
VGGFace
FaceNet
ArcFace18
ArcFace50
ArcFace101

Surrogate System
Single
Ensemble
w/o mmt w/ mmt w/o mmt w/ mmt
0.08
0.16
0.43
0.51
0.42
0.52
0.73
0.83
0.42
0.51
0.87
0.92
0.35
0.55
0.86
0.90
0.32
0.39
0.71
0.78

Table A.3: Attack success rate of dodging eyeglass frame attacks on closed-set face recognition
systems. Here, only the target system’s training data is visible to the attacker, and we use
diﬀerent surrogate models.
Target System
VGGFace
FaceNet
ArcFace18
ArcFace50
ArcFace101

Surrogate System
Single
Ensemble
w/o mmt w/ mmt w/o mmt w/ mmt
0.17
0.22
0.26
0.28
0.08
0.09
0.14
0.16
0.02
0.03
0.05
0.06
0.05
0.05
0.10
0.12
0.02
0.03
0.02
0.03

Table A.4: Attack success rate of dodging sticker attacks on closed-set face recognition
systems. Here, only the target system’s training data is visible to the attacker, and we use
diﬀerent surrogate models.
Target System
VGGFace
FaceNet
ArcFace18
ArcFace50
ArcFace101

Surrogate System
Single
Ensemble
w/o mmt w/ mmt w/o mmt w/ mmt
0.02
0.02
0.06
0.06
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.04
0.04

[197]

Table A.5: Attack success rate of dodging face mask attacks on closed-set face recognition
systems. Here, only the target system’s training data is visible to the attacker, and we use
diﬀerent surrogate models.
Target System
VGGFace
FaceNet
ArcFace18
ArcFace50
ArcFace101

Surrogate System
Single
Ensemble
w/o mmt w/ mmt w/o mmt w/ mmt
0.18
0.26
0.20
0.32
0.26
0.38
0.42
0.42
0.21
0.33
0.21
0.33
0.28
0.34
0.36
0.36
0.22
0.34
0.30
0.36

Table A.6: Attack success rate of dodging attacks on open-set face recognition systems by
the universality of adversarial examples. Here, N represents the batch size of face images
that share a universal perturbation.
Target System
VGGFace

FaceNet

ArcFace18

ArcFace50

ArcFace101

Attack Type
PGD
Eyeglass Frame
Sticker
Face Mask
PGD
Eyeglass Frame
Sticker
Face Mask
PGD
Eyeglass Frame
Sticker
Face Mask
PGD
Eyeglass Frame
Sticker
Face Mask
PGD
Eyeglass Frame
Sticker
Face Mask

Attacker’s Capability
N=1 N=5 N=10 N=20
1.00
0.89
0.81
0.53
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.02
0.02
0.02
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.99
0.90
1.00
1.00
0.99
0.98
1.00
0.96
0.79
0.46
0.99
0.86
0.70
0.67
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.99
0.98
0.98
0.93
0.92
1.00
0.91
0.75
0.47
0.99
0.78
0.67
0.62
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.00
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.94
1.00
0.68
0.68
0.41
1.00
0.85
0.73
0.65
0.99
0.98
0.97
0.97
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
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A.3

Universal Attacks

Finally, we evaluate open-set systems under universal dodging attacks. The results are
shown in Table A.6. Compared to Table 3.7 of Chapter 3, we find that open-set systems
are significantly more fragile to universal perturbations of all types than their closed-set
counterparts. For example, when N = 20, universal sticker attacks on open-set ArcFace101
have a 97% success rate, but no success in closed-set settings. Moreover, we again observe
that the universal grid-level face mask attack is more eﬀective than the other perturbation
types. Here, we also find that the sticker attack is as potent as the face mask attack in
open-set settings.
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Appendix B
Supplement for Chapter 6

B.1

Alternative Approach for Modeling Suspiciousness

Our second method of modeling the suspiciousness S(x) of an input image x leverages
a recent computational model of image salience, DeepGaze II [55]. DeepGaze II outputs
predicted pixel-level density of human fixations on an image with the total density over the
entire image summing to 1. Our measure of relative salience of the foreground to background
P
is the foreground score, which is defined as S(x) = i2{k|F (x)k 6=0} si , where si is the saliency
score produced by DeepGaze II for pixel i of image x. Since foreground, as a fraction of

the image, tends to be around 50-60%, a score significantly higher than 0.5 indicates that
predicted human fixation is relatively localized to the foreground.
The above approach models background suspiciousness in a way that aligns with human
perception. One limitation should be noted: the DeepGaze II model is designed on nonadversarial data and can thus be attacked. This may lead to adversarial examples that have
a salient background but achieve a high foreground score. However, we empirically find that
[200]

the DeepGaze II model is generally robust to perturbed images in practice. In most cases,
our attack produces non-salient background when

6= 0 in Eq. (6.1) of Chapter 6 (e.g., see

Figure B.1).

Or iginal
Sample

For egr ound
Mask

Dual-per tur bation Dual-per tur bation
Example (
)
Example (
)

Figure B.1: An illustration of dual-perturbation attacks that leverages fixation prediction
to model suspiciousness. Adversarial examples are with large `1 perturbations on the
background (✏B = 20/255) and small `1 perturbations on the foreground (✏F = 4/255). A
parameter is used to control background salience explicitly. Our attack produces non-salient
background when 6= 0.

B.2
B.2.1

Datasets
Segment-6

The statistics of the Segment-6 dataset are displayed in Table B.1.

B.2.2

STL-10

The statistics of the STL-10 dataset are displayed in Table B.2.

B.2.3

ImageNet-10

The labels and number of images per class in the ImageNet-10 dataset are listed in Table B.3.
[201]

Table B.1: Number of samples in each class of the Segment-6 dataset.
Class
Train
Bird
Cat
Dog
Toilet
Clock
Total

Number of samples
Training Test
3,000
200
3,000
200
3,000
200
3,000
200
3,000
200
3,000
200
18,000
1,200

Table B.2: Number of samples in each class of the STL-10 dataset.
Class
Airplane
Bird
Car
Cat
Deer
Dog
Horse
Monkey
Ship
Truck
Total

Number of samples
Training Test
500
10
500
10
500
10
500
10
500
10
500
10
500
10
500
10
500
10
500
10
5,000
100

[202]

Table B.3: Number of samples in each class of the ImageNet-10 dataset.
Class
Airplane
Car
Cat
Dog
Truck
Elephant
Zebra
Bus
Bear
Bicycle
Total

Number of samples
Training Test
500
10
500
10
500
10
500
10
500
10
500
10
500
10
500
10
500
10
500
10
5,000
100
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B.3

Implementations

We implemented all the attack model, as well as the defense approaches in PyTorch20 , an opensource library for neural network learning. We used the ResNet34 model [38] and standard
transfer learning, as the datasets employed in our experiments do not have a suﬃcient amount
of data to achieve high accuracy. Specifically, we initialized the network with the model
pre-trained on ImageNet, reset the final fully connected layer, and added a normalization
layer in front of the ResNet34 model, which performs a channel-wise transformation of an
input by subtracting (0.485, 0.456, 0.406) (the mean of ImageNet) and then being divided
by (0.229, 0.224, 0.225) (the standard deviation of ImageNet);

21

then, we train the neural

networks as usual.
Unless otherwise specified, we used 60 epochs with training batch size 128 for Segment-6.
For STL-10 and ImageNet-10. we trained the classifiers for 20 epochs by using a batch size
of 64. We used Adam Optimizer [52] with initial learning rate of 10

4

for Clean, and 10

3

for

AT-PGD and AT-Dual, respectively. We dropped the learning rate by 0.1 every 20 epochs on
Segment-6, and similarly at the 8th and 15th epochs on STL-10 and ImageNet-10.
As mentioned above, we implemented PGD and dual-perturbation attacks, bounded by both
`1 and `2 norms, to evaluate robustness of a classification model, as well as to build robust
classifiers. For `1 attacks, when they were used for evaluation, they are performed with 20
steps; for training robust classifiers, these attacks were performed with 10 steps at each epoch
of adversarial training. Similarly, for `2 attacks, they were performed with 100 steps for
evaluation, and 50 steps for adversarial training. We used the semantic segmentation masks
20

Available at https://pytorch.org/.
To fit the Segment-6 dataset which contains much smaller images compared to ImageNet, we also reset
the first convolutional layer of the pre-trained ResNet34 model by reducing the kernel size from 7 ⇥ 7 to 3 ⇥ 3,
stride from 2 to 1, and pad from 3 to 1.
21
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on the Segment-6 dataset and used fixation prediction to identify foreground and backround
on STL-10 and ImageNet-10.

B.4

Adversarial Training Using `2 Attacks on STL-10

Here, we present experimental results of the robustness of classifiers that use adversarial
training with `2 norm attacks on STL-10. Specifically, we trained AT-PGD using `2 PGD
attack with ✏ = 1.0, and AT-Dual by using `2 dual-perturbation attack with {✏F , ✏B , } =
{1.0, 5.0, 0.0}. The results are shown in Figure B.2, B.3, B.4, and B.5.

Figure B.2: Saliency analysis. The `2 dual-perturbation attacks are performed by using
{✏F , ✏B } = {1.0, 5.0}, and a variety of displayed in the figure. Left: foreground scores of
dual-perturbation examples in response to diﬀerent classifiers. Right: accuracy of classifiers
on dual-perturbation examples with salience control.
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Figure B.3: Robustness to white-box `2 attacks on STL-10. Left: `2 dual-perturbation
attacks with diﬀerent foreground distortions. ✏B is fixed to be 5.0 and = 0.0005. Middle:
`2 dual-perturbation attacks with diﬀerent background distortions. ✏F is fixed to be 1.0 and
= 0.0005. Right: `2 PGD attacks.

Figure B.4: Robustness against adversarial examples transferred from other models on STL-10.
Left: `2 dual-perturbation attacks performed by using {✏F , ✏B , } = {1.0, 5.0, 0.0005} on
diﬀerent source models. Right: `2 PGD attacks with ✏ = 1.0 on diﬀerent source models.

Figure B.5: Robustness to additional white-box attacks on STL-10. Left: 20 steps of `1
PGD attacks. Middle left: 20 steps of `1 dual-perturbation attacks with diﬀerent foreground
distortions. ✏B is fixed to be 20/255 and = 0.0005. Middle right: 20 steps of `1 dualperturbation attacks with diﬀerent background distortions. ✏F is fixed to be 4/255 and
= 0.0005. Right: `0 JSMA attacks.
[206]

B.5

Adversarial Training Using `2 Attacks on Segment-6

Now, we present experimental results of the robustness of classifiers that use adversarial
training with `2 norm attacks on Segment-6. Since DeepGaze II only work on images with
more than 35 ⇥ 35 pixels, we are unable to use DeepGaze II to compute the foreground
score (FS) for Segment-6. Hence, in the following experiment on this dataset, we omit
the salience term in the optimization problem of Eq. (6.1) and Eq. (6.7) in Chapter 6.
Specifically, we trained AT-PGD using `2 PGD attack with ✏ = 0.5, and AT-Dual by using
`2 dual-perturbation attack with {✏F , ✏B } = {0.5, 2.5}. The results are shown in Figure B.6,
B.7, and B.8.

Figure B.6: Robustness to white-box `2 attacks on Segment-6. Left: `2 dual-perturbation
attacks with diﬀerent foreground and background distortions. Right: `2 PGD attacks.
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Figure B.7: Robustness against adversarial examples transferred from other models on
Segment-6. Left: `2 dual-perturbation attacks performed by using {✏F , ✏B } = {0.5, 2.5} on
diﬀerent source models. Right: `2 PGD attacks with ✏ = 0.5 on diﬀerent source models.

Figure B.8: Robustness to additional white-box attacks on Segment-6. Left: 20 steps of `1
PGD attacks. Middle: 20 steps of `1 dual-perturbation attacks with diﬀerent foreground
and background distortions. Right: `0 JSMA attacks.

B.6

Adversarial Training Using `1 Attacks on ImageNet10

Next, we present experimental results of the robustness of classifiers that use adversarial
training with `1 norm attacks on ImageNet-10. Specifically, we trained AT-PGD using
`1 PGD attack with ✏ = 4/255, and AT-Dual by using `1 dual-perturbation attack with
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{✏F , ✏B , } = {4/255, 20/255, 0.0}. The results are shown in Figure B.9, B.10, B.11, and
B.12.

Figure B.9: Saliency analysis. The `1 dual-perturbation attacks are performed by using
{✏F , ✏B } = {4/255, 20/255}, and a variety of displayed in the figure. Left: foreground
scores of dual-perturbation examples in response to diﬀerent classifiers. Right: accuracy of
classifiers on dual-perturbation examples with salience control.

Figure B.10: Robustness to white-box `1 attacks on ImageNet-10. Left: `1 dual-perturbation
attacks with diﬀerent foreground distortions. ✏B is fixed to be 20/255 and = 0.005. Middle:
`1 dual-perturbation attacks with diﬀerent background distortions. ✏F is fixed to be 4/255
and = 0.005. Right: `1 PGD attacks.
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Figure B.11: Robustness against adversarial examples transferred from other models
on ImageNet-10. Left: `1 dual-perturbation attacks performed by using {✏F , ✏B , } =
{4/255, 20/255, 0.005} on diﬀerent source models. Right: `1 PGD attacks with ✏ = 4/255 on
diﬀerent source models.

Figure B.12: Robustness to additional white-box attacks on ImageNet-10. Left: 100 steps
of `2 PGD attacks. Middle left: 100 steps of `2 dual-perturbation attacks with diﬀerent
foreground distortions. ✏B is fixed to be 2.0 and = 0.005. Middle right: 100 steps of `2
dual-perturbation attacks with diﬀerent background distortions. ✏F is fixed to be 20.0 and
= 0.005. Right: `0 JSMA attacks.

B.7

Adversarial Training Using `1 Attacks on STL-10

Now, we present experimental results of the robustness of classifiers that use adversarial
training with `1 norm attacks on STL-10. Specifically, we trained AT-PGD using `1
PGD attack with ✏ = 4/255, and AT-Dual by using `1 dual-perturbation attack with
{✏F , ✏B , } = {4/255, 20/255, 0.0}. The results are shown in Figure B.13, B.14, B.15, and
B.16.
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Figure B.13: Saliency analysis. The `1 dual-perturbation attacks are performed by using
{✏F , ✏B } = {4/255, 20/255}, and a variety of displayed in the figure. Left: foreground
scores of dual-perturbation examples in response to diﬀerent classifiers. Right: accuracy of
classifiers on dual-perturbation examples with salience control.

Figure B.14: Robustness to white-box `1 attacks on STL-10. Left: `1 dual-perturbation
attacks with diﬀerent foreground distortions. ✏B is fixed to be 20/255 and = 0.0005. Middle:
`1 dual-perturbation attacks with diﬀerent background distortions. ✏F is fixed to be 4/255
and = 0.0005. Right: `1 PGD attacks.
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Figure B.15: Robustness against adversarial examples transferred from other models
on STL-10. Left: `1 dual-perturbation attacks performed by using {✏F , ✏B , } =
{4/255, 20/255, 0.0005} on diﬀerent source models. Right: `1 PGD attacks with ✏ = 4/255
on diﬀerent source models.

Figure B.16: Robustness to additional white-box attacks on STL-10. Left: 100 steps of
`2 PGD attacks. Middle left: 100 steps of `2 dual-perturbation attacks with diﬀerent
foreground distortions. ✏B is fixed to be 5.0 and = 0.0005. Middle right: 100 steps of `2
dual-perturbation attacks with diﬀerent background distortions. ✏F is fixed to be 1.0 and
= 0.0005. Right: `0 JSMA attacks.
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B.8

Adversarial Training Using `1 Attacks on Segment-6

Finally, we present experimental results of the robustness of classifiers that use adversarial
training with `1 norm attacks on Segment-6. We trained AT-PGD using `1 PGD attack with ✏ = 8/255, and AT-Dual by using `1 dual-perturbation attack with {✏F , ✏B } =
{8/255, 40/255}. The results are shown in Figure B.17, B.18, and B.19.

Figure B.17: Robustness to white-box `1 attacks on Segment-6. Left: `1 dual-perturbation
attacks with diﬀerent foreground and background distortions. Right: `1 PGD attacks.
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Figure B.18: Robustness against adversarial examples transferred from other models
on Segment-6. Left: `1 dual-perturbation attacks performed by using {✏F , ✏B } =
{8/255, 40/255} on diﬀerent source models. Right: `1 PGD attacks with ✏ = 8/255 on
diﬀerent source models.

Figure B.19: Robustness to additional white-box attacks on Segment-6. Left: 100 steps of `2
PGD attacks. Middle: 100 steps of `2 dual-perturbation attacks with diﬀerent foreground
and background distortions. Right: `0 JSMA attacks.

B.9

Attacking Randomzied Classifiers

In addition to deterministic classifiers that make a deterministic prediction for a test sample,
our proposed attack can be adapted to stochastic classifiers that apply randomization at
training and prediction time. For example, for classifiers using randomized smoothing, we can
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refine Eq. (6.1) in Chapter 6 as follows:

max

|| F (x)||p ✏F ,
|| B(x)||p ✏B

where

2

E⌘⇠N (0,

2 I)

[L (h✓ (x +

+ ⌘), y) +

· S (x +

(B.1)

+ ⌘)],

is the variance of the Gaussian data augmentation in randomized smoothing. 22 The

optimization problem in Eq. (B.1) can be solved by the same approach used for deterministic
classifiers, with the following modification on Eq. (6.5) at the second step in Section 6.2.4:
8
>
>
<gF = G(F(x) r
>
>
:gB = G(B(x) r

B.9.1

E⌘ [L(h✓ (x +

(k)

E⌘ [L(h✓ (x +

(k)

(k)

(k)

+ ⌘), y) +
+ ⌘), y) +

·S x+

(k)

·S x+

(k)

+ ⌘ ])

.

(B.2)

+ ⌘ ])

Variance in Gaussian Data Augmentation

Table B.4 and B.5 show the eﬀectiveness of Randomized Smoothing (RS) against the proposed
dual-perturbation attack. Here, we use diﬀerent variances in Gaussian data augmentation of
RS, and fix the number of noise-corrupted copies at prediction time, n to be 100. It can be seen
that RS is generally fragile to the dual-perturbation attacks that are adapted to randomized
classifiers. Moreover, increasing , the variance used in Gaussian data augmentation can only
marginally improve adversarial robustness to dual-perturbation attacks while significantly
decrease accuracy on non-adversarial data.

B.9.2

Number of Samples with Gaussian Noise at Prediction Time

It has been observed that Randomized Smoothing (RS) can be computationally ineﬃcient
at prediction time as it uses a large number of noise-corrupted copies for each test sample
22

Note that the Gaussian perturbations are only used to compute the expection of loss and are not in the
resulting adversarial examples.
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Table B.4: Robustness of RS against `1 dual-perturbation attacks.
Dataset

Defense approach

Segment-6

RS, = 0.25
RS, = 0.5
RS, = 1

✏F = 0/255
71.4%
61.7%
47.7%

Attack Strength (✏B = 5 ⇥ ✏F )
✏F = 4/255 ✏F = 8/255 ✏F = 12/255
9.6%
0.4%
0.1%
13.7%
1.9%
0.6%
15.6%
2.8%
0.4%

✏F = 1
0.0%
0.2%
0.2%

Table B.5: Robustness of RS against `2 dual-perturbation attacks on Segment-6.
Defense approach
RS, = 0.25
RS, = 0.5
RS, = 1

✏F = 0
71.4%
61.7%
47.7%

Attack Strength (✏B = 5 ⇥ ✏F )
✏F = 0.25 ✏F = 0.5 ✏F = 0.75 ✏F = 1
29.7%
6.7%
0.9%
0.1%
31.6%
11.8%
3.1%
1.3%
28.2%
14.4%
6.0%
1.5%

at prediction time. It is natural to ask whether the prediction time of RS can be reduced
without significantly sacrificing adversarial robustness in practice. We answer this question
by studying the eﬀectiveness of RS with diﬀerent n, the numbers of noise-corrupted copies at
prediction time. Specifically, we fix

= 0.5 and set n to be 1, 25, and 100. Note that when

n = 1, there is no two-sided hypothesis test for prediction; thus, no abstentions are obtained.
Here we use `1 dual-perturbation attacks on RS for demonstration purposes. The results
are shown in Table B.6. It can be seen that when n = 25, the accuracy on both adversarial
and non-adversarial data can drop by up to 10% compared to RS using n = 100. The reason
is that under a small n, the prediction appears more likely to abstain. Interestingly, when
n = 1, the accuracy can be marginally improved compared to n = 100, with the prediction
time being reduced by 99%. This indicates that in practice, we would not lose accuracy
without using the two-sided hypothesis test at prediction time.
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Table B.6: Robustness of RS against `1 dual-perturbation attacks under diﬀerent numbers
of noise-corrupted copies at prediction time.
Dataset

Defense approach

Segment-6

RS, n = 1
RS, n = 25
RS, n = 100

✏F = 1
0.3%
0.0%
0.2%

Dog

Air plane

Tr uck

Elephant

Clean
AT-PGD

Clean
AT-PGD

Clean
AT-PGD

Segment-6

Tr uck

I nput

Bir d

STL -10

AT-Dual

Cat

I nput

Clock

I nput

Tr ain

AT-Dual

Attack Strength (✏B = 5 ⇥ ✏F )
✏F = 4/255 ✏F = 8/255 ✏F = 12/255
19.8%
3.2%
0.8%
9.1%
1.3%
0.5%
13.7%
1.9%
0.6%

Visualization of Loss Gradient

AT-Dual

B.10

✏F = 0/255
66.0%
49.4%
61.7%

I mageNet-10

Figure B.20: Visualization of loss gradient of diﬀerent classifiers with respect to pixels of
non-adversarial inputs. AT-PGD and AT-Dual were obtained using adversarial training with
corresponding `2 norm attacks.

B.11

Examples of Dual-Perturbation Attacks
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Or iginal
Sample

Dual
Dual
Per tur bation Per tur bation

Segment-6

Or iginal
Sample

Dual
Dual
Per tur bation Per tur bation

STL -10

Or iginal
Sample

Dual
Dual
Per tur bation Per tur bation

I mageNet-10

Figure B.21: Dual-perturbation attacks. Adversarial examples are produced in response to
the Clean model for each dataset.
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Appendix C
Supplement for Chapter 8

C.1

Proof of Lemma 2

Proof.

1. First, we prove that An = I +

Pn

i=1

✓i ✓i> is invertible, and its inverse matrix,

An 1 , is positive definite by using mathematical induction.
When n = 1, A1 = I + ✓1 ✓1> . As I is an invertible square matrix and ✓1 is a column
vector, by using Sherman-Morrison formula, A1 is invertible.
A1 1 =

1

(I

✓1 ✓1>
).
+ ✓1> ✓1

For any non-zero column vector u, we have
u> A1 1 u =

u> u + u> u✓1> ✓1 u> ✓1 ✓1> u
.
( + ✓1> ✓1 )
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As u> u > 0 and

> 0, according to Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
u> u✓1> ✓1

u> ✓1 ✓1> u,

Then, u> A1 1 u > 0. Thus, A1 1 is a positive definite matrix.
We then assume that when n = k(k

1), Ak is invertible and Ak 1 is positive definite.

Then, when n = k + 1,
>
Ak+1 = Ak + ✓k+1 ✓k+1
.

As Ak is invertible, ✓k+1 is a column vector. By using Sherman-Morrison formula, we
have that Ak+1 is invertible, and
1
Ak+1
= Ak 1

>
Ak 1 ✓k+1 ✓k+1
Ak 1
.
>
1 + ✓k+1
Ak 1 ✓k+1

Then,
1
u> Ak+1
u=

>
>
u> Ak 1 u + u> Ak 1 u · ✓k+1
Ak 1 ✓k+1 u> Ak 1 ✓k+1 · ✓k+1
Ak 1 u
>
1 + ✓k+1
Ak 1 ✓k+1

>
As Ak 1 is a positive definite matrix, we have u> Ak 1 u > 0 and ✓k+1
Ak 1 ✓k+1 > 0. By

using Extended Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have
>
>
u> Ak 1 u✓k+1
Ak 1 ✓k+1 > u> Ak 1 ✓k+1 ✓k+1
Ak 1 u.

1
Then, Ak+1
is positive definite. Hence, An = I +

positive definite. Similarly, we can prove that A
definite.
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Pn

i=1

i

✓i ✓i> is invertible, and An 1 is

is invertible, and A

1
i

is positive

2. We have proved that An and A

i

are invertible. Then, the result can be obtained by

using Sherman-Morrison formula.
3. Let A

i, j

=A

i

✓j ✓j> . As A

i, j

is a symmetric matrix, its inverse, A

1
i, j

symmetric. Using a similar approach to the one above, we can prove that A
invertible and A

1
i, j

is also
i, j

is

is positive definite. By using Sherman-Morrison formula, we have

A

1
i

=A

1
i, j

A
1

1
1
>
i, j ✓j ✓j A i, j
.
+ ✓j> A 1i, j ✓j

Then,
✓i> A 1i ✓i

=

1
1
>
i, j ✓j · ✓j A i, j ✓i
1 + ✓j> A 1i, j ✓j
(✓i> A 1i, j ✓j )2
1 + ✓j> A 1i, j ✓j

✓i> A

✓i> A 1i, j ✓i

= ✓i> A

1
i, j ✓i

 ✓i> A

1
i, j ✓i .

We then iteratively apply Sherman-Morrison formula and get
✓i> A 1i ✓i  ✓i> A0 1 ✓i
=
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1

✓i> ✓i .

C.2

Proof of Lemma 3

Proof. Firstly, by using Sherman-Morrison formula we have
X⇤ ✓ i = B n An 1 ✓ i
= (B

i

+

z✓i> )(A 1i

= B i A 1i ✓i +
=
=

(B

A 1i ✓i ✓i> A 1i
)✓i
1 + ✓i> A 1i ✓i

z✓i> A 1i ✓i B i A 1i ✓i ✓i> A 1i ✓i
1 + ✓i> A 1i ✓i

+ z✓i> )A 1i ✓i
1 + ✓i> A 1i ✓i
i

Bn A 1i ✓i
.
1 + ✓i> A 1i ✓i

Then,
Bn A 1i ✓i
`(X ✓i , y) = ||
1 + ✓i> A 1i ✓i
⇤

y||22

Bn A 1i ✓i y ✓i> A 1i ✓i y 2
= ||
||2
1 + ✓i> A 1i ✓i
 ||Bn A 1i ✓i
= ||(B

i

y

✓i> A 1i ✓i y||22

+ z✓i> )A 1i ✓i

= ||B i A 1i ✓i

y + (z

 `(B i A 1i ✓i , y) + ||z
By using Lemma 2, we have (✓i> A 1i ✓i )2 

1
2

y

✓i> A 1i ✓i y||22

y)✓i> A 1i ✓i ||22
y||22 (✓i> A 1i ✓i )2

(✓i> ✓i )2 which completes the proof.
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C.3

Proof of Theorem 2

Proof. As presented in Lemma 3, we have
1

`(X⇤ ✓i , y)  `(B i A 1i ✓i , y) +

2

||z

y||22 (✓i> ✓i )2 .

By using Sherman-Morrison formula,
`(B i A

1
i ✓i , y)

= ||B i (A
 ||

B
1+

A

1
i, j

1

1
1
>
i, j ✓j ✓j A i, j
)✓i
+ ✓j> A 1i, j ✓j

1
i A i, j ✓i
✓j> A 1i, j ✓j

y||22

y||22 + 41 (✓)

where j 6= i, and 41 (✓) is a continuous function of ✓ = {✓i }ni=1 . As the action space ⇥ is
bounded, then 0  41 (✓) < 1. Hence, we have
`(B i A 1i ✓i , y)  ||
= ||

1
i, j ✓i
>
1 + ✓j A 1i, j ✓j
B i A 1i, j ✓i y

B iA

1+

 ||B i A
= ||(B

i, j

1
i, j ✓i

y||22 + 41 (✓)
✓j> A

1
i, j ✓j y

✓j> A 1i, j ✓j
✓j> A

y

+ z✓j> )A

1
2
i, j ✓j y||2

1
i, j ✓i

= ||(B

1
i, j A i, j ✓i

 `(B

1
i, j A i, j ✓i , y)

y) + (z

+ 41 (✓)

✓j> A

y

+ ||(z

||22 + 41 (✓)

y)✓j> A

1
2
i, j ✓j y||2
1
i, j ✓i

y)||22 (✓j> A
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+ 41 (✓)

+ ✓j> A>i, j (✓i

1
2
i, j ✓i )

+ 42 (✓)

✓j )y||22 + 41 (✓)

where 42 (✓) is a continuous function of ✓ and 0  42 (✓) < 1. Let A
then, similarly, (✓j> A

1
2
i, j ✓i )

(✓j> A 1i, j ✓i )2

i, j, k

=A

i, j

✓k ✓k> ,

can be further relaxed as follows.

=

 (✓j> A

1
1
>
i, j, k ✓k ✓k A i, j, k
)✓i )2
1
>
1 + ✓k A i, j, k ✓k

A

(✓j> (A 1i, j, k
1
2
i, j, k ✓i )

+ 43 (✓)

where 0  43 (✓) < 1, using the same approach,(✓j> A

1
2
i, j ✓i )

can be further and iteratively

relaxed as follows,
(✓j> A

1
2
i, j ✓i )

 (✓j> A0 1 ✓i )2 + 44 (✓)
1

=

2

(✓j> ✓i )2 + 44 (✓)

where 0  44 (✓) < 1. Combining the results above, we can iteratively relax `(B i A 1i ✓i , y)
as follows,
`(B i A 1i ✓i , y)  `(B

1
i, j A i, j ✓i , y)

 `(X✓i , y) +

1
2

||z

1

||z y||22 (✓j> ✓i )2 + 45 (✓)
X
y||22
(✓j> ✓i )2 + 4(✓)
+

2

j6=i

where 0  45 (✓) < 1 and 0  4(✓) < 1. Then,
`(X⇤ ✓i , y)  `(B i A 1i ✓i , y) +
 `(X✓i , y) +

1
2

||z
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1
2

||z

y||22

y||22 (✓i> ✓i )2
n
X
j=1

(✓j> ✓i )2 + 4(✓).

Hence,
ci (✓i , ✓ i ) = `(X⇤ ✓i , y) + (1
 `(X✓i , y) +
where ✏ is a constant such that ✏ =

C.4

2

||z

)`(X✓i , y)
y||22

n
X

(✓j> ✓i )2 + ✏

j=1

⇤ max✓ {4(✓)} < 1.

Proof of Theorem 4

Proof. We have known that hN , ⇥, (e
ci )i has at least NE, and each learner has an nonempty,
compact and convex action space ⇥. Hence, we can apply Theorem 2 and Theorem 6 of [92].
P
That is, for some fixed {ri }ni (0 < ri < 1, ni=1 ri = 1), if the matrix in Eq. (C.1) is positive
definite, then hN , ⇥, (e
ci )i has a unique NE.
2

3

c1 (✓) . . . r1 r✓1 ,✓n e
c1 (✓) 7
6 r1 r✓1 ,✓1 e
6
7
..
..
7
Jr(✓) = 6
.
.
6
7
4
5
rn r✓n ,✓1 e
cn (✓) . . . rn r✓n ,✓n e
cn (✓)

(C.1)

By taking second-order derivatives, we have

and

r✓i ,✓i e
ci (✓) = 2X> X +

2 ||z

r✓i ,✓j e
ci (✓) =

y||22
2

(4✓i ✓i> + 2✓i> ✓i I +

X
j6=i

2 ||z

y||22
2
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(✓i> ✓j I + ✓j ✓i> )

✓j ✓j> )

We first let r1 = r2 = ... = rn =

1
n

Jr(✓) =

and decompose Jr(✓) as follows,
2
2 ||z y||22
P+
(Q + S + T),
2n
n

(C.2)

where P and Q are block diagonal matrices such that Pii = X> X, Pij = 0, Qii = 4✓i ✓i> +
✓i> ✓i I and Qij = 0, 8i, j 2 N , j 6= i. S and T are block symmetric matrices such that
P
Sii = ✓i> ✓i I, Sij = ✓i> ✓j I, Tii = j6=i ✓j ✓j> and Tij = ✓j ✓i> , 8i, j 2 N , j 6= i.
Next, we prove that P is positive definite, and Q, S and T are positive semi-definite. Let
> >
d⇥1
u = [u>
(i 2 N ) are not all zero vectors.
1 , ..., un ] be an nd ⇥ 1 vector, where ui 2 R

1. u> Pu =

Pn

i=1

>
u>
i X Xui =

Pn

i=1

||Xui ||22 . As the columns of X are linearly indepen-

dent and ui are not all zero vectors, there exists at least one ui such that Xui 6= 0.
Hence, u> Pu > 0 which indicates that P is positive definite.
2. Similarly, u> Qu

0 which indicates that Q is a positive semi-definite matrix.

3. Let’s S⇤ 2 Rn⇥n be a symmetric matrix such that S⇤ii = ✓i> ✓i and S⇤ij = ✓i> ✓j , 8i, j 2
N , j 6= i. Hence, Sij = S⇤ij I, 8i, j 2 N . Note that S⇤ = [✓1 , ✓2 , ..., ✓n ]> [✓1 , ✓2 , ..., ✓n ] is
a positive semi-definite matrix, as it is also symmetric, there exists at least one lower
triangular matrix L⇤ 2 Rn⇥n with non-negative diagonal elements [41] such that
S⇤ = L⇤ L⇤ > (Cholesky Decomposition)
Let L be a block matrix such that Lij = L⇤ij I, 8i, j 2 N . Therefore, (LL> )ij =
(L⇤ L⇤ > )ij I = S⇤ij I = Sij which indicates that S = LL> is a positive semi-definite
matrix.
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4. Since
>

u Tu =
=

n X
X

2
(u>
i ✓j )

i=1 j6=i
n X
X
i=1

+

n X
X

>
(u>
i ✓j )(uj ✓i )

i=1 j6=i

1
1 > 2
2
>
>
[ (u>
i ✓j ) + (uj ✓i ) + (ui ✓j )(uj ✓i )]
2
2
j6=i

n

1 XX >
2
=
(u ✓j + u>
j ✓i )
2 i=1 j6=i i
0,
T is a positive semi-definite matrix.

Combining the results above, Jr(✓) is a positive definite matrix which indicates that
hN , ⇥, (e
ci )i has a unique NE. As Theorem 3 points out, the game has at least one symmetric
NE. Therefore, the NE is unique and must be symmetric.

C.5

Supplementary Results for The Red Wine Dataset

Figure C.1: Overestimated z, ˆ = 0.5, ˆ = 0.8.The average RMSE across diﬀerent values of
actual and on the redwine dataset. From left to right: MLSG, Lasso, Ridge, OLS.
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Figure C.2: Overestimated z, ˆ = 1.5, ˆ = 0.8. The average RMSE across diﬀerent values of
actual and on the red wine dataset. From left to right: MLSG, Lasso, Ridge, OLS.

Figure C.3: Underestimated z, ˆ = 1.5, ˆ = 0.8. The average RMSE across diﬀerent values
of actual and on the red wine dataset. From left to right: MLSG, Lasso, Ridge, OLS.
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C.6

Supplementary Results for The Boston Dataset

0

Figure C.4: The defender knows , , and z. RMSE of y and y on the Boston dataset. The
defender knows , , and z.

Figure C.5: Overestimated z, ˆ = 0.3, ˆ = 0.8. The average RMSE across diﬀerent values of
actual and on the Boston dataset. From left to right: MLSG, Lasso, Ridge, OLS.
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Figure C.6: Underestimated z, ˆ = 0.3, ˆ = 0.8. The average RMSE across diﬀerent values
of actual and on the Boston dataset. From left to right: MLSG, Lasso, Ridge, OLS.

C.7

Supplementary Results for The PDF dataset

Figure C.7: Overestimated z, ˆ = 1.5, ˆ = 0.5. The average RMSE across diﬀerent values of
actual and on PDF dataset. From left to right: MLSG, Lasso, Ridge, OLS.
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